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One of the most fascinating aspects of 19th 
century social history is the adaptability and the capacity 
for survival shown by many of Britain*s landed families. 
Admittedly they were increasingly moving on to the defens­
ive. By the end of the century their collective social and 
political influence had undergone considerable erosion and 
their economic supremacy was under challenge. Indeed, by 
the end of the Great War, British society was fast moving 
into an age in which the landed aristocracy was no longer 
the dominant force it had once been.
Nevertheless, the experience of Britain’s 
landed elite was not one of sudden decline and collapse; 
rather it took the form of a gradual eclipse. Indeed, if 
the overall position of landed society in 1914 was consider­
ably weaker than it had been a hundred years before, then 
it was still remarkably impressive for all that. Certainly 
the wealth of the aristocratic leadership was even more 
prodigious than ever. In this respect, industrialisation 
did not just create a new generation of Lancashire "worthies 
it also reinforced at least the financial standing of long- 
established families. In fact, by the end of the century, 
Lancashire’s leading magnates - Derby, Sefton, Devonshire, 
Wilton - were probably the wealthiest single group in the 
county. In much the same way the profits from business and 
urban property shored up the position of lesser landowners 
as well including, for instance, the Blundells, La thorns, 
Scarisbricks and Lilfords. However, the end of the 19th 
century also saw the contraction and, in some cases, the
(ii)
complete break-up of numerous Lancashire estates. In other 
words, landowners were travelling down two roads simultan­
eously during the course of the century — some to survival 
and others to oblivion.
Within this broad context this study justifies 
itself in several important ways. So far, little detailed 
work has been done on Lancashire landowners of the 19th 
century. This is all the more surprising considering the 
scale of economic change that took place, in a county where 
so much of the land was concentrated into relatively few 
hands. Hopefully, this study will go some way towards fill­
ing that gap. More especially, what follows re-examines 
aspects of landed behaviour; how, in fact, landowners 
related to the changes that were taking place around them.
In certain respects it ventures qualifications to established 
interpretation and, in doing so# makes extensive use of new 
evidence.
For the most part the thesis concentrates on 
the Clifton estate based at Lytham on the south Fylde. There 
was nothing particularly exceptional about the estate. In 
many ways it was rather typical, but that is what makes it 
interesting. It was a large ancestral property running to 
about 16,000 acres, mainly agricultural in character, yet 
increasingly caught up in urban and commercial developments. 
As such, the estate provides a valuable insight into chang­
ing social and economic attitudes. The Clifton estate, 
however, is not considered in isolation. Where appropriate 
comparisons are drawn with the experience of other land­
owners within the region and nationwide.
(iii)
The Clifton estate was one of those estates 
which failed to survive the rigours of economic change 
intact. In their case, the size of their landholding and 
its potential, at least in terms of business diversification, 
did not grant them immunity against financial disaster. In 
short, this suggests that much more is involved in explain­
ing the predicament many.landowners found themselves in at 
the end of the 19th century, than just the scale of their 
property and business assets. This is the theme taken up 
by the first two chapters. Chapter I looks specifically at 
landed incomes, the contribution made by non-agricultural 
sources and, most importantly, the motives which shaped 
landowners1 attitudes towards income and investment.
Incomes, of course, cannot be considered in isolation. 
Therefore Chapter II examines the spending habits of 
Lancashire landowners and the extent to which they were 
inclined towards debt-accumulating expenditure. It also 
suggests that the landowners* spending and their readiness 
to borrow money reflected their enduring confidence in the 
stability of their own social and financial position right 
up to the closing decades of the century.
However, in a county and in an age of rapid 
economic change, landowners were clearly presented with 
widening opportunities to exploit the resources of their 
estates. This is the theme for Chapter III, which deals 
with estate management and the respective roles of landowner 
and agent in managing and directing business affairs. It 
again poses the question as to the extent to which landowners 
in general, identified with the complexities and purposes
(iv)
of 19th century business management.
Chapter IV is concerned with agriculture and 
agricultural improvement and it brings together several 
themes which run through this study. Despite widening non- 
agri cultural investment most landowners were still financ­
ially dependent on their agricultural property; on a personal 
level, many identified most strongly with land and agricult­
ure; and they were sufficiently sure of themselves to embark 
on ambitious and expensive improvement schemes throughout 
the second and third quarters of the century.
Chapter V therefore examines the impact of 
the "great agricultural depression" on landowners who had 
spent heavily on their estates, who were still largely 
dependent on income from agriculture and who were also faced 
with the problem of mounting debt in a period when their 
revenue from farm rents began to stagnate and, in some cases, 
even contract. In this respect, it is argued that the late 
19th century depression had much more serious social and 
financial repercussions for Lancashire landowners them has 
previously been supposed.
Chapter VI focuses more sharply on the Clifton 
estate for the purpose of showing how changing economic and 
financial circumstances in the closing decades of the 
century eventually brought about a fundamental shift in the 
way in which urban property on one estate was both regarded 
and managed.
The closing chapter has a strong social 
theme to it. It first of all explains that the estate was
(v)
not o^st a financial unit but that it had an important 
social dimension to it as well. In other words, for much 
of the 19th century the landed elite, through their 
territorial dominance, exercised a powerful hold over social, 
political and administrative life outside the county*s 
industrial towns. Yet, by the end of the period, their 
collective power had been seriously undermined because of 
their weakened financial position, the fast diminishing 
relevance of their social role and the intervention of 
statutory authority. As such, Lancashire*s landed society 
survived into the new century but in a very much different 
guise.
f
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CHAPTER I
LAND, LANDOWNERS AND LANDED WEALTH
In September 1842 James Fair, land agent to 
the Clifton estate, wrote a glowing letter to the family 
solicitors, Wilson and Rawstome. It expressed a buoyant 
mood of confidence. An extensive scheme of agricultural 
improvements was under way, rents were fully paid up, there 
was the prospect of further territorial expansion in the ' 
offing with the purchase of Sir Peter Hesketh-Fleetwood’s 
neighbouring Great Marton estate, and a respectable surplus 
had been deposited with the bankers. 9
On the 6th February, 1886 Thomas Fair, who
had succeeded his father in managing the Clifton estate,
received a letter from the same family solicitors. This
letter, however, forecast a very different future. "With
£400,000 charged on the estates producing £36,000 per year
in addition to £5,000 a year annuities and the present
agricultural depression11, it was pointed out, "there is
little inducement to buy But, if W. Gladstone has not
in the meantime distributed a large area among the labourers,
it will be a great question, when young Clifton comes of age,
(2)whether you ought not to sell”. 9 It was a rhetorical 
question to which there could be only one real answer.
Property had to go if the estate was to be rescued from the 
brink of bankruptcy. Great Marton was the first portion to 
come under the auctioneer’s hammer and the wheels were set 
in motion in the break-up of a great landed estate.
I
This picture of contrasting fortunes is signifi
- 2 -
ant for a number of reasons. Clearly the end of the century 
marked a crucial turning point in the financial circumstances 
of one of Lancashire’s leading landed families. But, more 
importantly, it also marked a shift in the way in which the 
resources of the estate were to be managed. From 1900 
onwards the Cliftons were principally regarded as urban 
landlords and developers. In the mid-nineteenth century 
however, their reputation had been based on their ancestral 
ownership of extensive green acres and of a model agricult­
ural estate. In other words, a radical economic re-think 
took place as the 19th century approached its end. The 
realisation dawned that agricultural land did not pay either 
financially or socially as it once had. Instead, investment 
of a completely different kind, notably building investment, 
offered greater rewards and greater security. Above all, 
it was finally appreciated that the estate could be rescued 
from imminent insolvency only through ruthless accounting 
and business methods.
The events of the 1880s and the onset of the 
"great agricultural depression" dealt a massive blow to 
landed confidence. Of course, the Clifton estate, like 
many others, had run up against financial difficulties and 
problems in the past. There had been previous occasions 
when farm rentals had faltered and arrears had begun to pile 
up. Such was the case in the late 1840s and early 1850s, 
or following the bad winter of 1868; but then landowners and 
agents had reassured themselves that agriculture was basic­
ally sound and the problems would cure themselves in time.
If, for instance, current income suffered a shortfall then 
the estate could usually borrow its way out of trouble.
- 3 -
Not so in the 1880s. The crisis then was of a fundament­
ally different order. As farm rents began to stagnate and 
mounting arrears and abatements began to deplete current 
income the burden of debts and family settlements, so 
confidently accumulated in the past, now became an unbear­
able millstone. In short, the Cliftons and, one suspects, 
many other landowners became trapped in a vicious circle 
from which they found it impossible to escape without resort 
to drastic measures. Income was inadequate to satisfy 
current expenditure. Falling land values made it difficult 
to placate existing creditors let alone find new ones who 
were prepared to advance more money to cover mounting 
deficits. How then was the expensive life-style of a lead­
ing county family to be maintained? How were new sources 
of income to be generated and how was this to be achieved 
without incurring still greater debt?
But the change of emphasis from an agricult­
ural to an urban interest did not take place overnight.
And a principal theme of this introductory chapter is the 
way in which many landowners and agents clung tenaciously 
to deep-seated notions about the primacy and respectability • 
of land as against non-agricultural ventures, even on estates 
where non-agricultural opportunities were embraced early and 
eagerly. In the case of the Cliftons it took the desperate 
days of the late 19th century depression to awaken a 
keener interest in the urban side of their estate. They 
could no longer afford to let the agricultural domain take 
precedence in the way it once had. Instead they now 
handled their Blackpool property with a more lively commer­
cial awareness. The expansion of Lytham and the new resort
- 4 -
at St. Annes was seen as vital, whereas previously it had 
seemed that the estate was not unduly disturbed by the 
fact that both towns had struggled along in the shadow of 
burgeoning Blackpool and Southport.
Until the 1880s, such a drastic course of 
action involving the sale of land and a shift in business 
priorities would have been unthinkable. And this suggests 
that the business behaviour of a great landowner was. not 
always governed by an overriding concern for profit. Just 
as important in many cases were considerations of a social 
nature. As Professor Spring has pointed out in connection 
with the 19th century aristocracy, "much of what they did, 
and especially what they said, cannot be expressed quantit- 
atively."w/ But impressions of landowners1 attitudes 
towards the getting of wealth have been gathered largely 
from statistical sources and biographical sketches. On this 
basis Professor Ward, in his study of Ayrshire landowners, 
concluded that he was dealing with men of commendable 
versatility. Their collective experience, he pointed out, 
"cut across the whole spectrum of political, social and 
economic activity - as farmers, politicians, mineral devel- • 
opers, transport pioneers, patrons, businessmen, harbour 
builders, socialites, scholars, sportsmen, merchants and 
military men."^ Should we draw the same conclusions about 
Lancashire landowners? After all, it is difficult to think 
of a Lancashire town under industrial transformation or a 
railway line or canal under construction which did not have 
any connection with an established landed family. Or is 
this too simplistic a view? Was there, in fact, a wider 
spectrum of motive and attitude among landowners? Certainly
Professor Mingay came to the conclusion that it is impossible 
to generalise about the behaviour of landowners* They 
followed so many individual routes which, for him, reflected 
their bewildering "inadequacy before the mounting manif­
estations of the new industrial s o c i e t y " . S o m e  clearly 
embraced new business opportunities with all the enthusiasmf
of middle-class entrepreneurs. Some may have simply got 
caught up in the tide of economic expansion. But when we 
look at such cases, "would it not be a mistake", as Prof­
essor Thompson has indicated "to conclude that the simple 
fact of a spread of economic interest necessarily made an 
aristocrat feel any identification with industrialists or 
sympathy with middle-class objectives?"Moving to the 
other extreme, still more may have deliberately turned their 
backs on the pursuit of maximum profit, even when presented 
with the opportunity, content to lead the life of "country 
gentlemen" divorced from any participating association with 
the world of commerce and industry.
Nevertheless, at first sight it would appear 
that numerous landowners, both resident in Lancashire and 
non-resident, reaped considerable financial rewards from 
industrialisation. Bateman’s monumental catalogue of 
British landowners and estates, despite all its recognised 
shortcomings and inaccuracies, has at least enabled hist­
orians to identify landowners with non-agri cultural interests 
and provided a measure of the wealth to be derived from 
business sources/7  ^ For not a few the fortunes to be made 
from even a modest number of well-placed acres were of 
staggering proportions.
The large landowners, particularly in the
-  6 -
southern parts of the county, were clearly better placed 
to take advantage of 19th century industrial and urban 
development. The fortune of the Earls of Wilton, for 
instance, stemmed from the establishment of a separate 
branch of the Egerton family at Heaton Hall, north Manchester, 
in 1801 and from the purchase of numerous properties in the 
neighbouring townships of Prestwich, Crumpsall and Radcliffe 
during the first quarter, of the 19th century/8' There- 
after, the explosion in urban and mining development ' 
established the Wiltons as one of the wealthiest families 
in the county. In 1882 their agent claimed that the estate 
was worth £65,000 a year though the account books suggest 
that this was a somewhat exaggerated figure. Nevertheless, 
there can be no mistaking the impressive climb in rentals 
throughout the century. In 1825 current income amounted 
to £19,100 p.a. By 1873/4 this figure had swollen to 
£41,100 and most parts of the estate had at least doubled 
their revenue. The rate of increase then slackened though 
the accounts showed a very healthy gross income of almost 
£64,000 in 1894/9'
Urban estate also underpinned the Scaris- 
brick fortune. By any standards their wealth was of 
aristocratic proportions. Moreover, Charles Scarisbrick 
was one of Lancashire*s most substantial landowners. At 
the time of his death in 1860 he owned in excess of 30,000 
acres stretching across North Meols, Scarisbrick, Eccleston, 
Wrightington, Wigan, Halsall and Downholland. But his most 
crucial acquisition was the land he purchased in 1842/3 
which formed the heart of Southport*s future development.
It was the Southport property which Scarisbrick settled on
his "three illegitimate children and it was they who became 
beneficiaries of their father*s foresight and business 
acumen. On the eve of his death building land on the North 
Meols estate produced only £685 whereas farm rents produced 
over £7,500. Yet, from the 1870s onwards ground rents 
moved upwards at astonishing speed and accounted for the 
greater part of the £22,270 income which was drawn in 1902. 
This growth in income is all the more remarkable when set 
against the fact that between 1884 and 1908, £261,000 worth 
of property in the town was sold off.^0^
Of course no brief survey of aristocratic
wealth in the county would be complete without a mention of
the Earls of Derby. Their immense wealth was connected with
spiralling urban rents, particularly in the later 19th
century* Certainly there were landowners like the Dukes of
Richmond, Buccleuch and Sutherland who could boast of
larger estates but none were more valuable than the 70,000
acres which the 17th Earl inherited in 1908. Derby*s
agricultural estates alone were worth over £163,000 in 1876.
But, by the turn of the century, the rents from residential
and commercial property in Liverpool, Manchester, Salford,
Bolton and Bury had pushed up the Earl*s gross income to
(11}the princely sum of £300,000 a year. Similarly, the
industrial expansion of Barrow-in-Pumess produced even 
more spectacular results for the Dukes of Devonshire. In 
view of the family's financial predicament in the late 
1850s it could not have come at a more opportune moment.
Then, interest charges on current debts were soaking away 
4096 of their gross annual income. By contrast, dividend 
payments from Barrow's ship-building yards, steel company and
- 8 -
the Furness Railway pushed up estate income from £120,00 p. a.
in the 1850s to a peak of £310,000 in 1874 and, consequently,
the costs of servicing debt fell back to 16% of the annual 
(12)return.v y Mining and property interests were also the 
making of the Earls of Lilford. Their fortune was founded 
on the industrial development taking place on their mid- 
Lancashire estates of Atherton, Westhoughton and Leigh, 
where rentals more than doubled between 1836 and 1892.^^
These landed notables were not exceptional 
in having sizeable and strategically well-situated estates 
which enabled them to take full advantage of industrialis­
ation and urbanisation. They had their equivalents outside 
Lancashire. The Earls of Calthorpe, for instance, whose 
aristocratic life-style and influence was sustained, not by 
green agricultural acres, but by middle-class demand for 
houses on their urban estate at Edgbaston.^^ And, just 
as Barrow restored the financial health of the Dukes of 
Devonshire, South Wales coal and the growth of Cardiff1 s 
docks did much the same for the Earl of Bute’s. In 1822 
Bute’s Glamorgan estates produced an income of £9,400 and 
that was almost entirely made up of agricultural rents. By • 
1868 gross receipts stood at over £109,500 and farm rents 
accounted for only 7.6% of that f i g u r e . T h e  Earl of 
Crawford and Balcarres of Haigh Hall, Wigan, derived an 
income of £39,250 from the surrounding coalfields. Yet his 
coal receipts pale into insignificance when set against the 
£113,800 which the Duke of Hamilton was reputed to be making 
from his own coal interests at the end of the century, or 
the Duke of Northumberland’s £82,450.^^
- 9 -
Moreover, the financial benefits of indust­
rialisation reached down to the lower ranks of landed 
society. Just a few Lancashire acres where mining or build­
ing developments were taking place could mean all the 
difference between modest comfort and prestigious wealth 
or between success and failure in a landowner’s efforts to 
hoist himself up the ladder of county society. The rise 
of the Weld-Blundells, squires of Ince-Blundell Hall near 
Liverpool, stemmed from the growth of one of Southport’s 
most fashionable suburbs on their Birkdale property. In 
1859 ground rents accounted for an insignificant £435 a year
out of a total yearly income of £9,500. By 1876 the Weld-
(17)Blundell estates were said to be worth £60,000 p.a. ' 
Residential building in Southport also took place on 
Charles Hesketh’s North Meols property. Once again urban­
isation revived the flagging financial fortunes of a small 
landed family. In 1842 debt put such heavy pressure on 
current income that only £871 was left out of a total rental 
of £3,900 once service charges and outgoings had been met. 
The following year Hesketh was forced into selling a part 
of his Southport property to the Scarisbricks, yet the 
remaining portions yielded a return which Hesketh could 
never in his wildest dreams have imagined or anticipated.
By 1905 the Heskeths were largely urban landlords, the 
owners of a highly lucrative asset and the beneficiaries 
of a £12,500 income/18'
Urban rents and coal royalties in particular 
could produce spectacular rewards for a handful of land­
owners whose estates were small yet fortuitously located.
The Cotham family, for instance, were small landowners
- 10 -
from Claughton on the Fylde. Whereas their agricultural
rents showed little significant improvement during the 19th
century, their coal interests realised over £20,000 over a
twenty year period after 1847. When the coal ran out they
no doubt found some compensation in their St. Helens ground
rents which increased from £1,670 in 1870 to £4,114 by
1898.^^ Likewise, between 1860 and 1880, ground rents-
and mining royalties swelled the income of the Anderton
family who owned a number of scattered properties in Chorley
and surrounding villages. Leasehold property in Chorley
also accounted for more than half of the income produced
by the Cunliffe-Grundy estates.  ^ Coal on William Bankes*
2,400 acre Winstanley estate brought him over £14,100 p.a.
By contrast, his 69,000 acres in Ross-shire produced a
rental of just £2,463 in 1883. Others did better still.
James Deakin of Warrington Park, Launceston, would have
remained a modest west country squire had it not been for
the £16,000 a year he received from the one-hundred acres
he owned in Lancashire. Mine rents in Lancashire provided
John Leigh with £25,000 p.a. and allowed him to live in
comfort on his small Kent estate. But the accolade must
surely go to John Shaw whose one Lancashire acre was said
to be worth £2,263 p.a. which was half what his 9,000 acres
(2 2)in Cheshire-and Ross-shire could produce.v 3
Clearly this is an impressive catalogue of 
achievement to which other success stories could be added. 
Yet it would be easy, and at the same time, misleading to 
generalise out of these bald statistical statements, 
suggesting that landowners generally adopted a coldly 
commercial attitude in the matter of making money or that
- 11-
the whole of landed society in the county was carried 
along, in one way or another, on a flood tide of industrial 
and urban profits. Firstly, that would be to exaggerate 
the contribution which non-agri cultural investments made 
to the total incomes of landed families. Secondly, and 
perhaps more importantly, it would deny the influence of 
other considerations, largely of a social nature, which 
clearly played some part in how individual landowners, 
regarded business and the management of their estates. For 
instance, they did not all share Scarisbrick’s strong 
entrepreneurial impulse by seizing on whatever means came 
to hand of increasing personal income. In some cases other 
matters may have outweighed the pursuit of profit. Indiv­
idual landowners still set great store by the fact that, 
first and foremost, they were the trustees of ancestral 
properties and the guardians of established traditions and 
values. Land and agriculture were what had mattered in the 
past and still continued to do so. An agricultural estate 
carried pre-eminent status, influence and social esteem in 
a way in which commerce and industry did not. So, as long 
as land was able to provide, however modestly, as long as 
it continued to matter socially and politically, then land­
owners might be persuaded to reject business options - at 
least those which involved a radical shift in emphasis away 
from land - preferring to fill the more conventional role 
of owners of the soil. What is clear is that there is a 
need to part the statistical veil and to get at the person­
alities who lie behind it. Accordingly, the following 
case studies attempt a deeper insight into the complexity
- 12 -
of motives which shaped landowners* attitudes in the 
financial management of their estates. Only then can a
more realistic composite picture he built up.
II
At first sight it would again be easy to
assume that the Cliftons were swept along on the same
rising tide of business opportunity. During the course of
the 19th century they became linked with a number of 
ventures, including the commercial operations of the Ribble 
Navigation Company and principally resort development at 
Lytham st. Annes and Blackpool. Yet this should not 
obscure the fact that, above all, the Cliftons were the 
ancestral owners of one of Lancashire*s largest agricult­
ural estates; 16,000 acres stretching across the south 
Fylde from Clifton-with-Salwick in the east to Lytham in 
the west. Moreover, it is this single fact of ownership 
which carried the greatest influence and,as will become 
apparent, only gradually and as financial pressures built 
up did attention move away from land and agriculture to 
focus on other and potentially more lucrative sources of 
income.
When Thomas Clifton came into his inherit­
ance in 1832 there were strong financial reasons as well 
as social imperatives why he personally looked no further 
than the customary agricultural rent-roll to sustain his 
family*s position. There were no crippling family debts 
to clear or past extravagances to put right which might 
have impelled him to hurriedly diversify his business 
i n t e r e s t s . j n fact the Clifton*s financial position
- 13 -
was healthy enough. The current account was buoyant and 
there seemed to be every prospect that income would continue 
to improve. In 1832 farm rents from the 16,000 acre 
estate contributed £18,000 out of a total income of £24,862. 
Kirkham tithe and rack rents, leased from Christ Church 
Oxford, made up £5,550 of the remainder. Unfortunately, 
information on the level of expenditure is somewhat limited, 
but it is clear that the debt burden at this stage could 
not have made any threatening inroads into current income. 
Interest payments amounted to £4,152 of which at least 
two-thirds went towards servicing the unavoidable costs of 
the £65,000 which Thomas Clifton*s father settled on the 
younger members of his family. Even so, taken together, 
interest charges, family allowances and annuities 
totalled £7,403* which left a very wide margin indeed to 
cater for the costs of maintenance and improvements on the 
estate.
By any standards, then, Thomas Clifton
enjoyed a very respectable income, which had been inflated
by rising agricultural prices in the late 18th and early
19th centuries when farm rentals had kept pace with the
movement in prices. Rents were generally 40-50% higher in
1790 compared with their levels in mid-century. During the
Napoleonic wars further increases of up to 100% were not
uncommon as growing market demand, mediocre seasons and an
inelastic supply system forced up the price of agricultural
( 251produce and with it farm rentals.v The Cliftons shared 
handsomely in the upwards spiral in rents. In 1748 their 
rent roll amounted to £2,230 p.a. In 1785 it stood at
- 14 -
£3,049 but receipts had expanded to £15,167 by 1812 and 
£21,245 in 1822.
In part this sharp increase in income can 
also be explained by the reorganisation of farm units, the 
revision of a number of life-leases and the reclamation 
and enclosure of land on Lytham, Salwick and Layton mosses£2^  
Moreover, the Cliftons has been busy in the land market 
which, in the early 19th century, was as buoyant as agric­
ultural rents, and favoured the substantial landowner over 
the smaller owner-occupier. The modest freeholder had 
limited scope for implementing improved farming practices, 
he was less resilient in the face of the occasional bad 
harvest, and inflated land values, allied to the persistent
persuasion of a much bigger neighbour, made selling up a
( 28)highly attractive proposition^ ' So, from the early
decades of the 19th century, the Cliftons embarked on a
relentless campaign to expand and consolidate their
territorial influence. There is no doubt that the capital
was there. Much of it could be found out of the current
account in view of the fact that virtually every year
seemed to produce an impressive cash surplus. The Cliftons
were therefore able to forge ahead with two purchases in
1804, amounting to 200 customary acres, which virtually
(2Q)completed their hold oyer Little Marton.x At the same 
time pieces of Great Marton were gradually nibbled away 
as land in that parish came on to the market. Immediately 
after 1815 attention switched to neighbouring Warton with 
the acquisition of a string of properties whose former 
owners clearly found Clifton money more attractive
- 15-
than the uncertainties of the post-war recession. By far 
the largest purchase here was the Starky-Hopwood estate 
bought at a cost of £8,440 in 1818. It marked the onset 
of a spending spree in Warton which did not cease until
1885/ 30)
The period after 1815 did not mark a sudden
collapse in fortunes. They were not years of ffgeneral and
persistent gloom1 as was once thought. Admittedly,
landowners had to deal with moments of crisis in the early
1820s and again in the late 1840s and early 50s. But,
taking the period 1815 to 1845, rents generally remained
level and, in some instances, showed a steady increase.
The only severe years were 1821-5 when the cold winds of
delation were blowing. On the Clifton estate arrears shot
up to £8,422 by 1821 and rent reductions of between 20 and
25% were made over the following two years. Yet, by 1825,
arrears had been substantially reduced and rents were
(12)returning to their former level.w  J Rent movements on 
other estates followed a similar pattern. Receipts on the 
Derby, Sefton and Hesketh estates had fully recovered by 
the late 1820s though it would seem that the improvement in 
rents on the smaller estates was delayed until the mid- 
1830s.^3) • Nevertheless, in a thirty year period after 
1815, the farm rents belonging to many landowners continued 
to move steadily upwards and some recorded considerable 
increases. The Clifton rent-roll rose by some 24% between 
1813 and 1832, and this was far from being untypical. 
Increases on the Derby estate amounted to 27% over a similar 
period and the Earl of Sefton*s farm income grew by 20%. 
Lesser landowners also saw their rents increase though not
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by the same proportion* Over the shorter period of 1819 
to 1835 there was an increase in rentals, of 17% on the 
Blundell estate at Crosby and the Ffaringtons* at Worden 
Hall, Leyland.^^
This general increase in gross rentals cannot 
be put down to the engrossment of estates or urban develop­
ment. The land which the. Cliftons purchased in Marton and 
Warton certainly helped to inflate their rent-roll. But 
the income they derived from property in Lytham - thatched 
cottages in the main - would have been a marginal signif­
icance. For the most part, therefore, their improved 
income stemmed from the steady rise in farm rents across 
the agricultural e s t a t e . T h e  Derby accounts confirm 
the same trend. All but one of Derby’s six agricultural 
estates in west Lancashire produced an increase in rents 
from 1815 to 1835, and additional property purchased over 
the same period will account for only a tenth of the overall 
27% rise in r e c e i p t s . A n d  on the other estates where 
increased rents are recorded there is no evidence of 
additional land purchases having taken place.
There was no compelling reason, then, why a 
landowner like Thomas Clifton should have shifted his 
attention towards other sources of income. Agriculture paid. 
The returns were far from being dazzling but they were sound 
and respectable. Moreover, there is a more general danger 
of exaggerating the contribution which business and indust­
rial investment made to landed incomes even in Lancashire. 
Very few landowners, in fact, were in a position to forego 
their agricultural estates. Lord Derby is exceptional in
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the way in which urban and industrial profits assumed an 
increasing proportion of his total income. In any case 
it was almost inevitable that the character of Derby’s 
income should change, without any positive encouragement 
on his part, considering the exceptional size and the 
strategic location of his estates. Even so, despite the 
fact that urban rents leaped ahead during the first decades 
of the 19th century, they accounted for only 32% of 
Lord Derby’s total rentals in 1835*^^ Moreover, apart 
from the great mine owning and urban landlords like the 
Derbys, Seftons, Wiltons and Devonshires, most Lancashire 
landowners did not derive a consistent or even an impress­
ively high income from their non-agricultural investments.
Admittedly, the return on urban property 
qould be spectacular but it was often slow to mature.
Other business concerns also produced results which may not 
always have come up to initial expectations. For instance, 
investment in railway projects must have been a largely 
unproductive exercise. Too many lines, built at too great 
a cost and competing for too small a volume of traffic must 
at best have meant low dividends for investors dazzled by 
the railway euphoria of the 1840s. The London and North- 
Western was one among many companies which briefly bathed 
in the prosperity of the mid-Victorian boom and then slid 
into deep recession by the late 1870s and 80s as working 
costs began to swamp receipts.w  ' Consequently, William 
Garnett of Quernmore incurred heavy losses on virtually 
all his considerable railway investments from the mid-l850s 
o n w a r d s . T h e  Cliftons themselves were connected with 
several local lines. They made sizeable sums out of the
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sale of land to the railway companies but shares and stock
amounted to little more than a liability. "Risky and
unnecessary" summed up Thomas Cliftonfs verdict on the
estatefs involvement. Dividends paid by the Preston
and Wyre Railway Company, who built the lines to Fleetwood,
Lytham and Blackpool between 1840 and 1846, were poor apart
from the years when the railway was actually under construct- 
(41)ion. y True to form, the Lytham-Blackpool line, built 
between 1861 and 1863, was bedevilled by excessive costs 
and unanticipated debts. The estate had to come to the 
Company’s rescue on two occasions, 1864 and 1877, by buying 
further stock and shares and suffered a financial loss in 
doing so.^^
Industrial investment was not always any 
less hazardous. Many Lancashire estates had connections 
with mining, yet very few landowners could afford to regard 
coal as the mainstay of their incomes. Whilst the rewards 
could sometimes be impressive, they were often short-lived.
In fact, industrial gross revenues probably rose faster 
than purely agricultural incomes up to the late 1870s, but 
they also fell faster thereafter. This was the experience 
of landowners in Staffordshire where a sharp fall in 
industrial income set in by the early 1880s. The same
trend is apparent in Lancashire and it had the effect of 
bringing the central importance of farm rents into sharper 
focus. The Heskeths of Rufford Hall, for instance, had 
exhausted their coal revenues by the 1870s. At the same 
time the trustees to the Anderton estate, near Chorley, 
made hurried investments in repairs and improvements on the
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agricultural estate following the collapse of their coal
.,, r 44)
royalties. Similarly, until the third quarter of the
century, urban rents and coal royalties in particular had 
been the making of the Lilfords family fortune. Yet, after 
1880, income from these sources levelled out and on 
occasions pitched downwards. As a result, Lilford’s 
purely agricultural estate at Bank Hall took on much more 
than just a cosmetic importance. By 1890 farm rents 
accounted for more than 60% of estate income. Indeed the 
slide in coal revenues was such that agricultural land, 
despite all its problems, came to be regarded as sufficiently 
attractive an investment for Lilford to extend to his Bank 
Hall estate in the mid-1880s.
Furthermore, not every business venture was 
paved with gold. The losses could be just as spectacular 
as the profits. Thomas Clifton was well aware of the mis­
fortune which had fallen on other landowners in their 
pursuit of sudden wealth. Indeed the desperate position 
into which Sir Peter Hesketh-Fleetwood fell may well have 
contributed to Clifton’s own lack-lustre attitude towards 
urban development. In the 1830s Hesketh-Fleetwood 
committed everything he had to creating a port and resort 
at the mouth of the River Wyre. His vision of the new 
town of Fleetwood turned into a personal nightmare.
Financing the Preston-Wyre railway and laying out the 
ground plan of the town brought him debts of £104,000 by 
1840. And another £100,000 still had to be found for 
further railway works. In desperation he had to sell his 
North Meols estate to his brother, Charles Hesketh, in 1841 
though the proceeds would never have been enough to save
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him from bankruptcy. By the 1850s Sir Peter was reduced 
to sending begging letters to his brother. Perhaps he had 
no other choice since Fleetwood’s ground rents, amounting 
to only £877 in 1857, did not even go half way towards 
meeting interest charges on outstanding d e b t s . M i n i n g  
also had its landed casualities. The Braddylls of Sarnies— 
bury Hall are a case in point. They ran up debts totalling 
£271,000 by 1847. Part can be explained by inept and . 
fraudulent management and by the costs of building an 
imposing second seat at Conishead Priory in Furness. But 
by far the heaviest spending went into numerous collieries 
which mostly generated debt rather than profits. Conseq­
uently, Braddyll was compelled to sell off most of his 
estates culminating in the auction of Samlesbury Hall 
itself in 1862
Finally, it is worth pointing out that even 
among landowners who had a growing dependence on non- 
agricultural sources of income, there were those for whom 
no element of choice was involved. No positive decisions 
needed to be taken. Not every landowner had the same room 
for manoeuvre as the Cliftons or the Scarisbricks in 
deciding where to concentrate priority and resources. Even 
if they had*, one wonders just how many would have acted 
with quite the same business acumen as Charles Scarisbrick, 
who tried his hand at a wide variety of ventures - paint- 
works, lead and slate quarries, canals, railways - and who 
finally settled the once barren wastes of Southport on his 
three illegitimate children on the shrewd assumption that 
urbanisation would provide them with a handsome return in 
the future. More became involved in industry or property
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speculation simply because this was their only route to 
wealth and fortune. The Earls of Calthorpe, for instance, 
derived an aristocratic fortune to match their aristocratic 
status from Birminghamfs select residential suburb of 
Edgbaston, But for them, as their agents sensibly recog­
nised, Edgbaston was the Calthorpes* only asset of income 
producing potential.
The same was true of the Earls of Lilford. 
Until they inherited the extensive Bank Hall estate in 1860 
the Lilford*s landholdings were of a modest size. It was 
their good fortune, however, that their properties in 
Atherton, Westhoughton and Leigh were located on the coal­
fields of central Lancashire and that they also straddled 
what became the railway crossroads of the c o u n t y . I n  
much the same way the Weld-Blundell family enthusiastically 
welcomed the interest which building speculators took in 
the agriculturally unproductive wastes of Formby and 
Birkdale. For them it came as a miraculous change in 
circumstance. In 1810 Charles Blundell had inherited the 
poorer part of the family’s ancestral estates. As a result 
of bad feeling between himself and his father 6,000 much 
more valuable acres in Lostock, Anderton, Adlington and 
Horwich had been settled on Charles* two sisters. Charles 
himself was left with one valuable estate at Ince-Blundell, 
the barren sands along the coast and a significantly 
inferior income. Little wonder, then, that Blundell’s 
successors readily took on the role of urban landlords/50 ^ 
Finally, the Earls of Wilton on their north Manchester 
estates could not have withstood the spreading tide of
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urbanisation. From the outset much of their property was 
characterised by terraced housing not green pastures. ^ 51 ^
Landowners responded to widening sources of 
income in a variety of ways# It was by no means inevitable 
that they should have snatched at every business opportunity 
that came their way. Clearly there were some who did. 
Scarisbrick and Hesketh-Fleetwood are two examples of land­
owners who took the positive entrepreneurial decision to 
depart from a dependency on the customary agricultural 
rent-roll. Yet for others like Lords Lilford and Wilton, 
as was surely the case with the Earls of Calthorpe at 
Edgbaston, from a strictly financial point of view there 
existed no real alternative to encouraging industrial and 
urban development, if they were to equip their aristocratic 
titles with wealth of aristocratic proportions. Finally 
there was the broad band of landowners who became caught up, 
not unwillingly, in the business and commercial worlds 
though not to the extent that it devalued the social or 
financial importance they attached to their agricultural 
interests. Clifton and Lord Derby were just two among many 
who, as Professor Thompson has pointed out, "were fortunate 
enough to possess mineral and urban resources (and) exploited
them or allowed them to be exploited simply because it was
(52)
the sensible thing to do." And no more than that.v
So far the one other vital influence affecting •
landowners1 attitudes towards exploiting the resources of 
their estates has been neglected and is worth exploring 
further. A landowner’s concern to improve his income could 
and did conflict with imperatives of a social nature.
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Indeed, at times, there seems to have been a distinct 
ambivalence about landed behaviour. For some it was 
clearly the case that land and agriculture mattered to the 
extent that they were prepared to disassociate themselves 
from any other kind of investment and even suffer a 
potential loss of income as a result.
The celebrated Cokes of Norfolk are a perfect 
example of a landed family for whom the traditional concerns 
of landownership carried greatest weight. Nothing was 
allowed to detract from their plans to expand and improve 
their Norfolk estates. So, to meet the costs involved, 
their urban properties were sold off between 1786 and 1804. 
Consequently they casually passed over the rich potential 
of their Manchester and London properties. The conclusions 
drawn by Coke’s biographer are worth stating in full.
"Coke," he wrote, "like other English landowners, used his 
estates not only as a money-making asset but as the found­
ation for social prestige and political importance in the 
county... .The search for profit was tempered by the search 
for deference and esteem, at any rate from the articulate 
and prosperous sections of rural society."' Clearly 
the same social impulses were very much at work by the 
middle of the 19th century. This, for instance, was 
apparent in the way in which Sir James Graham handled his 
own finances. In his case the crippling costs of servicing 
large debts and the expense of repair and improvement work 
on his Netherby estate left him with a net income of only 
£7,000 a year out of a gross rental of £21,000. It would 
have made greater financial sense, as his agent pointed 
out, to have sold a part of the estate, cleared the debts
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and invested any residue more wisely. But more was at stake 
than money and no land was ever sold/5Zf^ Similarly, Lord 
Calthorpe’s financial future might have been very different 
indeed had he given way to temptations to relinquish his urban 
estate. In 1823 he seriously contemplated exchanging the 
lucrative potential of Edgbaston for the prestige and influence 
which 11,000 acres in Suffolk might have bestowed. In fact,- 
it needed all the powers of persuasion which Calthorpe*s agent 
could muster to reassert business priorities over his master’s 
social and political impulses and convince him that suburban 
Edgbaston would more effectively pay the family’s way in the 
world.
Social considerations, then, could sometimes 
cloud a landowner’s financial perceptions, all the more so in 
the case of individuals striving to haul themselves into the 
upper echelons of landed society. Case studies of two 
Lancashire landowners make this very clear.
Lawrence Rawstome is an interesting figure 
because of his family’s early connections with urban and 
industrial development in the county and because Rawstome 
himself, sometimes with gay abandon, chose to devote most of 
his time and energy to pursuing the life-style of a convent­
ional landed figure. By the end of the 17th century the 
Rawstoraes themselves were already well-established among the 
broad base of Lancashire’s landed families. As well as being 
Lords of the Manor of Farington they also owned estates at New 
Hal}., Raws tens tall, and Hutton Hall, just south of the River 
Ribble at Preston. From then on a whole series of Rawstoraes
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can be found supplying J.P.s, Deputy-Lieutenants, Colonels in 
the local militia and active political campaigners in the 
Borough of Preston/-^
By 1810 Rawstome was clearly intent on 
expanding his territorial influence. He set about purchasing 
an estate in Penwortham adjacent to his own property at Hutton 
Hall. His decision to do so was influenced by social ambitions 
as much as anything else. Scattered properties in Hutton, 
Preston, Farington and Rawstenstall brought him a comfortable 
income but collectively they did not afford the social merits 
of a compact estate. An engrossed estate comprising Hutton 
and Penwortham would achieve this. However, the costs were 
high. £92,000 was needed to buy the land and plans to rebuild 
Penwortham Priory as the new family seat worked out at a 
further £20,000. Some of the expense was to be offset by sell­
ing off detached properties elsewhere including holdings on 
Farington Moss and in Broughton, houses and building plots 
in Preston and agricultural land and textile mills in the 
Rossendale Valley in east Lancashire. He anticipated that 
these sales would realise £81,00.0 "leaving a debt of about 
£30,000 with a rental much increased (and) a compact and 
improveable estate."
However Rawstome ran into difficulties from 
the outset. He failed to find immediate buyers for his urban 
and industrial properties and current income fell well short 
of matching the level of expenditure on servicing interest 
charges on his debts and on making further additions to his 
newly created estate. But an inadequate income did not deter
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Rawstorne from pursuing every opportunity for territorial 
expansion or from crowning his estate with a sufficiently 
imposing seat. So part of his Farington land which he orig­
inally intended to sell off, was kept in reserve with a view 
to making an exchange with the Ffaringtons of Worden Hall for 
their Penwortham property. Moreover Rawstome’s spending did 
not stop there. In various efforts to consolidate his hold 
over Hutton and Penwortham £3,150 was spent on acquiring a 
large farm in Hutton in 1813, £1,100 on land near Penwortham 
Bridge in 1825 and a further £1,000 on a farm adjacent to 
Penwortham Priory in 1826. In addition, £1,870 went on exten­
sions and improvements to Hutton Hall, whilst Penwortham Priory 
itself was closed in 1825 for an extra £8,000 worth of renov­
ations. Of course all this had to he paid for and the money 
came not from the sale of other property but largely from 
Rawstome*s own bankers. By 1815 his debts still stood at 
£97,000. Consequently, taxes and interest charges swallowed 
all but £2*636 out of a total income of £8,921 and a part of 
that was needed for repairs and maintenance on the estate.
Nevertheless, as his diary makes clear, 
problems of income did little to dent Rawstome*s confidence.
He livecfthe life-style of the country gentleman to the full.
He spent the greater part of 1812 touring Scotland and study­
ing Scottish farming methods, he carried out the duties of 
High-Sheriff of Lancashire in .1814 and, in 1816/7 he went on 
the socially obligatory "Grand Tour" of Europe. He was in an 
even more buoyant mood on his return. "I am now looking 
forward," he wrote, "to a change in my situation which is 
likely to lead to new objects and new interests. The knowledge
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■thus attained confirms me in the resolution of directing my 
thoughts and actions to those objects of public and private 
good which belong to the sphere in which I move*” But this 
change in circumstances had nothing to do with business.
Raws tome's solution to his financial problems lay through the 
time-honoured device of marrying into money. Unfortunately, 
marriage arrangements never got any further than the lawyer's 
office, where this potentially lucrative match foundered on the 
matter of the marriage settlement.
However nothing seemed to change Rawstome' s 
casual attitude towards managing his finances. By 1820 his 
income had grown to £10,500 a year but his spending more than 
kept pace. By 1821 annual expenditure was running at £1,000 
above his income. He was compelled to continue his borrowing 
and so in 1824, he consolidated all his debts into a £100,000 
loan from the Bank of England. Yet this did not mark the end 
to Rawstome*s mounting debts. In 1827 he had to borrow a 
further £3,000 from his Preston bankers just to cover current 
interest charges. And in 1832 he had to raise another £5,000 
to pay off his sister's portion. It was enough to deflate 
even Rawstome's own confidence. ”1 have quite determined to 
live off my income,” he soberly reflected, ”and if I cannot do 
it in any other way I shall break up and go away next year.” 
But, like Sir James Graham at Netherby, that was always a last 
and drastic course of action to take. In fact strict account­
ing and household economies saved the day and, by 1842, there 
was a significant improvement in his real income to the extent 
that he was able to boast about having "£1,000 in hand at the 
bank.” Passing years clearly imposed their own restraining
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hand, and yet Rawstome never shook off the relentless impulse 
to enhance his own landed status. One of the last notes in 
his diary proudly recorded another foray into the land market
Lawrence Rawstome*s career is closely 
paralleled by that of William Garnett of Quernmore near Lan­
caster, Garnett, Like Rawstome, was motivated by the same 
ambitious pursuit of land, status and standing in county 
society to the point that it involved making considerable 
financial sacrifices. The one major difference between the 
two men was that Garnett was able to launch himself into the 
upper tiers of landed society from a much better financial 
springboard. Yet in Garnett's case the lure of landed status 
meant a divorce from industrial connections and the loss of an 
industrial fortune.
Very little is known about William Garnett's 
background. His father was a Lancaster merchant who dealt in 
the Jamaican trade on a modest scale. On his death in 1800 
his estate, valued at just under £2,000, was divided between 
his two sons. William Garnett put his inheritance to good use 
wisely investing it in property in Oldham and Manchester and 
a variety of manufacturing concerns. He was clearly success­
ful because, in 1835, he took the decision to move into land 
by taking out a lease on Bleasedale Tower near Gars tang. His 
first major purchase, however, did not take place until 1842 
when he bought the nearby Quernmore estate for £29,300. It 
was a compact property comprising 19^5 acres and including a 
home farm, eight tenanted farms and an imposing mansion erected 
in 1793 and described by the agent as "fit for the reception
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and residence of a family and establishment of the first 
( 58)
importance.1 A further £28,000 was spent on buying the
copyholds and hereditaments and £1,000 on domestic fittings, 
library and household furniture. But that was only the start 
of the vast sums which Garnett lavished on his property. By 
1870 a total of almost £207,000 had been spent on the purchase 
of and improvements to the Quernmore, Bleasedale, Scarthwaite 
and smaller Catterall estates.
Where had the initial capital come from? It 
came from the sale of various business investments which were 
gradually disposed of as land purchase and large-scale improve­
ments dictated - warehouses in Liverpool, shares in a multitude 
of railway companies, a stake in West Hartlepool Dock Company, 
bonds and shares in a copper mine and property in Oldham and 
Manchester. Of course the capital account itself could not 
have suffered from the conversion of business assets into 
another valuable asset, namely land. But the same could not 
be said for the current account. The account books speak for 
themselves. Prior to his heavy investment in land Garnett's 
non—agricultural sources produced an income of over £12,000 a 
year in 1841. However by 1847, three years after the Quernmore 
purchase, his total income had slipped to £8,342 with rents 
from his newly acquired estates accounting for 40% of that 
figure. Moreover, throughout the 1840s and 50s a considerable 
proportion of current income found its way into maintenance, 
a programme of farm rebuilding and extensive drainage work.
The sacrifices involved in establishing one­
self in landed society were therefore quite considerable, and
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Garnett restricted himself to a personal income of £2,000 in 
1857. This was a far cry indeed from the £12,000 in interest 
which his investments had produced in 1841. In effect, 
Garnett’s income found the level of the net return from his 
agricultural rents which levelled out at about £6,000 p.a. by 
1870. However, not all his business investments had been sold. 
Some were kept in reserve ready to be turned into cash whenever 
developments on the estate required. Accordingly, when Garnett 
bought the Scarthwaite and Sowerby estates in 1859 and 1876-8 
he found the purchase price of £22,000 from the sale of his 
West Hartlepool Harbour and Railway stock and various other 
railway shares. Garnett, in fact, never lost the eye for a
good investment. For instance, he put £7,000 into a number of
industrial concerns between 1876 and 1878, including sugar and 
margarine companies; but the objective was always short-term 
profit for the purpose of reinvestment in his estates rather 
than long-tarm income.
Garnett may have suffered a loss of income
but, like Rawstorne, he found that the life of a country
gentleman had its social compensations. He quickly established
a reputation for himself as one of the country’s leading
agricultural improvers and as a prominent figure at the meet-
(61)ings of the region’s agricultural societies.k J He carried 
the Conservative cause into the Lancashire towns with which he 
retained some connections and, for instance, spent over £5,OCX) 
on the 1841 elections in Salford. Furthermore, as Garnett’s 
social standing in county society improved his social spending 
increased accordingly. In 1848 his charitable, payments did 
not extend much beyond charities for the poor and the churches
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and schools within the vicinity of his own estate. Yet, by 
1860, the level of Garnett’s subscriptions and donations was 
twice that of the 1840s. His patronage extended to forty-nine 
separate causes covering a multitude of sporting events, 
schools, hospitals, memorials and militia organisations through­
out north Lancashire. But Garnett eventually reaped the 
reward of what was essentially a social investment. He became 
High Sheriff of the county in 1879.^^
Ill
In addition to the obvious financial import­
ance which he attached to his agricultural estates, there 
were also strong social reasons why Thomas Clifton was anxious 
to cut a conventional landed figure. With 16,000 acres of 
some of Lancashire’s more fertile acres and a rent-roll to 
match, the Cliftons were landowners of aristocratic proport­
ions. But what the Cliftons possessed in land they had lacked 
in social prestige and influence. Until the 19th century the 
family’s Catholic adherence had limited their social reach.
It was a deficiency, however, which Thomas Clifton set about 
putting right by doggedly pursuing every means of thrusting 
himself to the fore of county society. He was ambitious to 
turn his estate into a showpiece of agricultural improvement. 
He renounced the Catholic Church and fervently embraced the 
Anglican establishment. He dutifully served as a J.P., as a 
Deputy-Lieutenant and as High Sheriff of Lancashire in 1835. 
The same social ambitions led him into buying a prestigious 
London address in Grosvenor Square and country'houses in the 
aristocratically favoured retreats of Rutland and Northampton- 
shire.(53)
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Furthermore, he saw to it that the social 
momentum was sustained by succeeding generations. His son 
John Talbot, who inherited the estates in 1851 , served as 
Conservative M.P. for north Lancashire between 1844 and 1847 
and became High Sheriff in 1853. The political mantle was 
eventually taken over by Clifton*s grandson, Thomas Henry, who 
represented the same constituency from 1874 until his death in 
1880. But, as was so often the case in the past, judicious 
marriage alliances were the most effective means of enhancing 
title, prestige and fortune. Thomas Clifton tried to revive 
his own family baronetcy which had become extinct in 1694, but 
with no success. However there was no shortage of aristo­
cratic connections. John Talbot Clifton married into the 
Earl of Lonsdale’s family. His brother, Charles Frederick 
did somewhat better. He married the Earl of Hasting’s eldest 
daughter and duly came into three substantial estates in 
Leicestershire, Yorkshire and Ayrshire and eventually the title 
of Lord Donnington. All told, by 1894, the Cliftons
could claim connection by marriage with the families of at
(6*5}least a dozen peers of the realm.v
A heightened social awareness will also help 
to explain the Clifton’s sometimes exaggerated response to 
the social and*political issues of their day. For instance, 
Thomas Clifton’s passionate defence of the Protectionist 
cause in the 1840s rested largely on his broader concern with 
protecting the interests of the landed order. The "free trade 
experiment1*, as he continued to call it, made little impact 
on his own agricultural interests. Equally, his passion­
ate defence of the Anglican Church and his victimisation of
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Catholic and non-conformist groups on his own estate expressed 
the same unswerving commitment towards preserving the estab- 
lished order. Moreover, the open contempt with which
members of the Clifton family regarded Lancashire1s ”nouveaux 
riches” reflected their own concern to preserve the dominance 
and social exclusivity of their own elite. A dispute with a 
Lytham resident over the terms of his lease led Thomas Clifton 
to typically remark: ”1 must confess to some prejudices
against the class to which Mr. Hornby belongs - viz. cotton 
spinners and persons who have the constant habit of driving 
bargains are always attempting to overreach themselves.’1^ ^
Lady Clifton took a very similar line. ”We have the misfort­
une”, she complained in 1868 to Thomas Fair, the land agent,
”to belong to a county where merchants and wealth are far 
above, in their own opinion, the aristocracy and the old 
landed gentry.
The continued emphasis on the agricultural 
estate, then, reflected a social impulse as well as objective 
financial judgements. Consequently, in 1836, James Fair was 
appointed as land agent to the Clifton estate with the specific 
task of improving the long-term profitability of the agricult­
ural sector. And, in view of the general movement in farm 
rents, his efforts met with a substantial measure of success. 
Admittedly, the records are not as complete as they might have 
been. Few detailed statements of accounts survive for Thomas 
Cliftonfs period. Furthermore, capable as James Fair was as 
an agricultural manager, he had obvious shortcomings as an 
accountant. The cash books of his agency are a confused and 
a confusing source, some of the surviving account sheets were
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left unbalanced and quite a number went unsigned by 
Clifton himself. Extrapolating from these accounts is made 
all the more difficult by the fact that receipts from the 
occasional sale of hay, corn, timber and bricks tended to 
be lumped with the general farm income. Above all, the 
accounts themselves rarely distinguish between farm rents 
and the ground and property rents in Lytham.
Nevertheless, despite these deficiencies in 
the evidence, there can be no mistaking the upward swing in 
estate income during the 1830s and 40s. Total income in 
1832 stood at £24,862 and climbed to £29,942 in 1848, an 
increase of roughly 20%^^ Fortunately, a clearer state­
ment of accounts does exist for 1857 which makes it possible 
to separate out the respective contributions of the Clifton1 s 
urban and agricultural estates to their gross income. By 
the middle of the 1 9th century Lytham was barely in the 
embryonic stage of development as a residential resort and, 
therefore, income from this source must have been limited.
In fact, houses and ground rents in Lytham could have 
accounted for no more than about £2,500 of the family*s 
total annual income, and that would be erring on the gener­
ous s i d e . T h i s ,  therefore, puts the increase in farm 
rentals in a still better light. Between 1832 and 1848 they 
showed an increase of 31%. Of course, some allowance must 
be made for the income which came from the property purch­
ased over the same period, notably in Marton, Great Plumpton 
and Warton. Even so, the rents from these properties could 
not have contributed more than 4% of the overall increase 
in agricultural income. The only area to show a loss in the
years after 1832 were Kirkham tithe, glebe and rectory 
rents - in fact a substantial 50% drop/75)
These years of steady progress, however, 
were interrupted by the sharp set-back which followed in the 
wake of the Corn Law repeal. There had of course been 
moments of crisis before when arrears had piled up, current 
income had been put under pressure and difficulties had 
ensued in meeting financial obligations. But the difference 
between the recession of the late 1840s and early 50s and 
that of the early 1820s was that, by mid-century, the estate 
was also faced with alternative approaches to staging a 
recovery. In this respect, 1848 proved to be a testing time 
for the Clifton estate. Landowner and agent were faced with 
a set of crucial questions. For instance, should land be 
sold off to reduce the current level of debts? If so, where 
would the axe fall - on part of the agricultural or urban 
estates? And the answers to those questions were inextric­
ably bound up with another - which source was likely to 
secure an improving and dependable income in the future? In 
any case, to deal with more immediate and pressing problems 
economies would have to be made. Personal spending would 
certainly have to be cut back. So would expenditure on the 
estate. But where? On agricultural improvements or on 
schemes for urban development or both? These were all 
crucial questions with profound implications for the future.
In fact the future turned out to be less 
bleak than either Thomas Clifton or his agent, James Fair, 
first imagined. But, at the time, prospects seemed daunting
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enough. By 'late arrears were beginning to mount, income 
had fallen back to £27,500, confidence seemed to be drain­
ing away and creditors were making alarming threats to call 
in their loans to the estate.Moreover, by a twist of 
fate, the onset of the recession coincided with a period 
of particularly heavy expenditure. Large sums had been 
spent on house building and amenities in Lytham and on the 
first instalment of a loan taken out under the terms of the 
Government Drainage B i l l . x n addition, there were 
family commitments to be met. £20,000 had to be found to 
launch one of Clifton1 s younger sons on a military career by 
buying him a company. £3,000 was needed to pay off the 
debts which Clifton*s heir, John Talbot, had run up at his 
London Bank. And, shortly, £13,000 would be required to 
clear the portion settled on Clifton’s brother, William.
There was very little hope of Clifton
borrowing his way out of trouble. Debts already amounted
to £190,000 with interest charges absorbing 31% of the gross
income in 1848.^^ Moreover, the family’s Preston bankers
were unlikely to be any more sympathetic to the idea of
extending additional loan facilities. Ah accumulation of
annual deficits in the current account between 1845 and 1848
( 78)had already produced an overdraft of £30,000.
The only course of action was a programme of 
selective economies. Family spending was an obvious target. 
Clifton agreed to sell his London house and take a smaller 
residence in the country where "a much reduced household 
would be called for.” Closing Lytham Hall would also
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contribute a certain saving as would a sharp reduction in
the level of expenditure on the plantations, game and 
(79)gardens. But clearly savings in these areas would not
add up to very much. Still greater retrenchment was needed. 
Yet, at the same time, potential income for the future had 
to be safeguarded.
As far as Thomas Clifton was concerned there
was only one choice and that was continuing the programme of
improvements on the agricultural estate. f,Our way ahead
lies through redoubling the efforts of our farmers,'1 he told
James Fair, and "measures should be taken for their benefit
which will at least raise their spirits and rouse them to
continued exertion. ” 8^^  His motives were a mixture of
paternalistic impulse and stubborn confidence in the basic
stability of agriculture. In fact, Clifton’s views fell
closely in line with his agent’s own thinking. What they
both had in mind was a more energetic prosecution of the
improvement scheme. So, in return for prompt rent payments,
Fair promised the estate’s tenants new farm buildings and
"to put the drainage on such a footing as few landlords
would have done."^81  ^ He was as good as his word. The
Inclosure Commissioners provided the capital, kilns and
machinery were installed for the production of drainage pipes
and tiles and, out of current income, additional sums were
diverted into the construction of new embankments and water— 
(82)courses•v '
Clifton’s heir was even more convinced that 
this was the right course of action to take. He had no
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doubts that the current difficulties would soon give way 
to better days provided landowners abandoned protectionism 
and instead encouraged "economic management and higher 
productivity”. "Land now", he claimed, "is a very differ­
ent article to what it used to be. It is a raw material 
from which, like the manufacturers, we are bound to get the 
greatest return," Rigorous business methods were what were 
needed - laying small and efficient farms together, getting 
rid of incompetent farmers and improving productivity through 
land improvements. ^ ^
So, as far as possible, investment in 
agriculture was to be maintained; but that involved making 
sacrifices elsewhere. Attention immediately focused on 
Lytham, What little promise Lytham had shown as a popular 
residential resort had been due almost entirely to Clifton 
money. The outline features of the townfs physical devel­
opment had been sketched in during the 1840s, In 1840-1 a 
new and imposing hotel, the Clifton Arms, had been built 
fronting a marine drive and promenade which were intended to 
be the site for substantial private residences and lodging 
houses. The first of these properties were financed and 
constructed by the estate along East and West Beaches and 
adjoining terraces. Steps were also taken to remodel the 
area around the Market Square and Clifton Street and replace 
the rows of squalid thatched cottages with shops and ornate 
cottages intended for seasonal occupation.^
Yet it was an expensive business with no 
prospect of an immediate return. Building operations in
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Lytham averaged £6,000 a year between 1845 and 1848, The 
costs of road making, sewering and opening up building land 
were met by a floating loan from the Preston Bank though 
that had the effect of inflating the rising level of debt 
charged on the estate. Thomas Clifton was unimpressed.
nAn extravagance we can ill—afford,,f he remarked, using it 
to lend further weight to his argument that priority should 
be given to the agricultural estate.Accordingly, 
expenditure on building work was cut back to £2,500 by 1850, 
of which by far the largest proportion went on renewal and 
repairs to farm buildings.
Retrenchment involved not only selective 
reductions in estate expenditure but also the disposal of 
land. Of course none of the settled estates could be touched 
but that still left a number of properties which could be 
sold off. ' The range of choice was really limited to the 
land which Thomas Clifton had purchased since inheriting the 
estates in 1832, namely properties in Warton, Westby-with- 
Plumpton, Marton and Blackpool. Again, as far as Clifton 
was concerned the choice was never a difficult one to make.
The acquisitions he had made in the townships adjacent to 
the ancestral core at Lytham were important measures of 
consolidation. Land in Marton, bought from Sir Peter 
Hesketh-Fleetwood in 1841 crowned efforts to extend the 
Clifton estate in a coastal belt stretching from Lytham to 
the outskirts of Blackpool. The following year Clifton had 
also bought a substantial and largely compact holding, again 
from Hesketh-Fleetwood, which lay to the east of Blackpool 
between Great Marton village and Cliftonfs Layton Hall estate.
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About the same time Clifton bought out Lord Derby*s interest 
in Westby—with—Plump ton and, as a result, completed his 
hold over the township. Similarly, the piecemeal purchase 
of Warton, as it came on to the market, fell in line with 
the long-term objective of buying up the whole of the parish. 
In fact, even in the financially difficult years of the late 
1840s and 50s, small purchases continued to be made in both 
Marton and Warton.
That left the land in central Blackpool which 
came into Clifton*s possession between 1843 and 1846. 
Initially, however, the intention behind the purchase of the 
Blackpool property was not to make a speculative killing by 
putting it back on the market as soon as it had appreciated 
in value. On the contrary, the strategic location of these 
plots positively invited development. A later chapter looks 
more closely at the Cliftons* role as urban planners.
Suffice to say at this stage that at first the estate enthus­
iastically took up plans to develop the site for itself.(90) 
The new Blackpool North railway station was built on Clifton 
land, an arterial road was constructed running from the sea­
front inland as far as Layton Hall, various building schemes 
were discussed with a firm of Liverpool architects and almost
£3,000 was £pent on new roads, a new hotel and a rearrange-
(91)ment of property.v
However, by late 1847, such grandiose schemes 
had been abandoned. There is no doubt that the financial 
difficulties which the estate had run up against exerted the 
strongest influence in shaping the decision to sell. Moreover,
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James Fair reasoned that he had bought cheaply enough and 
estimated that an immediate auction would net a substantial
(92)
profit. For, as he pointed out to the Scarisbricks’
agent, land in Blackpool, which he had acquired for a 
fraction of a penny per square yard, managed to sell for as 
much as 5d. a square yard by r,the mere fact of opening 
streets and roads.” (93) Furthermore, at the time, he 
personally felt that land values in Blackpool had reached 
their p e a k . (9^ ) But there were other important considerat­
ions which will also explain the Cliftons* withdrawal from 
an active and direct involvement in the resort*s development. 
Their plans for a high-class residential area would clearly 
have conflicted with low-status building on neighbouring 
plots, which threatened the long-term profitability of the 
scheme. Finally, no emotional wrench was involved in break­
ing away from a property with which there was little ancest­
ral connection and which was detached from the main body of 
the estates.
Thereafter, property in Blackpool was looked 
upon as a safety net to fall back on, a useful convertible 
asset which could be turned into cash whenever storm clouds 
gathered or left to appreciate in value as a harvest to be 
reaped at some future date. Accordingly, land in Blackpool 
and Layton was put up for auction in 1848, 1850, 1852 and 
1856 though not with the success that was expected. The 
central properties close to the sea-front were disposed of 
but Layton Hall and substantial plots along Talbot Road were 
left on the estate*s hands. Nevertheless, the land which 
was sold grossed over £5,300 by 1852 and a further £5,600 was
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realised from the sale of land to the railway company in 
Layton as well as in Lytham. And, as the accounts make clear, 
the money was used to clear some of the debt owed to the 
Preston Bank and to discharge part of the portions settled 
on Thomas Clifton’s brothers.(95)
Clifton himself was far from unhappy with 
this arrangement. He preferred to put his faith in the 
agricultural estate and not in what he personally regarded 
as speculative ventures. In fact he took much the same 
blinkered view of Lytham’s emergence as a residential resort, 
and he seemed not to have been unduly disturbed by the town’s 
lethargic growth rate. His own social and aesthetic pre­
occupations outweighed any desire for spectacular returns. 
However welcome additional income from ground rents might 
have been, unsightly building and, more especially, an 
onslaught of new residents with alien religions and political 
sympathies were not. ”1 have no wish to see hordes of 
Manchester men descend on us,” Clifton informed James Fair 
in 1846, "We have no need for them.1
Of course it would be wrong to assume that, 
thereafter, the Cliftons and their agents treated the urban 
estate with indifference. Nevertheless, the difficulties 
of the late 1840s had prompted a re-examination of invest­
ment priorities. After all, most landowners below the level 
of the great territorial magnates had limited capital 
resources to play with. Most were not in the position of 
Lord Bute, for instance, who could well afford to lavish 
large sums on his agricultural estates out of the burgeoning
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income provided by royalties from his Glamorganshire coal— 
(97)fields. As is evident, nurturing building development
was an expensive business. But agricultural improvements 
on the scale envisaged by the Cliftons was even more so.
Yet, the decision to maintain and extend investment in 
agriculture was taken on the reasonable assumption that the 
agricultural estate would generate a solid, reliable, if 
unspectactular income. It was also a decision which equated 
with Clifton’s strong social impulses. In this sense he was 
typical of the "generality of landowners (who) did not share 
the primary motivation of men making their way in the world 
to maximise profits."(98)
James Fairfs outlook on the future was one 
of guarded confidence. "Rents are well paid up," he informed 
John Talbot Clifton in 1852, "and, provided that improve­
ments continue to receive our diligent attention, there is
( qq)
every reason to suppose that they will be improved on."w ^y 
But that must surely have been a long-term view. By 1860 
total estate income was little more than £600 above the 1848 
figure. The slow growth in agricultural revenue was the 
result of a combination of circumstances. Any adjustment 
to farm rents had to take account of tenancy changes, the 
prevailing level of arrears and, in particular, the estatefs 
leasing policy. The fact that rents barely moved between 
1848 and the early 1860s was due not only to the effects of 
the depression but also to the agent’s preference for long 
and medium term leases; and it was not until about 1860 that 
the longer lease, which was usually attached to the large 
farms, gave way to annual agreements.^
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Farm rents finally came under complete 
revision in 1866-7. By 1870 total income had climbed to 
£32,927 and £37,754 by 1880. Yet, taking the period 1850 
to 1880 as a whole, by any standards the improvement in 
income was disappointing and, even then, the increase was 
concentrated largely in a ten year period between the mid- 
1860s and 70s. In view of the enormous sums that were spent 
on repairs and improvements, income from the agricultural 
estate fell well short of earlier expectations. Farm rents 
across the estate increased by an average of 11i% between 
1865 and 1875. And this figure would have been even less 
impressive had it not been for the comparatively steeper 
increases on the farms in Lytham. They alone accounted for 
more than half of the rise in agricultural income. On other 
parts of the estate, further removed from the railway and 
the urban markets of the Fylde coastal towns, increases in 
farm rents were poor. Between 1866 and 1880 receipts from 
Westby-with-Plumpton and Clifton-with-Salwick rose by only 
6% and 5i% respectively. Moreover, after 1875, the position 
deteriorated considerably and, by 1880, away from the 
Cliftons* coastal properties, farm rents were slipping below' 
their 1870 levels.^®1)
On the face of it, the urban estate showed 
little more promise. Some increase in revenue from property 
and ground rents in Lytham had taken place by 1866, but its 
apparent importance was inflated by the generally stationary 
income from agriculture. As a residential resort Lytham was 
stagnating. Its successful emergence as an* attractive middle
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class resort capable of competing with Southport or even 
the more select districts of Blackpool depended on the land­
owner* s readiness to maintain investment in amenities and 
building schemes* But clearly the claim of one Lytham 
resident in 1860 that "the landowner*s best interests (lay)
with improving the condition of the town" had fallen on deaf 
(102)
ears* Instead agriculture exhausted the estate *s
resources. The Cliftons* remaining Blackpool interests 
suffered from the same basic lack of promotion. Hence, the 
annual income from urban property increased by only £2,000 
between 1866 and 1880 and this figure would have been sub­
stantially worse had it not been for the St. Annes Building 
Company whose lease, taken out in 1874, contributed more than 
£1,500 of the overall increase.
With the onset of the agricultural depression 
after 1880 the Clifton estate fell on hard times. Their 
income from farm rents began to fall away and the time was 
still some way off when revenue from the urban estate would 
be healthy enough to take up the slack. The predicament 
which the Cliftons eventually found themselves in was closely 
bound up with the way in which they and their agents had 
chosen to manage the resources of their estate. In their 
case decisions had been shaped by a combination of motives — 
by a strong sense of tradition, by social conventions as 
well as by an over-optimistic view of agriculture *s future 
profitability. But they, along with other landowners ment­
ioned in this study, demonstrate the wide variations which 
can be found in the ways in which individual- landowners 
responded to the changing economic climate of the 19th century.
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Indeed, it may be worth stressing that the picture of 
economic change on landed estates is as much one of opport­
unities missed as one of opportunities taken.
However, there is one element missing. The 
mixed fortunes experienced by landowners at the end of the 
century cannot be explained exclusively in terms of the 
breadth and diversity of a landowner!s assets or the shrewd­
ness of his managerial decisions. That some estates survived 
more or less intact and others contracted or broke up 
altogether was tied up with the spending of wealth as much 
as with its making. And it was characteristic of many land­
owners that they spent more than they actually earned.
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CHAPTER II
THE SPENDING OF WEALTH
The spending habits among Britain*s land­
owners and the extent to which they were inclined towards 
debt-financed expenditure has become the subject of consid­
erable debate. Thirty years ago it was argued that, by the, 
mid-nineteenth century, landowners generally had taken on a 
much more active role in the management of their estates. 
Consequently, so the argument went, they were able to 
increase their incomes and therefore reduce the burden of 
debt which their predecessors had accumulated through a
(A )
lengthy process of neglect and extravagance. J Professor 
Thompson challenged this argument at an early stage, taking 
the view that no fundamental shift in the behaviour of land­
owners took place and that, for most, debt remained an endur-
(2)ing fact of life. ' Evidence from estates in Lancashire 
suggests that this was indeed the case. In fact, what 
J.H. Plumb has said of 18th century landowners could also be 
applied to their 19th century counterparts: ,fFor one that
survived a score were destroyed, overtaken by those natural 
disasters which beset families - failure of heirs, wanton 
extravagance, reckless loyalty, sheer bad luck. But debt,
)the crushing inexorable burden of debt, extinguished most.,,w/
I
As regards indebtedness among Lancashire land­
owners several points are worth making from the outset. Land­
owners who had a varied range of assets, who ftere able to call 
upon diverse sources of income, who were not over—dependent on
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agriculture and who, ideally, were not over—burdened by 
inherited debt were usually best placed to reduce debt or 
avoid indebtedness altogether. This, however, cannot have 
been true of many. Most of the estates encomapssed by this 
study carried debts though the incidence and size of indebt­
edness varied from one estate to the next. Even so, debt was 
not necessarily regarded as a calamitous affliction. In this 
sense a landownerfs debts have to be considered in relation to 
his income and, more specifically, the proportion of his 
income which went into servicing the annual costs of any 
charges on his property. Debt, in other words, was perfectly 
tolerable so long as it could be comfortably financed out of 
current income.
In general, the great landed figures of the 
realm could call upon such a scale of income and disposable 
assets thaf it seems they were able to go in and out of debt 
throughout the 19th century almost at will. Despite their 
heavy spending on industrial ventures, land and houses, the 
profits from mining and urban property meant that the likes 
of the Northumberland, Sutherland and Dudley families only 
occasionally resorted to mortgaging and even then on a short­
term basis. Moreover, the speed and scale of debt reduction 
among the territorial magnates could be spectacular* The 
Dukes of Marlborough solved their financial problems by sell­
ing off £4-500,000 worth of family heirlooms and treasures.
The Duke of Bedford reduced encumbrances on his estates from 
a staggering £552,000 in 1839 to nothing by 1855. The Earl 
of Durham’s debts stood at £635,000 in 1841 yet this figure 
had been reduced to only £100,000 by 1880. Lord Calthorpe
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accumulated debts totalling £141,000 in 1881 but had managed 
to clear the lot fourteen years later*
Lancashire’s leading landowners managed their 
own debts with the same versatility. The Dukes of Devonshire, 
for instance, disposed of charges on their estates with 
apparently the same consummate ease with which they were 
accumulated. In their case, gambling, the costs of settle­
ments and the sixth Duke’s passion for house building produced 
debts of not far short of £1 million by the early 1840s on 
which interest payments absorbed 55% of current income. But 
just as amazing was the capacity of the estate to swiftly 
reduce the mortgage burden to more manageable proportions.
This was achieved through the sale of the family’s Yorkshire 
estates which raised £575,000. Yet no great personal or 
financial sacrifice had been involved. They were able to 
retain their Lancashire property in Furness with its rich 
industrial and urban potential; and they were able to hold on 
to their ancestral estates in Ireland with which, for reasons 
of personal attachment and social prestige, the Devonshires 
were reluctant to part. Having reduced indebtedness to a 
more respectable level the Duke then enjoyed a halcyon period 
of rising incomes stemming mainly from the industrial growth 
of Barrow. However, in the late 1870s, fortunes suffered a 
sharp reversal as Barrow’s ship—building, railway, jute and 
steel companies plunged into recession. The estate conseq­
uently found itself having to raise huge sums to shore up 
these ailing industries at a time when the income from divi­
dends and royalties was falling away sharply.* The end result 
was debts of £2 millions by 1888. Yet all was not lost by any
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means. Such was the scale of the Devonshires1 resources 
that they were able to sell off land and property, clear the 
mortgages, rearrange investments and, by the turn of the 
century, secure a level of income which was as impressive as 
it had been during the golden days of the 1860s and 70s.^
Given the scale and diversity of his own 
assets and income, Lord Derby dealt with the problem of debt 
just as effortlessly. Owing to the unavoidable costs of 
family settlements charges on his estate amounted to £92,750 
in 1818. This had been cut back to £64,000 in 1825 and had 
dropped still further to just over £36,000 by 1835. Yet 
these figures disguise the fact that over the same period 
numerous loans were taken out and all of them were repaid 
within a very short period. Current income or the sale of 
detached properties enabled Derby to clear his debts at will. 
In the same way, he bought land worth over £95,000 between 
1815 and 1835. Yet the cost was never converted into a debt 
charge. Capital was readily available out of the estate. The 
sale of unwanted property brought in £31,000 whilst the 
remaining £64,000 was found out of current income. It was 
not a large sum to find considering that Derby’s coal royal­
ties alone produced £43,000 over roughly the same period and
that, in 1849*, between £101-104,000 was owed by various rail-
. (6)way companies•
The north Manchester estates belonging to the 
Earls of Wilton produced a buoyant income without any of the 
heavy obligations which fell on many other landowners. By 
1894 the outwards sprawl of Manchester’s satellite towns 
brought the Wiltons an income of almost £64,000 a year. Land
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and property were managed in a cold and business-like 
manner. Nor were there any strong emotional ties with the 
family*s agricultural estates scattered throughout Yorkshire, 
Staffordshire and Somerset. Their land in Somerset, for 
instance, was widely dispersed and, as Lady Wilton pointed 
out to her agent, the family had ”no individual interest in 
the county.” In fact, the .Somerset estate was put on the 
market in 1866 specifically to avoid the heavy costs of ' 
restoring the condition of the land and repairing the dilap­
idated state of the farm buildings. Not surprisingly, as the 
trustees* accounts of 1898 make clear, there were no outstand­
ing mortgages on the estate and a steadily rising income, 
together with the capital from land sales, were more than
(r7\
enough to deal with the cost of family settlements.
II
In 1851 James Caird calculated that the 
amount of encumbered land was "greater than (was) generally 
supposed.” By 1878 he apparently saw no reason to change this 
view. There were few landlords, he argued who "have not 
either inherited or found it necessary to create mortgages on 
their estates.
This was certainly true of many Lancashire 
landowners below the level of the territorial magnates who 
were discussed in the previous section. Unlike the landed 
aristocrat, the lesser landowner generally had fewer means at 
his disposal to either avoid indebtedness or to quickly reduce
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the burden of debt when it assumed threatening proportions*
Firstly, the smaller landowner did not enjoy the same size
and diversity of income. True, many had non-agricultural
investments, some drew an impressive income from mining or
building speculation, but few could actually depend on an
improving and, at the same time, long-term income from these
sources* Moreover, additional income of this kind was not
specifically used to reduce, let alone pay off, outstanding
debts. But this was also true elsewhere. Only one of the
many Staffordshire landowners engaged in non-agricultural
ventures, for example, actually used income from these sources
(q)for the purpose of debt redemption.K ' Again, the sale of 
land offered another solution to the problem of the level of 
indebtedness but there were obvious limits to the extent to 
which individual landowners were able to dispose of property 
without eating into the main core of their estates. Certainly 
there was a distinct reluctance to part with really old 
ancestral land. In this respect, Sir James Graham of 
Netherby was probably typical of many in his preference to 
soldier on under the crushing burden of interest charges 
rather than sell part of his agricultural estates.
Nevertheless, although it was difficult for 
the middling gentry to avoid or reduce debt by any appreciable 
amount, there is reason to believe that, collectively, they 
may not have been unduly disturbed by the prospect of indebt­
edness. Mortgages were tolerable so long as they were kept 
within manageable bounds and could be comfortably supported 
out of current income once other fixed items of expenditure 
had been met. Debt only became a threat when it reached the
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point of absorbing the greater part of a landowner1 s net 
income.
So, servicing mortgages was a feature of 
financial management on most estates. The Heskeths of Meols 
Hall, instance, lived with debt throughout the 19th 
century despite their highly lucrative association with the 
development of Southport. Ironically, Charles Hesketh nearly 
abandoned North Meols in 1840 in favour of what he considered 
to be more profitable estates, firstly at Hornby near 
Lancaster and then at Wennington. At the time, his reasons 
were fairly apparent. Outgoings on his North Meols estate 
were absorbing almost 75% of his income. Fortuitously, he 
was able to acquire his brother’s property in North Meols in 
the wake of Sir Peter’s disastrous involvement in creating 
the new town and port of Fleetwood. Nevertheless, an increas­
ing income from Southport ground rents was barely enough to 
keep pace with the heavy costs of settlements, annuities .and 
interest payments. And, with mortgages amounting to £183,000 
in 1898, Hesketh was left with barely £2,000 a year out of a 
gross income of over £10,000. But at least Hesketh had 
valuable urban property to fall back on and parts were grad­
ually sold off to reduce the debt burden to a more manageable 
£121,000 by 1906.
The problem of meeting interest payments 
clearly accounted for the hard line which was taken with 
lessees on Lord Lilford’s estates. Mortgages on his Astley 
Hall estate, for example, absorbed 54% of Lilford’s income 
from that particular property in 1887. Accordingly, when one
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of the local coal companies put in a request for a reduction 
in footage rates because of the deepening recession in the 
industry, their appeal was turned down. The estate was faced 
with its own difficulties as a letter from Lilford’s agent 
makes perfectly clear, ,fThat other lessors have made con­
cessions to the company is not in itself a reason for abate­
ment in the present case,’1 he informed Lilford’s solicitors,
1 for, bearing in mind the present charges on the estate,- I 
think it will be of the first importance to the lessors to 
obtain the utmost possible income and to refuse to depart 
from the terms of the lease.
The position on the large Hesketh estate at 
Rufford is also one of steadily accumulating debt. When 
Sir Thomas Hesketh inherited the property in 1842 debts 
amounted to over £104,000 with interest charges absorbing 
31% of current income. J9 The level of indebtedness contin­
ued to rise thereafter, driven up by family settlements, 
personal extravagance and heavy capital investment on the 
estate. Again, despite Hesketh’s breadth of non-agricultural 
investments, income from these sourses only contributed to 
servicing the interest payments; it was never sufficient to 
make possible a significant reduction in the debt capital. 
Quarries at Wrightington, for instance, brought in only £2,802 
between 1814-39.^^ More was expected of the estate’s mining 
interests in Great Harwood, Parbold and Shevington but again, 
the return was disappointing. Coal rents and royalties 
produced only £6,386 over the twenty year period 1822-41 and 
then production started to fall away. Consequently, Great 
Harwood was sold in 1848, the other two properties in 1875
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and all at modest prices.^15) In the meantime, the level 
of expenditure on purchasing land and making improvements on 
the agricultural estate reached new heights after 1850.^^
And current income could not, by itself, have supported the 
heavy bursts of spending involved. The Hesketh Marsh reclam­
ation project alone absorbed £35,000 in just five years 
between 1879 and 1884. Admittedly farm rents did increase, 
from c.£14,000 to c.£20,000 in 1880, yet much of this 
increase, as was the case on other estates, was concentrated 
in the period 1860 to 1876. The pattern of income and 
expenditure was clearly out of balance, as is evident from 
the accumulating deficits in the current account. By 1879 
the estate was overdrawn by almost £19,000; by 1881 the 
figure had reached an alarming £46,000. But, following a 
number of property sales, it was reduced to an average of 
£25,500 throughout the 1880s. To a large extent, the mount­
ing deficits can be explained by the soaring interest payments 
on a growing string of mortgages. In 1890 total debts 
amounted to over £587,000 which meant that interest charges
( ^ r7 \
on the Rufford estate alone took 90$ of the gross rental.v
III
The relationship between income, expendit­
ure and indebtedness on the Clifton estate falls into a 
similar pattern. Basically, a growing income was accompanied 
by even heavier expenditure and, consequently, mounting debt. 
Though the Cliftons1 gross annual income climbed from £24,862 
in 1832 to over £40,000 by 1899 the accumulation of debt more 
than kept pace. When Thomas Clifton inherited the estates
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in 1832 total encumbrances amounted to £113,000 of which 
£o5,000 can be accounted for by portions settled on numerous 
younger children by his predecessors. At this stage interest 
payments took a very modest 16% of the landownerfs gross 
i n c o m e . B y  1850 the debt burden had risen to about 
£206,000 and interest charges had doubled, accounting for 
27% of estate revenue. But the real surge in debt accumul­
ation took place in the second half of the century. Family 
settlements, land purchases, estate improvements and indiv­
idual extravagance drove mortgages up to £361,000 in 1880 
and a massive £590,000 by 1900.^^
However, it is worth emphasising that debt 
by itself was not the main course for concern. What really 
mattered was whether a certain level of debt could be 
supported and, therefore, as long as land values held up and 
as long as 'there was the expectation that income would 
steadily improve, landowners like the Cliftons would continue 
to finance major items of expenditure out of loan capital.
In any case, there was little point in a landowner tighten­
ing his own purse strings if, as was the case with most, it 
meant reducing the mortgage burden by relatively meagre 
amounts. Certainly John Talbot Clifton thought along very 
similar lines*. He was a firm believer in obtaining the 
highest credit which current income could afford. As he 
confidently told his agent in 1850, there was "no security 
as good as land; it stands to reason that a party or company 
would be happy to lend £200,000 on a security of £25,000 a 
year."^20  ^ Equally, Thomas Fair was not himself unduly dis­
turbed by increased interest charges provided a "commensurate
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increase in income” "took place* So, far from exercising
restraint, estate borrowing forged ahead from the 1850s 
onwards* From 1853 to 1865 loan charges rose from £8,155 
to £11,615, which represented 58% of gross income* But then 
the proportion of total income assumed by interest payments 
levelled out at an average of 58-9% between 1865 and 1878, 
when rents throughout the whole estate showed an increase.
The problems appeared only when interest payments and income 
moved dramatically in opposite directions from 1880 onwards. 
At that stage debt became a menacing threat.
Until the 1880s the Cliftons had no diffic­
ulty in raising all the loan capital they wanted. It was 
available from a wide range of sources. Firstly, there was 
the personal level of friends and relatives. Of course, 
individual fortunes in the family did not amount to much more 
than own portions which were generally vested in the estate. 
Nevertheless, on the occasions when the estate ran into 
difficulties with its creditors, it was not unusual for 
family members to come to the rescue. Thomas Clifton*s wife, 
Harriet, made £17,500 available during the trying months of 
1848, Lady Clifton provided £10,000 in the 1880s and her 
daughter-in-law, Lady Donnington, a very welcome £7,500 in 
1894 when few private investors were prepared to risk their 
money in land and in the. Clifton estate in particular.^2^
Outside of the immediate family, the world
of the ,!local solicitor, maiden aunt and the country parson"
(25)was a plentiful source of capital.'* In fapt, the Cliftons 
acquired most of their loans through local solicitors who
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channelled trust funds and private investments in the 
direction of the Clifton estate. Of course investors never 
got an impressively high return but they could depend on an 
income that was both regular and secure. Consequently 
there was no shortage of individuals ready to loan money in 
varying amounts. Many of the advances were quite small. 
Typical was the £1,500 advanced by two spinsters in 1864 
which in fact remained vested in the estate for the rest of 
the century. Also local clergymen provided sums from 
£10,000 to £90,000. At the top of the scale, members of 
the Miller family, Preston*s leading cotton manufacturers, 
loaned the Cliftons a total of £150,000 by 1900.
Apart from the money from trust funds and 
a wide circle of friends and relatives, banks - particularly 
the local institutions - played a crucial role in meeting 
the deficits which invariably built up in the landowner*s 
and the estate*s accounts. Support was available at two 
levels. Firstly, the Preston Bank, for instance, organised 
short-term loans to help the estate through temporary diffic­
ulties. In 1844 it stepped in to clear the portions owed 
to Thomas Clifton*s brothers until such time as mortgages 
could be arranged. The bank also found the money for the 
construction work which took place in Lytham in the late 
1840s. The costs were finally converted into a mortgage in 
1857. It also made another £25,000 available, this time in
1894, when the estate was under pressure to meet current
(27)interest charges on its borrowings.
Secondly, a bank*s overdraft facilities to 
all intents and purposes became an instrument of long-term 
borrowing. For, as the detailed account books after 1862 
make clear, it was rare for the estate or the landowner1s 
family to be in credit with any of their Lancashire or 
London bankers. Instead it was usual practice to run up a 
substantial deficit which, when mutually convenient, could' 
be converted into a mortgage. In this way a mortgage of 
£90,000 was taken out in 1866 partly to clear £51,000 of 
debt which had built up in the Cliftons1 accounts in Preston 
and London over a period of seventeaiyears.
However, from the mid-nineteenth century 
onwards, government sources and especially the large 
financial institutions became increasingly important in 
funding British landowners. Thomas Clifton took advantage 
of the 1846 Public Money Drainage Act and borrowed £10,000 
of government money for the purpose of extending the drain­
age scheme on his own estate. But greater use was made of 
the private improvement companies and, in the early 1860s 
and again in the early 1880s, Clifton borrowed a total of 
almost £30,000 from the Lands Improvement Company largely 
for drainage work. It was not until 1876 that the estate 
approached the Royal Insurance Company for capital but, from 
then onwards, insurance companies provided an increasing 
proportion of the Cliftons1 total loans. The advantages in 
this arrangement were immediately apparent. Sizeable 
advances could be ontained at competitive rates, a string 
of smaller mortgages could then be consolidated into one
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and a considerable saving made on interest charges and 
solicitors1 costs. By the end of the century the Royal 
became, in effect, the financial prop of the whole estate. 
Initially, Clifton borrowed £65,000; this was increased to 
£162,000 by 1900 in addition to which the Lancashire Insur­
ance Company advanced a further £12,000.
The Cliftons’ spending habits, their steady 
accumulation of debt and their readiness to borrow money 
reflected several things - unavoidable family obligation, 
ambitious investment schemes, personal extravagance but 
also over-confidence in the financial durability of their 
own estate. Family settlements were a cross which most 
landowners had to carry and often resulted in recurrent as 
well as heavy debt. The process of settlement was designed 
to protect the interests of future heirs against the mis­
management or depredations of the current owner by imposing 
restrictions - at least in theory though rarely in practice - 
on his freedom to buy and sell land, lease property or raise 
mortgages. It was also intended to secure the payment of a 
wife’s jointure as well as the portions and annuities of 
any younger children out of the rentals from the estate.
The major problem with settlements, however, was that they 
left the financial health of the estate at the mercy of 
biological chance* Moreover, in estimating the size of 
portions and jointures, landowners had the tendency to over­
estimate the estate’s capacity to pay into the future.^ ^
According to one local observer in 1896 
there were many financially crippled landowners in Britain
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whose "predicament was largely the result of charges,
particularly settlements, on the estate."^) In 1832
Thomas Clifton inherited a charge of £65,000 which was
vested in the estate by way of portions. Included in this
sum was the £40,000 which his father had settled on three
younger sons and two daughters. Moreover, settlements
carried the additional sting of including annuities for
spouses, younger children and other family relatives. John
Clifton1s Will provided annuities for his children totalling 
(32)£1,500 p.a.w  y There was no other alternative but to 
burden the estate with discharging the settlements. Neither 
John Clifton nor his successors left personal estates large 
enough to make anything more than a dent in the total debt.
John Clifton1s personal estate, for instance, amounted to
only £4,500 and, as was usual where such modest amounts
were involved, this sum was used to benefit the younger
children.
There was therefore no prospect of paying
off this kind of debt except on a long-term basis. For the
sake of legal and administrative convenience it was usual
to clear the portions by raising the sum on mortgage. But,
whether or not the portions remained vested in the estate,
the result was exactly the same — a steady accumulation of
debt which passed from one generation to the next. Hence,
by 1875, only £12,000 of John Clifton’s £40,000 had been
(34)entirely cleared.
Thomas Clifton had to provide for a progeny 
wh i was almost as numerous as his father’s. He settled a
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further £40,000 on his three younger sons and an annuity 
of £300 each* When he died in 1851 he also left a very 
modest personal estate and, again, it was not used for 
reducing the charge on the estate* Instead it was used to 
provide a £10,000 trust for his wife and a £5,000 insurance 
was divided among his younger children. (35) o^e more, 
very little of the £40,000 was actually paid off. In 1848 
£2,000 was discharged with the money which came from the 
sale of several properties in Blackpool. Apart from this 
small sum, the rest was converted into a mortgage in 1866 
when it was decided to disentail the estate. Clearly this 
arrangement made sounder financial sense than servicing the 
settlement charges out of the estate. By the 1860s lower 
interest rates were generally available in the money market. 
Moreover, as long as portions remained vested in the estate, 
they constantly raised legal complications which were both
' / 7 ^  \
inconvenient and expensive to deal with.v:? J
Nevertheless, settlements continued to act 
as a constant drain on the estate’s resources. John Talbot 
Clifton had just one son, Thomas Henry, but, when he died 
in 1880, he not only left personal debts of £2,700 but a 
wife and seven children to be provided for. As a result, 
the estate was charged with yet another settlement, this 
time £36,000. In total the accumulation of family settle­
ments throughout the 19th century came to £146,000 and yet,
(37)by 1894, only £20,000 had been cleared.
Settlements, then, were burdensome, but they 
only partly explain an accelerating rate of indebtedness;
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for, whereas in mid-century debt of this kind accounted 
for little more than half the total charges on the estate, 
by the 1890s it represented a much smaller fraction. With 
the Cliftons* debts standing at over £590,000 in 1900 a 
massive £464,000 still needs to be explained,
To begin with, it is easy to see why the 
Cliftons had to resort to such heavy borrowing. Quite 
simply, between 1862 and 1900, the current account showed 
a surplus on only seven occasions. In all the other years 
deficits were recorded ranging from as little as £934 in 
1867 to £42,634 in 1893. As a result, about £338,000 worth 
of debt piled up in the current account between 1862 and 
1900 which was eventually farmed out among private and 
institutional mortgagors.  ^'
But how is this prolific over-spending to 
be explained? The purchase of land is an obvious starting 
point. It is generally agreed that the rate with which 
landowners acquired new property slowed down in the second 
half of the 19th century, yet it is also apparent that 
increasing and consolidating their estates still retained a 
powerful attraction for many landowners. The Earls of
Lisburne, for example, despite onerous family debts,actually 
intensified efforts to consolidate their estate between 1876 
and 1886. ^  ^ The same pressing concern for compactness 
will also explain the Earl of Scarbrough’s regular forays 
into the land market in the 1860s and 70s/42) And the 
larger landowners in Staffordshire continued to increase the 
size of their estates well into the later 19th century.
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But, in many cases, land purchase was a cause of heavy 
borrowing. It was an expensive business which few, apart 
from the great territorial magnates, could afford to 
finance out of current income.
The Cliftons1 spending on land falls into 
this general pattern. Their large-scale purchases took 
place during the first half of the century followed by a 
process of consolidation thereafter. Major acquisitions 
completed their hold over Westby-with-Plumpton and Marton 
and strengthened their grip in Layton and Warton.^^ After 
1850 the Cliftons busied themselves buying up r,in-lying,! 
fields and farms and consolidating their estates. Warton 
was the principal target with £31,500 being spend between 
1852 and 1886 on twelve separate properties of varying sizi^^ 
Other Lancashire landowners were apparently just as active.
Sir Thomas Hesketh bought land in Tarleton (1852), Mawdesley 
(1874) and Croston (1879), again as a consolidating measure!^^ 
Lord Lilfordfs Bank Hall estate was already a large and 
compact property when it came into his ownership in 1861.
His immediate predecessor had spent £73,000 on an additional . 
1226 acres during the 1840s and 50s. But Lilford himself 
seized on every opportunity to complete the ancestral core 
of the estate through a string of small purchases culminat­
ing in the acquisition of Sir Thomas Hesketh1 s remaining 
167 acres in Bretherton.^47' Similarly, in a series of 
transactions between 1854 and 1866, the Starkie family 
bought up the 1550 acres which comprised the Ashton Hall 
estate, formerly the residence of the Dukes of Hamilton.
Lord Cardwell established his own claim to a substantial
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territorial interest in Lancashire with his purchase of 
the 1199 acre Ellerbeck estate in 1860. And, on a lesser 
scale, the Alison family of Park Hall, near Chorley, 
extended their estate by buying up farmland in Euxton and 
Eccleston in 1873.^^
The continued purchase of agricultural land 
can be included among projects such as house building or
the beautifying of parks which were intended to enhance
status and prestige. At the same time, it was not expected 
that investment in land would show a financial loss. But, 
as Rawstome*s agent pointed out, the return on land needed 
a long-term perspective, especially if land had been bought 
on mortgage and at the inflationary price of the 1870s.
The land market in Lancashire remained busy because there
was no shortage of eager buyers for whom land was still a
highly desirable social asset. In this respect, the demand 
for land was generated from outside the circle of the 
established elite as well as from within. The Garnetts of 
Guemmore were not the only family to use business wealth 
to equip themselves with landed status. The Fylde district 
alone contained quite a scattering of new landowners who, 
during the first half of the 19th century, had used the 
profits of commerce and industry to launch themselves into 
landed society.
The Jacksons of Barton Hall spring to mind 
as does James Pedder, Prestonfs foremost linen merchant, 
who purchased the Bispham Lodge estate in 1834.^°^ Nearby, 
John Kenyon, a Liverpool merchant, channelled a small fort­
une into buying and improving an estate at Stalmine during
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( 51)the 1830s. Even after 1850 the movement into land
continued, prompting Thomas Fair to remark that "the old 
families (would) soon be unable to compete with the 
fortunes of men of commerce. "(52) Certainly very few could 
have competed with the scale and speed with which Thomas 
Miller bought his way into landed society. His enormous 
wealth came from Preston’s largest cotton spinning company 
which his grandfather had helped to build in the early years 
of the century. In 1839 Miller inherited over £64,000 on 
his father’s death together with a string of cotton mills 
in which he became the major shareholder in 1842. By 1853 
he had set himself up as one of the Fylde’s leading land­
owners by buying Preese Hall for £30,000 and what became 
the new family seat, Singleton Hall, for just over £70,000. 
But the Millers did not stop at that. Between 1853 and 
1865 they bought up land in five neighbouring parishes and 
no expense was spared in creating a model estate at 
Singleton. A new mansion house was built together with new
cottages, church and school and thousands of pounds spent
( 53)on restoring the poor condition of the land.
Again, a mixture of social and political 
motives influenced the Cliftons* continuing activity in the 
local land market. For instance, in 1845, the auction of 
a farm in Woodplumpton caught John Talbot’s attention 
simply because it carried "voters’ qualifications and a pew 
in the parish church. And once the wheels had been
set in motion to purchase the control of a parish it was 
difficult to stop the momentum. Every property which came 
on to the market was invariably snapped up irrespective of
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cost. So, having bought a part of Thomas Warbrick’s Marton 
property in September 1848, Clifton pointed out to his 
agent that not only was it ’desirable to obtain the rest 
but necessary,” The following month he bought Crookhallfs
farm in Warton, At the time it was financially ’rather 
inconvenient” yet ”it was preferable to letting the property 
fall into other hands.”^5)
Inevitably, any indication that the Cliftons 
were interested buyers had an inflationary effect on prices. 
In 1873 Clifton paid just over £100 an acre for Crossfield’s 
67 acre farm in Warton. It was one of the few remaining 
owner-occupied farms in the parish and its owners used this 
very fact to put pressure on the estate and extract the 
highest possible price. ”1 have a very great dislike to an 
auction,” Crossfield told Thomas Fair, ”nor have I any 
desire to'introduce into the township a lot of little owners, 
or in fact any other party, and with that view have all 
along urged the policy of offering the land to Colonel 
Clifton privately - as I was sure it was far more desirable 
to him than any other person - and would be a step towards 
acquiring the whole township,” His last remark went 
straight to the heart of the matter and Clifton paid just 
£250 short o‘f Crossfield’s asking price.
In total, the Cliftons spent over £91,000 
between 1832 and 1885 in expanding and consolidating their 
estates in the south-west comer of the Fylde. Generally, 
they bought at high prices. Land values climbed steeply 
during the middle decades of the century in the wake of
t
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transport improvements, the growth of urban markets and
relentless demand among buyers. Where a farm and four acres
in Warton fetched £400 in 1829, Clifton had to pay £635 in
1854. Similarly four acres along the Blackpool-Lytham road
in Great Marton sold for £182 in 1834; in 1857 Clifton paid 
(57)£635. Admittedly, such expenditure was partly offset
by the sale of other land which brought in £44,000. However, 
land sales and purchases rarely coincided. Indeed it was 
not until after 1876, when most of the acquisitions had in 
fact been made, that any substantial amount of land was sold 
off. Until then, land, almost without exception, was bought 
with borrowed capital. Sometimes the vendor chose to leave 
the purchase money vested in the estate often for quite 
lengthy periods. For instance, in 1863, interest was still 
being paid to Robert Rawcliffe’s trustees whose estate had 
been bought by the Cliftons in 1 8 4 2 . Normally, though, 
the purchase money was advanced by the local banks, solic­
itors and insurance companies and only on one occasion was
(59)land paid for directly out of current income.
Not only was land bought, it also had to be 
improved, and that was another major area of debt-accumulat­
ing expenditure. Several points are worth emphasising here. 
Improvement -work - draining, fencing, farm buildings - 
involved large sums and, in general, much of the capital 
cost tended to be borne by the landowners themselves. In 
mid-century drainage alone worked out at an average cost of 
£5 an acre and that presumably excluded the cost of seed 
where land was put down to grass, fertilizers and the 
interest charge on borrowed money. ^  ^ Land reclamation was
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even more expensive. Dawson—Green of Whittington Hall,
Lancaster, shied away from plans to drain four hundred acres
of Cockerham Moss in 1866 after a survey estimated that the
cost of drainage, banking and manuring would run out at £50 
(61}an acre. Reclamation work on Hesketh Marsh came to
£22 per acre between 1879 and 1884 and that excluded a 
further £11,000 which was spent on new roads, fences, gates 
and farm buildings. Moreover, rarely were costs evenly
spread over a number of years, and there was usually some 
time delay before farm rents could be adjusted upwards. It 
is therefore unlikely that, in most cases, expenditure on 
the scale envisaged by many landowners could be found out 
of current income.
It has been estimated that British landowners 
expended some £24 millions on a variety of agricultural 
improvements between 1846 and 1876. £12 million of this
figure was borrowed from government sources and private 
improvement c o m p a n i e s . I n  feet, Lancashire landowners 
were among the first to apply for government loans under 
the 1846 Public Money Drainage Act. Lord Derby borrowed 
£34,000 and Lord Francis Egerton took out £20,000 for the 
purpose of draining moss land on his Leigh estate. Thomas 
Clifton was also among the more substantial borrowers. He 
initially applied for £25,000 but actually took up only 
£10,000 which he used to build a main drain across his 
e s t a t e s . I n  addition, on two separate occasions, Clifton 
borrowed a total of almost £30,000 from the Lands Improvement 
Company.
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The rest of the capital came from other 
sources though what proportion was funded directly out of 
current income and how much was converted into debt is 
difficult to estimate. Thomas Fair claimed that, between 
1838 and 1894, a total of £296,000 had been spent on farm 
buildings, roads, drainage and "general improvements1 
throughout the Clifton estate/67  ^ Clearly, £40,000 came 
from the Inclosure Commissioners and the Lands Improvement 
Company. However, it is reasonable to suppose that as much 
as 50% of the remainder found its way into the annual 
deficits in the current account which were eventually con­
verted into a mortgage debt.
Thomas Fair’s own balance of estimates make 
this quite clear. Once "fixed outgoings" had been deducted - 
and by this he meant annuities, family payments, interest 
charges, taxes, managerial expenses, insurance, donations 
and subscriptions - what was left out of current income was 
patently insufficient to meet the rising costs of repairs 
and improvements which he considered so vital to the estate’s 
development. Income from the agricultural estate advanced 
in fits and starts and could not have kept pace with the 
gathering momentum of improvement expenditure. In 1874/5 
outgoing le’ft a balance of just £3,911, and yet the costs 
of drainage work alone in 1874 came to £1,342, while through­
out the 1860s and 70s yearly expenditure on buildings 
averaged £5,000. Fair’s predicament in 1878 was even 
gloomier. He was left with a balance of only £1,885 "for 
repairs of buildings, drainage, roads, plantations and all
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estate improvements, irrespective of contingent outlays 
which (were) constantly and unavoidably occurring.” Indeed, 
building costs alone topped £8,000 in 1878.^68)
Indebtedness among landowners can also be 
explained by their spending on urban, industrial and 
commercial undertakings. Earl Fitzwilliam ran up debts of' 
£800,000 in the 1840s largely as a result of his invest­
ment in mining on his Wentworth-Woodhouse estate. The 
Earls of Durham and Londonderry went into considerable debt 
for much the same reason. (^ 9) Qn a ]_esser scale the Earl 
of Scarbrough increased the debt charge on his estate from 
£40,000 to £120,000 in order to launch the new resort of 
Skegness in the 1870s. And Hesketh-Fleetwood bankrupted
himself because of the debts he incurred in creating the 
port of Fleetwood.
Similarly, the mounting deficits in the
Cliftons’ current account and their steady accumulation of
mortgages partly resulted from their investment in Lytham
and St. Annes. They concentrated most of their spending on
Lytham in the late 1840s and early 50s, building villas,
cottages, promenades, public baths and assembly rooms at a
(72^total cost of about £41,750.w ' Thereafter, smaller though 
still quite considerable sums were ploughed into various 
amenities in an effort to enhance the resort’s image, but 
at the cost of widening the deficit in the estate’s account. 
In 1863 over-spending amounted to £29,000, of which £19,000 
can be attributed to investment in the Blackpool—Lytham 
railway line, extensions to Lytham’s public baths and a 
major stake in the newly formed Fylde Waterworks Company.
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Urban rents showed a healthier increase after 1873 but any 
improvement in income was more than offset by the £14,300 
which was spent on building a new coastal road connecting 
Lytham with the new resort at St, Annes.^^
Expenditure on the scale which took place 
on both the urban and agricultural estates will largely 
explain the Cliftons1 colossal overspending between 1832 
and 1880. But this is not quite the whole story. Not even 
investment on this level will totally account for debts of 
£361,000 in 1880. Moreover, whereas capital investment 
began to tail off after 1880, the debt burden actually shot 
up to a crushing £590,000 by 1900. This sudden acceleration 
was symptomatic of a cancer that had been eating away at 
the financial health of the estate throughout the second 
hald of the century. In short it was the consequence of 
years of expensive self-indulgence by three successive 
generations of Cliftons.
There seems to be little quarrel among 
historians concerning the extravagant behaviour which 
characterised landowners of the late 18th and early t9th 
centuries. Reckless irresponsibility is said to have brought 
about the Duke of Buckingham’s notorious bankruptcy by 1848; 
and, if few could match the sixth Duke of Devonshire’s spend­
ing power, fewer still could match the speed with which his 
passion for houses, travel and collecting art treasures 
piled up debt.^^ By contrast, the mid-Victorian years 
have been regarded as an era which supposedly ushered in a 
"reaction to the loose spending of earlier generations."
And yet it is questionable whether landowners had generally
become more interested in "redeeming the debts of the 
(75)past." In their behaviour and spending habits land­
owners were probably no different from their predecessors.
In other words, their ranks were likely to contain the 
same mixture of the profligate and carefree as well as the 
thrifty and industrious. . Staffordshire, for example, could 
boast its fair share of enterprising landowners who increased 
their incomes through cultivating the resources of their 
estates; but, at one and the same time, the diligent and the 
frugal rubbed shoulders with those who wantonly disposed of 
fortunes almost as quickly as they were made.^^ Similarly, 
Lord Lisburnefs efforts to improve estate income were under­
mined by the debts which his eldest son ran up. This harm­
ful tradition of family extravagance persisted into the
1880s and resulted in mounting debt in a period of declining 
(77)revenue. '
Much more work needs to be done on the life­
styles and personal spending habits of Lancashire landowners; 
but it may be that few were prepared to trim their own 
spending to the fluctuating level of estate income. In this 
respect, the Garnetts of Quernmore were exceptional in the 
way in which the sober, frugal habits of their business 
background lived on for several generations. William 
Garnett, the founding father of the estate, gave priority 
to the purchase and improvement of land. He scrupulously 
observed the limits to his own personal spending, scrutin­
ised the accounts for unnecessary expenditure and repeatedly 
told his agent to cut back on the household budget. His son,
- 73 -
William James,, carried on in the same tradition. He
apparently had a personal dread of going into debt and kept
a similar tight rein on spending,Interestingly, by
the time the estate passed into the third generation, there
are signs of a slight change in attitude. The Garnettfs
social spending on charities, political causes and the
trappings of status increased as they become more entrenched
in landed circles. In 1879 William Garnett spent £2,121 on
the duties of High Sheriff and, in the same year, extended
the family mansion at a cost of cc/1,800. And, for tns first
( 79)time, deficits began to appear in the current account. J 
Other landowners seemed to have been less restrained in 
their spending. In part the Braddylls1 financial liabilit­
ies can be linked with the rebuilding of their imposing 
seat at Conishead Priory in the 1850s, and the De Hoghtons 
lavished a small fortune on the complete restoration of 
Hoghton Tower in the 1870s. Still others preferred to
distance themselves from their Lancashire' estates altogether 
and, like Lilford or Hesketh, retreat to the warmer and 
more expensive climes of the south of England, Europe and 
the Caribbean.
However, few landowners could have matched 
the Cliftons1 extravagant tastes or their almost total 
disregard for the staggering debts which their reckless 
self-indulgence piled up. Whereas Thomas Clifton had always 
shown himself willing to moderate his spending when the 
estate was under financial pressure, his successors were 
clearly not prepared to make the same sacrifices. Once John 
Talbot Clifton has exhausted his interest in a political and
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military career he spent most of his later life in the
gaming clubs of London, amid the hunting circles of
Northamptonshire and cruising the Mediterranean in a series 
of ocean-going yachts. The bills inevitably found their 
way back to the estate office. April 1854 was typical of 
the many occasions the agent had to come to his employer*s
rescue. Then, £5,000 was needed to cover the costs of
refurbishing Clifton*s London home in Berkeley Square, 
repairs to his hunting lodge amounted to £500 and there was 
the matter of clearing £5,000 worth of debts owed to 
Clifton*s private bankers. ^8^
"Keeping up this play of being rich with 
nothing at the bank and £5,000 in debt,” he complained,"will 
break any man*s spirits.,tV But it did not dampen 
Clifton*s enthusiasm for spending more. He lived from one 
financial crisis to the next in the comfortable knowledge 
that the bills could be settled later; and no amount of 
pleading and cajoling by his wife and agent made the slight­
est difference to his extravagant habits. ^8Zf^ By 1864 
Clifton had run up a further overdraft of £6,000 which the 
estate had to pay off in yearly instalments.^8^  But no 
sooner had one debt been cleared than another began to 
gather in its place. Between 1864 and 1874 Clifton and his 
son received additional payments of almost £19,000 which 
were used to discharge their personal liabilities.^88  ^ Yet 
clearing this accumulation of debt increased the estate *s 
outgoings, widened the deficit in the current account still 
further and compounded the mortgage requirement. In addition, 
the estate then had to deal with debts of £50,000 which
John Talbot Clifton left on his death in 1882*
However, by chance, the deaths of Thomas 
Henry Clifton and his father brought a temporary respite to 
the problem of coping with excessive family expenditure.
The estate passed to a minor and its management was placed 
in the hands of trustees. At last Thomas Fair was in a 
position of being able to make his financial projections on 
the basis of fairly reliable estimates. Family payments 
rarely exceeded £10,000 a year throughout the 1880s and 
this was sufficient at least to stabilise the gulf between 
income and expenditure which had been progressively widen­
ing until 1880. Indeed, the estate accounts recorded the 
almost unprecedented achievement of showing a small surplus 
on several successive occasions.
Yet this turned out to be nothing more than 
the calm before the storm. By 1900 another £129,000 worth 
of debt had accumulated most of it after 1889. The main 
explanation for this alarming increase is obvious. Family 
expenditure shot up to almost £40,000 in 1889, £32,800 in 
1890, £39,000 in 1891, £20,500 in 1892 and a peak of 
£46,000 in 1 8 9 3 . Spending on this scale coincided with 
the young John Talbot Clifton attaining his majority and, 
with it, the freedom to indulge his expensive whims. His 
roaming espeditions into the most remote comers of the 
world made his grandfather*s Mediterranean cruises cheap by 
comparison. "How very much the estate will be crippled in 
the future." the accountants warned Thomas Fair. "We fear 
Clifton*s income will be much diminished and must be
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regretted on his own a c c o u n t . A t  a conservative 
estimate Clifton exceeded his allowance by £140-150,000 
between 1889 and 1900. It could not have come at a worse 
time with the deepening agricultural recession putting 
still greater pressure on current income.
Nevertheless, Clifton!s reckless behaviour 
should not obscure the fact that the estate was vulnerable 
long before be applied the final blow in 1889. The Cliftons, 
like many other landowners, were already weighed down by 
heavy debt. Yet this was a condition which few could have 
avoided and even fewer could have entirely escaped from 
unless, of course, they had the income and assets of Lord 
Derby or the Duke of Devonshire. They borrowed money to 
pay off portions, to buy and improve land, to promote 
business ventures and to finance an expensive life-style 
and the visible trappings of status. At the same time, they 
borrowed money on the assumption that income would continue 
to improve and, as long as this was the case, even an 
increasing level of debt could be tolerated. But, in the 
end, an inflated sense of self-assurance, an over-confidence 
in the security of land pushed the Clifton estate to the 
brink of disaster. John Talbot Clifton simply helped it 
over the edge.
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CHAPTER III .
THE LANDOWNER AND ESTATE MANAGEMENT
It has been argued that the landowners* 
"persistent energies for change" provided the basic 
momentum behind the agricultural advance of the 19th centuryP ^ 
Historical Judgements on the entrepreneurial activities of. 
landowners in the non-agricultural sector have been no less 
generous. It has been suggested, for instance, that the 
landowners* role in industrial development was probably of 
equal importance to the part they played in the course of 
agricultural change over the period 1700-1870.^ In this 
respect the wheel has turned full circle. No-one can now 
seriously accept the view published by 19th century radicals 
that, in contrast to the dynamism of the industrial and 
commercial "middle classes", Britain*s landed elite were 
both backward and lethargic in their economic thinking and 
in the management of their estates.
However, a real danger lies in assuming that, 
merely by act of association, landowners were the major 
source of initiative and instinctively responded to new 
business opportunities. Outward impressions of the land- 
owner-as-industrialise run the risk of investing him with 
entrepreneurial qualities which in reality he did not always 
possess. For instance, because of the direct links between 
the growth of Barrow as a centre for the iron and ship­
building industries and the Devonshire estate, it is tempt­
ing to ascribe the qualities of business leadership to the 
landowner himself. Yet it has been said of the seventh Duke
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that his administrative involvement in Barrow*s development 
was negligible, it is doubtful whether he was even familiar 
with the geography of the town, and that he felt more at 
ease in the conventional surroundings of the Lonsdale 
Agricultural Society,Professor Ward’s bald statement of 
business enterprise on the part of 19th century Ayrshire 
landowners could just as easily apply to most Lancashire 
landowners and be just as misleading, By virtue of the 
geographical extent of their estates Lancashire’s major land­
owners were singularly well placed to reap the rewards of 
industrial and urban development in the county. In virtually 
every case - turnpikes, canals, railway promotion, mining, 
ports, seaside resorts, residential building - connections 
of some kind can be traced to the landed interest in the 
county.
Crude overviews of this kind beg a number 
of pressing questions, answers to which may very well provide 
a more complex, yet at the same time, more valid, picture of 
landowners’ response to the economic challenge of their day.
At the heart of the matter lies the extent to which landowners 
were actually involved in the management of their estates.
It is to be expected that, as leaders of society, they should 
have had the. freedom and leisure to pursue occupations of a 
social and political kind unencumbered by the petty details 
of estate supervision. Nevertheless, Professor Thompson has 
warned that "it would be wrong to conclude that landowners 
confined themselves exclusively to the esqpenditure of 
incomes and were content to leave administration to agents 
and servants." Indeed he saw the role of landowners as
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being far more positive than that since ffthe tendency on 
the part of the great landowners was to become more fully 
involved in management and the general impression is that 
a growing proportion of them did in fact behave as 
directors of estates."^
However, what form did their participation 
take? Involvement could be expressed at several levels; at 
the titular level in the way in which the landowner added 
the weight of his rank and status to the promotion of the 
vested interests of his estate; at an administrative level, 
in that some landowners did have the control which stemmed 
from a detailed, working knowledge of investments and 
developments on their properties; and finally at the 
creative level in the sense of a landowners being alert to 
new opportunities and having the readiness to assume the 
initiative. There is no doubt that this is an interesting 
and useful analytical formula, though it remains difficult to 
locate individual landowners in one or more of these categ­
ories. However, it expresses an approach shared by 
Dr. Cannadine whose study of the managerial roles of the 
Earls of Calthorpe and their agents led him to conclude that 
"there were many intermediate positions between impressive
power and total impotence.. .a broad spectrum ranging from
(6}informed idleness to circumscribed exuberance. "v ' What is 
clear is that only through case studies of how business 
decisions were shaped on individual estates can historians 
acquire a fuller understanding not only of changes in 
landowners1 attitudes but also of the adaptability and
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capacity for survival displayed by some, though by no means 
all, of the landed elite.
Accordingly, the remainder of this chapter 
focuses primarily on the Clifton estate at Lytham but also 
offers comparisons with the managerial experiences on a 
number of other Lancashire estates, in the hope that it will 
make a further contribution to building up a composite 
picture of the attitudes and function of major landowners 
in an era of profound economic change. Evidence is 
difficult to unearth, but the estates so far researched do 
underline the fact that there was no typical model, no 
definitive form of landowner-agent managerial relationship. 
Personal idiosyncracies, the size of an estate, the mounting 
complexities of estate business, the emergence of more rigorous 
professional standards among agents and an increasing tendency 
among the larger proprietors towards prolonged absenteeism, 
all these factors had a bearing on the role of the landowner 
in business affairs.
I
At one end of the scale stands the figure 
of Charles Scarisbrick, founding—father of the seaside resort 
of Southport. In the fullest entrepreneurial sense, the 
flair and foresight behind schemes to diversify investments 
as widely as possible outside the confines of his ancestral 
and agricultural estate was unmistakably Scarisbrick1 s. 
tyfffh properties scattered across central and south-west
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Lancashire, a complex administrative structure evolved on 
his estate. As chief agent, W.H. Talbot supervised the 
running of the whole estate from his base at Wrightington 
Hall, A team of sub—agents was delegated to look after 
specific interests - Richard Wright at Southport, Samuel 
Jones at the Green Slate quarries and coal managers at the 
Wigan collieries. But none of these men exercised managerial 
autonomy. Instructions were passed down the command struct­
ure from on high, for it was essentially Scarisbrick who 
retained exclusive control of business decisions. Indeed, 
the instructions he issued to Talbot were not only detailed 
but they embraced every conceivable aspect of estate affairs 
ranging from trivial administrative matters to complex 
large-scale investments - the deployment of workmen around 
the property, the provision of pensions for the widows of 
estate workers, the construction of cottages, the sinking of 
a new coal-pit, all came under Scarisbrick1s close scrutiny. 
Nothing seems to have escaped his attention. He had an 
intimate knowledge of the character and abilities of his 
tenant farmers and of the cropping arrangements on individual 
farms. Little, if anything, was left to the discretion of his 
agent as is evident, for example, from his precise instruct­
ions on farm, letting. "Pennington,1 he informed Talbot in 
December 1855, "though a good-natured fellow, is too great 
a fool to be a neighbour as he has shown - Let Gore have the 
Burscough fields. Keep the remainder together until we see
further. Pilkington to have the next chance Forshaw
has the next offer." But Scarisbrick was ju£*t at home in 
the business world taking personal control over such matters
as share transactions and the buying and selling of land.^
Sir Thomas Hesketh was very much of the 
same mould as Charles Scarisbrick. In his case prolonged 
absences from Rufford Hall did not make Hesketh any less an 
effective director of his estate. He governed at a distance 
He was deliberate and firm in his instructions and unrelent­
ing in his demands upon his long-service and long-suffering 
agent William Shakeshaft. The volume and the tone of the 
correspondence between the two leaves no doubt that Hesketh 
intended his agent to act as little more than a general 
factotum. Failure to execute Hesketh1s instructions to the 
full was met with threatening censure. His autocratic, 
uncompromising temperament was plainly expressed in a sharp 
rebuke he delivered to his agent in 1817: "The enormous 
amount of arrears and the evident plan to continue the 
system by'not paying their present rents bespeak a total 
disregard of you as my steward... .If any tenant cannot pay 
sell him up and turn him off. Better to farm the lands 
myself than go upon a system which has now existed so many 
years and has certainly increased in an extraordinary manner 
during your stewardship"; and he went on to warn his agent 
that if he did not "have.. .authority enough to overcome this 
or exertion 'enough to do so there can be but one alternative
This could just as easily have been a 
description of the Scarisbrick estate since Hesketh1 s agent 
was left with minimal scope for independent action.
Certainly the broader policies governing estate development 
lay exclusively within the prerogative of the landowner.
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But not even the minutiae of day-to-day administration went 
without his correction. Indeed the managerial tone was set 
by the general instructions which were issued to Shakeshaft 
on his appointment in 1809* Estate policy for the rational­
isation of farm units, land-use, drainage and rents was 
sole preserve of the landowner. The agent was appointed to 
implement it. Twenty five years later there was no evidence 
to suggest that Hesketh had in any way relaxed his grip over 
estate affairs. He was adament, for instance, in maintain­
ing a watchful eye on building costs. "Before you begin 
repairs of any kind", Hesketh informed his agent in 1833,
"I desire I may have particulars with a sketch of the 
premises and as nearly as you can of the expense requisite 
for each.” The suggestion that perhaps more repairs were 
needed prompted an immediate reaction: "I must repear my
orders positively that in making necessary repairs I will not 
alter, new-build and modernise old houses - as they have 
hitherto done for the tenantry, so they shall continue to 
do."^ His supervision of other administrative tasks was 
no less exhaustive. In one of Hesketh’s typically wide 
ranging letters Shakeshaft was instructed not to let farms 
on the Great Harwood estate since Hesketh himself intended 
to go over 7everyone of them immediately after the rent day... 
in order that I may fix more decidedly on what I will do in 
the winter.1 Indeed, not a ditch was cleaned out nor a 
field drained without his specific direction or approval/10'
More significantly, the reach of Hesketh*s 
personal involvement extended far beyond the conventional
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administrative tasks of running a large agricultural estate. 
His business interests included quarries in Wrightington, 
coal—mining in Shevington and Great Harwood and Parbold and 
a substantial stake in the Ribble Navigation Company.
However, here he was less sure of his ground, and he wisely 
took expert advice from an experienced coal-agent in Bolton, 
and worked closely with the estate’s Preston solicitors on 
the finer legal issues of his business a f f a i r s . Y e t  
Hesketh nevertheless insisted on retaining complete control 
over decision making. For instance, his dealings with a 
Liverpool based mining company which was interested in 
carrying out exploratory work in Shevington in 1816 had all 
the hallmarks of his autocratic manner. Claiming that he 
was "always ready to receive any fair and equitable offer 
from any respectable and responsible people,” Hesketh went 
on to specify his own stringent conditions. Damage to 
property was to be made good "honestly, faithfully and with­
out disputes.” On no account was the estate to incur any 
of the expenses. Borings were to be taken only where 
Hesketh thought fit. The lease would be limited to twelve
months and Hesketh reserved the right to close down operat-
(12)ions should "any injurious activity" take place. Not
altogether surprisingly the company objected to the land­
owner’s terms which, they thought, reflected "a seemingly 
unfriendly disposition manifested throughout the whole tenor 
of them. In particular they wanted permission to bore
as long as there was a reasonable hope of success and 
without the restrictions of having Hesketh* s^ appointed super- 
visor permanently on site/141 Hesketh's reaction suggested
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a greater concern with protecting his own authority and 
status that with taking immediate advantage of what was no 
doubt a potentially lucrative business offer. ,fI have no 
wish to let my coals," he announced, "and I am heartily 
wearied with so tedious a correspondence. I now finally 
and decisively conclude the negotiations by saying that the 
conditions as laid down and forwarded to you must be 
immediately accepted or wholly rejected." To conclude the 
narrative, the mining company failed to meet the deadline of 
one week and so negotiations were brought to an abrupt endP^ 
Hesketh was very much his own master.
His personal handling of coal-mining on his
estates was not untypical of Hesketh1 s style. The same
decisive action was evident in his dealings with the Ribble
Navigation Company. Hesketh had in fact been a shareholder
(1 f \}in the company since its formation in 1806.' * A new
company was incorporated in 1837 for the purpose of carrying
out further improvement work to the Port of Preston and the
Ribble estuary, after eight years of protracted discussion
and negotiation between the interested parties, who included ’
(17)a number of prominent landowners. In a personal
memorandum Hesketh made his own estimation of the company’s 
prospects and the terms on which he would be prepared to 
participate in the scheme. In general he took a pessimistic 
view of the company’s future profitability. A current company 
debt of over £3,800 had to be paid off and there was every 
indication that cargo traffic would transfer itself up the 
coast to Glasson dock, since cargo intended for Preston had
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first to be disembarked at the mouth of the Ribble estuary 
at Lytham. Hesketh was proved right in his views of 
Preston’s viability as a port and he wisely kept his own 
share stake in the new company to a m i n i m u m , (^Q)
As the owner of a relatively modest and
largely agricultural estatem Charles Blundell typified the
diligent squire of the early 19th century. In his case
absence from the estate did not imply detachment from its
administration. From his London home he bombarded his
agent, an Ormskirk solicitor, with searching questions and
detailed comment on estate affairs - how to deal with
tenants in arrears of rent, grazing arrangements on the Hall
Park, the sale of surplus stock, which of his Preston
(19)properties to sell and when.v For better or worse there
could be little doubt with whim the final decision lay.
,fI now find," Blundell remarked to his agent in connection 
with a property deal of 1825, "that I should have done well 
to have purchased when land was low, as you recommended, for, 
though I should have sold at the present prices, it would 
have been the best investment.
Scarisbrick and Hesketh and Blundell, then, 
are just three examples of landowners who, in varying degree, 
stamped their own authority on the management of their 
e s t a t e s . Y e t ,  moving to the other end of the spectrum, 
there were others who were more or less content to leave 
estate affairs in the hands of their agents. Indeed, whilst 
there are numerous examples of a joint initiative between 
landowner and agent behind successful business ventures, at
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the same time, there were also aristocratic ironmasters 
like Lord Granville or colliery owners like the second Earl 
of Durham who continued to regard their estates as a unit 
of consumption rather than as a business concern requiring 
careful management. in fact, it may well have been the
case that the 19th century witnessed a more pronounced 
withdrawal by landowners generally, and by the gentry in 
particular, from an active administrative role. As their 
business interests widened and called for much greater 
managerial complexity, they were able to fall back on the 
professional skills of agents who were better versed in 
business and financial matters.
Of course it did not always follow that 
delegating powers of control to an agent necessarily meant 
better management. In a period when recruitment procedure 
was ill-defined, appointing the right kind of agent could 
largely be a matter of luck. In fact, some were distinctly 
unfortunate in their choice. To some extent the Braddylls* 
financial misfortunes stemmed from the incompetence and 
plain dishonesty of their agent. The coal mines for which 
he had full managerial responsibility operated at a heavy 
loss. More seriously, "deficiencies” in the agentfs 
accounts amounted to £49,000.(23' The Earl of Wilton of 
Heaton Hall, Manchester, suffered a similar e^ qperience. In 
1841 claims were also made against his agent, Richard Denham, 
for the "errors” in his accounts which came to almost 
£38,000 spread over a period of sixteen years.^  ^ But the
fact that these unfortunate occurrences took place at all
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gives some indication of a lack of managerial supervision 
by the landowner himself.
Lord Lilford*s estate offers a good example 
of the way in which managerial arrangements were influenced 
by the nature of business affairs, by the landowner^ 
virtually permanent absence from the property and by his 
own lack of business experience. Until the acquisition of 
Bank Hall, Bretherton in 1861 urban property and coal mining
at Leigh and Atherton were the central concerns of the
(25)Lilford estate. y Lilford himself maintained an overview 
of estate developments as the weighty correspondence with 
his agent will testify. But he was content to leave both 
policy and detailed planning to his agent and solicitors and 
many of his letters merely reiterated and approved proposals 
put forward by his staff. "I must be guided by your judge­
ment of what is best,” he told his agent Richard Hodgkinson 
on one occasion when negotiations were being conducted with 
a group of coal speculators/26  ^ But even Hodgkinson did 
not measure up to the more complex demands of running a 
large and diverse 19th century estate.
Lilford1 s agent had all the commendable 
qualities of a loyal and hard-working steward but, in certain 
important respects, he fell short of what was increasingly 
required of the modern business manager. By 1836 he 
confessed to being bewildered by the complexities of dealing 
with mine operators and building speculators who besieged 
his office for operational concessions on the estate. 
Hodgkinson’s candid assessment of his own position is worth
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quoting in full. »i know not why SQ happens," he
complained to the estatefs lawyers, "but it has so happened
for the last twelve months that no bargain that I have made
has been carried into effect, some flaw or defect or other
has been found or pretended to be found in the title of
wording of the contract, so as to render my utmost exertions
abortive and hence my situation has for some time been very
irksome; and, if it cannot be improved, I must quit it up 
( 0 7 )
altogether.1 By the end of the year Hodgkinson had in
fact resigned and he made way for William Selby and his son,
men who first and foremost were mining engineers and products
of the business world. As a result the Lilford estate came
under the managerial control of agents who had specialised
expertise, powerful opinions and a strong influence over
their employer. It was essentially they who developed a
competitive and finely tuned policy towards the mining
companies; and it was they who, through their comprehensive
knowledge of mining operations in the locality, determined
(28)the pace and conditions under which coal was to be mined. 
Moreover, this situation on the Lilford estate was not 
exceptional. Despite all their mineral wealth, the admin­
istration on the Earls of Dudley’s Midlands estates during 
the early 19th century was woefully archaic. Supervision 
was distant, accounting methods were primitive and the 
obsolete practices of 18th century stewardship prevailed. In 
short, the Dudley estates were "under the everyday manage­
ment of men who were not qualified in land or mine valuation,
(29)
still less in mining engineering. ”
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However, it must be added that Lilford, like Dudley was no 
passive observer. There were occasions when he made a firm 
managerial intervention and yet, when he did so, it was not 
always for sound business reasons. In this respect two 
episodes are worth recalling. The first, in 1836, concerned 
building policy in Atherton and Leigh. Normally such 
matters as building covenants, lease terms, street plains 
and land values were dealt with by a management team of agent, 
surveyors and lawyers. Lilford played no part except for 
signing bundles of leases on his rare visits to the county.
In 1836, however, a proposal to build a gasworks in Atherton 
resulted in a sharp difference of opinion between Lilford 
and his agent. Keen to encourage building expansion in 
Atherton, Hodgkinson had no doubts that it would pay the 
estate to offer generous terms to the gas company, namely a 
ground rent of id. per square yard instead of the customary 
1d. together with a 999 year lease. His letters to Lilford 
were suitably deferential but they expressed a commercially 
sound argument which was seemingly difficult to resist.
Indeed Hodgkinson had already pre-empted a formal letter of 
approval* "As it was indispensible that your Lordship*s 
name or mine should first appear in the list (of subscribers)
I put down your name for ten shares with an expressed 
stipulation that I must have them myself if your Lordship 
declined taking them."(315 Lilford‘s reaction was not the 
one Hodgkinson expected. His sense of business opportunity 
gave way to a greater sense of fair play which argued that 
Atherton should be treated no differently from Leigh.
Lilford was firmly opposed to letting land in Atherton for
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anything less than the 1d. per square yard he charged at
Leigh and he was prepared to "offer a lease of 99 years and 
(32)no more," Hodgkinson refused to relent. "It is not
for me," he replied, "to point out to your Lordship any 
particular line of conduct for your Lordship to adopt in any 
particular question - but it may perhaps be part of my duty 
to acquaint your Lordship of the feelings in any particular 
question arising solely between your Lordship and your ' 
tenants." There already existed three factories in Atherton, 
he went on, capable of consuming more gas than the whole 
township of Leigh. A gas works had already been built at 
Leigh and on land belonging "to a private person who among 
us is noted for making most of his property." Furthermore, 
"the inhabitants of Atherton feel strongly upon what they 
call the preference given to Leigh over Atherton on the 
subject of leasing.Ultimately, this combination of 
ingratiation and hard reasoning carried the day. The gas­
works at Atherton was built and 999 year leases became the
(34)standard building term. 7
A second area of conflict between landowner 
and agent centred on the intense rivalry among the railway 
companies to gain access across Lilford*s estate, which was 
strategically situated between Liverpool and Lancashire's 
industrial heartland, Bolton and Manchester. The early 
years of Lancashire's railway history had been formative 
ones in equipping estate administrators with the experience 
of dealing with the railway companies. Indeed the Lilford 
estate was connected with two of the first Xines to be built, 
the Bolton/Leigh and the Newton/Warrington lines, which
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opened in 1831.^"^ Hodgkinson and the estate’s solicitors 
were basically responsible for articulating the landowner’s 
interests. Their command over the complexities of railway 
promotion was vital - for instance, the timing and present­
ation of objections before parliamentary committee or 
compensation to be paid for damage done to agricultural land. 
In the case of the Bolton-Leigh railway bill it was the 
estate’s solicitors who drew up the detailed and specific 
clauses which excluded the railway company from building 
roads and warehouses which might have been a threat to 
Lilford’s own coal trade in Atherton. At the same time these 
early ventures registered the fact that transactions with 
the railway companies could be highly lucrative. One and a 
half acres sold to the Newton-Warrington railway company 
made £433 and the Bolton and Leigh company paid £1,000 for 
their tract of land.^°^
It was partly the speculative attraction of 
selling railway land to the highest bidder which prompted 
Lilford’s unusual intervention in the negotiations between 
the estate office and two rival companies over the construct-, 
ion of a Manchester-Southport line in 1845. The intense 
rivalry to win Lilford*s support involved the Grand Union 
and a Manchester based consortium whom proposed building 
two lines - Manchester/Southport and Liverpool/Preston - 
served by a junction at Atherton. No doubt Lilford was 
aware that, in the railway mania which characterised the 
1840s, exorbitant prices could be asked and obtained. His 
own preference settled on the Grand Union, they offered a 
cash price of £200 per acre as opposed to a share allocation
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in the company* Yet, there were also motives of a more 
personal nature involved. He took offence at the fact that 
his agent Selby and the directors of the competing company 
had earlier reached a preliminary agreement without his 
prior knowledge or consent.(37) Nevertheless, Selby’s own 
assessment of the situation made sound commercial sense. 
Carriage charges demanded by the Grand Union and their 
associate companies had previously made it difficult for 
Atherton coal to penetrate the Liverpool and Manchester 
markets and he was more than anxious to prevent the Grand 
Union from completing what would amount to a monopoly over 
the railway network in the locality. (38) In the end the 
prospects of a speculative killing and Lilford1s sense of 
wounded pride gave way to his agentfs sounder business 
assessment. In all, Lord Lilford could be described 
neither as a disinterested onlooker nor a dynamic partic­
ipant in the management of estate affairs. He could and 
did act decisively in influencing managerial decisions but 
not in a way which suggests a mature commercial awareness.
II
The Clifton estate highlights important 
features of managerial relationships on what was a large and 
complex property. In this respect the period of Thomas 
Clifton’s ownership, from 1832 to 1851, is of particular 
interest. After all, these were formative years in the 
estate’s development when agriculture was being reorganised, 
railways built and the first heavy investment made in the 
urban property. It was also a period in which the landowner
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was administratively more active. Even so, Clifton’s role, 
like that of Lord Lilford*s, tended to be heavily 
restricted by his own absenteeism and his inability to come 
to terms with business affairs outside matters of an 
agricultural kind. After mid-century successive owners 
continued to matter though not in any serious administrative 
sense. Briefly, they tended to be more concerned with the 
spending of wealth rather than with the means which generated 
it.
In terms of managerial influence there were 
other groups of people who mattered more than the Cliftons. 
Firstly, every landed family needed a body of solicitors at 
its back if only to fight the seemingly endless litigations 
which formed a conventional part of a landowner’s life­
style. But, clearly, the role of the legal body was more 
important than that. Cutting through the complex knot of 
family settlements, land laws, conveyance, covenants and 
mortgages required intense legal supervision. Indeed the 
Cliftons had personal experience of the kind of problems 
which the absence of professional guidance could create.
The attempt by Hesketh-Fleetwood’s steward to carry out the 
sale of the .Marton estate to the Cliftons in 1842 without 
regular legal advice resulted in such difficulties with 
mortgages that the whole transaction was threatend at one 
stage.^9) Furthermore, solicitors’ wide experience of 
building procedures and leasing policies proved to be of 
crucial importance to an estate increasingly concerned with 
urban development. Indeed the Cliftons’ solicitors were 
fully involved in every stage of planning especially when
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bhe building of Sb. Annes gob under way.^^"^ Moreover, 
where solicibors acbed in bhe dual role of legal advisors 
and brusbees bo an esbabe, as was bhe case ab Soubhporb, 
bhey were in a posibion bo exerb a more considerable 
influence over policy.
Above all,, as has already been suggesbed, a 
brushed firm of solicibors filled bhe vibal role of morbgage
f / O \
broker. ' Given bheir wide-ranging influence and 
connecbions as well as bheir genuine sense of bradibion and 
long service bo bhe esbabe, Wilson and Deacon came bo bhe 
rescue of bhe Clifbons on more bhan one occasion. Their 
familiariby wibh bhe local money markeb enabled bhem bo find 
consolidabing morbgages ab bhe besb rabes. In bhe difficulb 
days of 1850, for insbance, bhey persuaded a local business­
man and properby owner, J.W. Shubbleworbh, bo parb wibh 
£76,000 for bhe purpose of clearing a number of smaller and 
more expensive loans and, as a resulb, reduced bhe level of 
fixed oubgoings on inberesb c h a r g e s . A n d ,  in momenbs
of crisis such as in 1894, bhey personally pub up bhe money
(44)bo shore up bhe esbabefs solvency.
Bub by far bhe mosb imporbanb adminisbrabive 
group were bhe land agenbs. Indeed, behind every successul 
landowner, ib could be argued, bhere could be found an 
equally successful agenb. The forbunes of bhe Bedford, 
Sbafford and Fibzwilliam families, for example, were builb 
on bhe devobion and capabiliby of agenbs like John Haedy, 
James Locke and Daniel Maude/45' These impressive figures 
also had bheir regional equivalenbs. The Hales saw bo bhe
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central administration of Lord Derbyfs multifarious estates. 
Succeeding generations of Selbys took command of Lord 
Lilford1 s widely scattered urban and agricultural propert­
ies. The Devonshire interests were left in the capable 
hands of James Drewry. And, at one time or another, all of 
these men canvassed the knowledge and experience of the 
Fairs who, in effect, masterminded the sweeping changes 
taking place on the Clifton estate during the 19th century. 
Furthermore,many of these agents established dynastic links 
with their respective estates ensuring a continuity of 
management procedures and policies. In their role as agents 
the Shakeshaft family became as indelibly linked with the 
Rufford Hall estate as the landowner. Similarly, the first 
of the Fairs, James Fair, arrived as agent to the Clifton 
estate in 1836 and his grandson was carrying out the same 
administrative duties at the turn of the century.
Clearly, the real test of a good agent was 
not just his unimpeachable character but his technical 
expertise is meeting the ever-widening demands made on his 
managerial skills. By the middle of the 19th century it 
no longer sufficed to recruit from among groups which had 
been traditionally favoured by landowners, namely local 
solicitors and retired army officers, on the grounds that 
individuals such as these were regarded as socially fitting 
Managing the rapidly diversifying interests of the 19th 
century estate called for qualities of an essentially 
professional kind. Energy, initiative, technical expertise 
and broad administrative abilities were required to deal
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with the scale of enterprise evident on many of Lancashire’s 
large estates# Agricultural affairs alone demanded a 
thorough business-like approach. Implementing a good 
system of farming involved a vigilant attention to the 
condition of every farm and every field, familiarity with 
technical advances in farming methods, proficiency in drain­
age operations, a working, knowledge of price and market 
trends and so on.^^ More and more, however, the respons­
ibilities of the 19th century land-agent transcended the 
traditional sphere of agriculture. Increasingly he moved 
in the world of the mining engineer, the railway contractor, 
the builder and the financier. He was involved in the 
evaluation of non-agricultural ventures and in a continuing 
redefinition of the estate’s needs all of which suggested 
”a step forward in the development of an estate consciousness 
and of a more professional function for the agent.1
By and large, the estates which fall within
the scope of this study were administered by men of impress­
ive ability. No more so than the Clifton estate which was
fortunate to have at the helm men of the calibre of James
and Thomas Fair. A number of impressive developments took 
place under their agency. They brought sweeping changes to 
the agricultural property. The village of Lytham was trans­
formed into a select residential resort. The expansion of 
Blackpool was also bound up with the Cliftons1 territorial 
interests. The estate inspired the planning and building of 
a new resort at St. Annes. Further, the construction of the 
Py»2_de railway network and schemes to dredge the Ribble and 
enlarge the Port of Preston were ventures which had strong
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connections v/ith the Clifton family. It is an impressive 
scene of economic activity such as could have been found on 
many large estates during the 19th century; and yet such a 
bald statement of achievement leaves a number of important 
questions unanswered. How were such undertakings managed?
Who determined the timing and direction of these develop­
ments? What form did the decision-making process take? In 
short, is it possible to lay bare the respective managerial 
contributions of landowner and agent? Professor Thompson 
has already pointed out how difficult it is "to generalise 
about the division of managerial function between landowners 
and their agents."^^ Nevertheless, it seems vital to an 
understanding of the nature and mechanism of change on 
landed estates that some attempt should be made.
There can be no doubt that the truly entre­
preneurial phase in the transformation of the Clifton estate 
stemmed from the partnership between Thomas Clifton who 
inherited the property in 1832 and James Fair who was 
appointed agent in 1836. Unfortunately little is known about
Fair’s background. What evidence there is suggests that he 
had established a certain local reputation for himself 
before his appointment to the estate office at Lytham. He
had served his apprenticeship with Lord Derby and was 
eventually placed in charge of the Earl’s Weeton property on 
the Fylde, where he probably came to Clifton’s attention.^50  ^
Clifton could not have been more fortunate in his choice of 
agent. Fair brought with him qualities of character, 
resourcefulness and technical ability which were evident 
from the outset. First and foremost, his reputation was
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built on his abilities as an agricultural improver. As
early correspondence and a series of estate surveys suggests,
Fair threw himself into the' detail of reorganising farming
throughout the estate. When he was not in the estate
office his time seems to have taken up with the newly
founded Lytham Agricultural Improvement Society, keeping
abreast of the latest scientific treatises or exchanging
views and ideas with other agriculturalists.^^ His
expertise did not go unnoticed. Neighbouring farmers and
landowners made frequent demand on Fair’s time. Typical
was John Cunliffe of Myerscough Hall who pleaded that he
could "scarcely move a spadeful of earth from the place
where it lies until you have seen it."v J William Garnett
wanted Fair’s advice on whether to purchase Ashton Hall
(55)estate when it came onto the market in 1840. Edward
Dawson of, Aldcliffe Hall wanted a tour of inspection of 
Lytham estate before he started draining his own property[5^ ) 
Estate work dominated Fair’s life virtually to the exclusion 
of all else. Even the frequent and at times lengthy letters 
between Fair and his brother Thomas, who was agent to the 
Earl of Lonsdale in Cumbria, were almost totally confined 
to business transactions and exchanges of views on current 
agricultural m a t t e r s . B u t  Fair’s efforts did not go 
unrewarded. His £800 p.a. salary in 1865 compares exactly 
with what the Duke of Bedford paid his chief agent in 1861.
In fact, by 1875, Thomas Fair was judged to be worth the 
princely sum of £1,400 p.a. with a further £100 allowance 
on his house. This was tribute indeed to an agent’s qual­
ities, personal sacrifices and what appeared to be the
(56)indispensability of his position.
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James Fair was probably not untypical in 
terms of the energy and resilience that were needed to 
oversee a number of concurrent undertakings. William 
Shakeshaft, agent to the Hesketh estate at Rufford for 
twenty five years, was of the same mould. He rose from very 
humble beginnings to become an assistant to a Preston land 
surveyor. He was then employed by Preston’s leading cotton 
manufacturer and one-time M.P., John Horrocks, to manage 
his property in the town, which enabled him to set himself 
up as an independent land surveyor. Finally, in 1809, the 
Heskeths appointed him as their full-time agent. Like Fair 
he found himself faced with wide-ranging responsibilties. 
Initially he was employed to survey the whole of the estate, 
make valuations, engage workmen and instigate improvements. 
But, in due course, he supervised the longer-term reclamation 
projects on Tarleton Moss, Martin Mere and Longton and 
Croston marshes, he surveyed sections of the Liverpool to 
Preston turnpike and he managed coalmines at Great Harwood, 
Wrightington and Shevington. One letter of July 1833 
describes the pace of his working life though admittedly 
at one of the busiest times of the year: "Since I have begun 
(the harvest) I have mounted my horse at seven and continued 
upon in trotting and galloping about the park til twelve, 
mounted again at one and continued til seven or eight at 
night and sometimes nine, and on Saturday til ten* I have 
twenty one mowers and one hundred haymakers besides the men 
whom we employed before." This at the age of sixty two. It
is not altogether surprising that Shakeshaft. died eight
(57) months later.N
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Moreover, the relationship between land­
owner and agent was not necessarily distant and formal. In 
the case of Clifton and Fair, their relationship was one of 
mutual respect and intimacy between friends rather than one 
of employer and employee. Thomas Clifton was genuinely 
concerned about his agent’s health as the rigours of estate 
work began to take their toll. nI fear your late indispos­
ition has been brought on by over-extension through want of 
requisite assistance....Having myself found some benefits 
by a change of air I venture to recommend the same
medicine to you and during your absence forget all 
( 58)business.'’^ ' Regularly Clifton implored him to take a
break at the family’s country retreat at Oakham and have
(59)medical treatment in L o n d o n . B u t  rarely was Clifton’s 
advice taken up. However, from 1843 onwards, Fair occasion­
ally took the spa waters at Harrogate, though this did not 
mean any loss of control over affairs in the estate office 
at Lytham. At his own request he was pursued by a constant 
stream of letters which kept him fully informed about 
progress with the drainage schemes, building works, lease 
agreements, the sale of farmers’ crops and so on.^0  ^ For 
his part, Clifton shared the intimacies of a friend report­
ing family gossip - the health of his family, the social 
details of sporting occasions, family marriages, recent
/ r  * \
property purchases by leading county families. °
Given this personal intimacy between land­
owner and agent it should be possible to make a closer 
examination of their respective contributions in shaping 
"business policy on the estate* Xn his attitude and interests
- 112 -
Thomas Clifton cuts a very conventional figure. Indeed,
Broderickfs anachronistic caricature of the English landowner, 
penned in 1881, defined an ideal to which Clifton aspired 
but never attained. UA great English landlord of the best 
'kyPe>n ke wrote, "brings to bear, not only on agriculture 
but on the whole rural economy of his neighbourhood, a 
higher intelligence, larger views of estate management, a 
more enlightened spirit, a deeper sense of responsibility, 
than could be expected of even yeomen....He spends money on 
agricultural improvements which professional farmers could 
ill-afford. Thomas Clifton would have recognised the
spirit in which that was written. Like any other landowner 
he was desperately anxious that his estate should provide 
him with all the visible trappings of high social station 
and ample means of providing for his dependents. At the 
same time he embodied the notion that he was entrusted with 
the responsibility of safeguarding the estate for the benefit 
of future owners and occupiers of the soil. Indeed he made 
every effort to reconcile what were clearly conflicting 
obligations. For instance, this was apparent in 1349 when 
he pursued ways of raising his sonfs allowance without 
prejudicing investment in the estate. At his own suggestion 
Clifton put fiis London house on the market which he anticip­
ated would realise £10,000 and save interest payments of 
£500 p.a. This way, he pointed out to Fair, the allowance 
"might now be afforded without diminishing the improvements 
which are going on and, I hope for the benefit of those who 
succeed me, will continue to go on upon the property.63^
Clifton1 s concern for the well-being of the ,
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estate is evident* Yet his area of interest and the level 
of his active participation were very narrow. His was 
essentially the world of the agriculturalist. In this 
respect he insisted on being kept fully informed as to what 
farming developments were taking place. Though he was 
mostly absent from the estate a constant flow of information 
found its way to Clifton.• More important matters calling 
for immediate attention usually occasioned meetings with his 
agent and, with fastidious regularity, Clifton journied to 
Lytham from his London or Rutland homes to attend rent days 
or meetings of the local agricultural society, and he 
usually used such opportunities to make an inspection of 
farms on the estate. He was certainly well acquainted with 
individual tenants and their farming capabilities. He took 
an active interest in appointments to vacant farms and he 
made his own recommendations when there were several applic­
ations for the same tenancy. Even during the last year
of his life, when racked by illness, Cliftonfs appetite for 
information remained as keen as ever. "Nor have I heard 
anything of Mr. Lauder*s sale,” he impatiently wrote to 
Fair, "and what is going on at Salwick? How is planting
( 6^ )getting on? And have you let the building of the lodges?”v 
Nor had he lost a life-time fs habit of making detailed scrut­
iny of reports and accounts: "I do not perceive in the drain­
age account of Westby that you have done anything for J.Ward. 
Does he still object to deep drainage or the men going on 
his property?1 Moreover, Clifton did not restrict him-
g@l£ solely to the agricultural concerns of his own estate.
His passionate defence of protectionism brings into sharper 
focus the behaviour of a traditional landowner who saw
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protection as a pillar of both the agricultural and landed 
interest which, on that basis, had to be defended to the 
last. He spent the last months of his life in an abortive 
attempt to rally the landowners of north Lancashire behind 
a series of petitions against what he always regarded as 
the nfree trade experiment.1
Yet, What of Clifton’s managerial role in such 
ventures as urban development and railway promotion - 
undertakings which have a far greater entrepreneurial ring 
about them? Important decisions were involved in the non- 
agricultural sphere. For, as time wore on, it became 
increasingly apparent that the future prosperity of the 
estate would come to rest more and more on the profitability 
of land speculation in Blackpool, the promotion of an 
efficient railway network throughout the region and the 
encouragement of residential building in Lytham and neigh­
bouring coastal areas. It is worth recalling that, although 
agricultural rents remained the financial life-blood of the 
estate until in fact the end of the century, non-agricultural 
income was nevertheless of some importance. For instance, 
the Lytham investment of the early 1340s was producing a 
valuable £5,000 p.a. by 1867 from ground and property rents. 
This sum amounted to a welcome 20% of the income derived 
from all the estate farms and obviously went some way 
towards servicing the debts which were inevitably incurred 
in carrying out the improvement work in the agricultural
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There is no doubt that Thomas Clifton 
recognised the potential of his Blackpool and Lytham 
properties. Equally, he no doubt wished to increase his 
income from the estate; but it seems unlikely that he 
actually suggested and directed how this could be done. When 
to invest and where, a nd when to sell, or what terms to 
agree with developers, and how to safeguard the wider 
interests of the estate. Clifton’s attitude could not 
actually be described as hostile to crucial developments of 
this kind but nor was it always helpful. The fact was that 
Thomas Clifton found it difficult to identify with and fully 
understand business ventures outside the world of agricult­
ure he knew best. Indeed, on occasion, he carried a sense 
of caution and suspicion to the point of inhibiting positive 
decision-making. This is made very clear in the estate’s 
dealings with the railway companies. Railway development 
involved the Cliftons from the outset. The construction of 
an integrated railway network across the Fylde, thus linking 
the region with the industrialised south and east of the 
county, was central to the prosperity of the Clifton estate.
A main spine was built between Preston and Fleetwood and 
opened in 1840. By 1846, two branch lines had been con­
structed which connected Blackpool and Lytham with the main 
line.^^ Yet it is apparent that the initiative and policy 
in dealing with the railway companies stemmed from the agent 
and not the landowner. It was James Fair who forged 
connections with the pioneering companies. In September 1836 
he was elected as a director of the Preston .and Longridge 
Railway Company. On his initiative the estate invested in 
two share issues of the North Union Railway Company in 1837.
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And it was Fair who stage-managed the complex and trying 
negotiations with the Preston and Wyre Railway Company 
concerning the sale of land in Clifton-with-Salwick and 
Kirkham required for the building of the main Fylde linei70'
However, the Cliftons, like many other land­
owners, became more actively and directly involved in rail­
ways during the period of hectic branch-line construction
(71)from the 1840s onwards. J Their first major investment 
was in the Lytham-Kirkham line which had been projected in 
the original Preston and Wyre Railway Bill.^2  ^ Yet it was 
built not because of Thomas Clifton’s personal commitment 
to the project, but despite his thinly disguised reservat­
ions about it. The energy behind the scheme came from 
James Fair, and he devised the terms on which an agreement 
with the Railway company was reached. He handled the complex 
matters of raising capital, determining the size of the 
estate’s own financial stake, planning the route of the new 
line, negotiating compensation for damage and severance and 
asserting his right to a place on the board of directors.
Even the family’s lawyers confessed a certain inadequacy and
inexperience in negotiating contracts with railway companies
(73)and methods .of raising the necessary capital. It was
Fair who obtained what proved to be very advantageous terms. 
Thomas Clifton advanced £25,000 which was secured by a 
mortgage to the railway company at 4% interest but with the 
option of converting the sum into stock over a seven year 
period. Furthermore, he and his successors were reserved 
the right of nominating one director to the company. Moreover, 
the route of the track, skirting the boundaries of Clifton
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and meandering through Westby, Warton and Lytham, ensured 
that no part of the estate went unserved by the railway,
However, at one stage, it looked as if the 
scheme would never get off the drawing board. The reason 
was Thomas Clifton’s vacillating attitude. Of course every­
thing depended on the sanction of the landowners and a point 
was in fact reached when the promoters began having doubts 
about finding terms which would fully meet with Clifton’s 
approval. Speculation about the line’s future was delib­
erately leaked to the local newspapers in order to pressure 
Clifton into making a firm decision, 111 was not sorry to 
see the latter village (Lytham) named,” the estate’s 
solicitor wrote to Fair, ”for, as agreed to at the meeting,
it will give Mr. Clifton an opportunity of deciding whether
(75)or not he will have a railway at L y t h a m . O n c e  Clifton 
had finally consented he left the whole matter entirely in 
Fair’s hands as the following instructions make clear:
”With respect to the railroad,” Clifton informed his agent, 
”if you are of the opinion that the terms which you proposed, 
should they be conceded by the directors at the intended 
meeting.... .are such as to be advantageous to the property, 
of course, I most willingly assent to them.” The landowner’s 
main concern was limited to obtaining an assurance that 
physical damage to the land would be kept to a minimum and 
adequate compensation would be paid to tenant farmers.
Financial dealings with the railway company 
were then left to Fair. In effect he went on to present his 
employer with a series of ”faits accomplis”. For instance,
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it was the agent who made the decisions regarding the
estate’s share-holding in the company. In August 1845 he
put a number of shares onto the open market in order to
capitalise on their rising value. He also knew that Thomas
Clifton would be far from unenthusiastic about limiting the
estate’s connection with the railway companies. As expected,
a few days later, Fair’s decision was fully endorsed. ”1 am
not fond of railway shares and I never was,” Clifton wrote,
”and I therefore heartily concur with you in the propriety
'of selling such portion as you think fit....and, if it can
be affected, I am most willing to part with any portion of
mine and, though throwing so many into the market at once
might not be politic, I hope you will get rid of them as
(77)soon as possible.r,v '
Thomas Clifton’s role, then, was a titular 
one. It consisted largely of endorsing the managerial 
decisions of his agent. However, on occasion, it extended 
to using the weight of the family name and influence as a 
lever against the railway company. In March 1845, for 
instance, the company threatened to withdraw from the 
original agreement, which had clearly been entirely generous 
towards the Clifton interest. But the estate had the whip- 
hand. John Talbot Clifton, who at the time was M.P. for 
North Lancashire, countered with the warning that his 
parliamentary support for a proposed Lytham and Blackpool 
Railway Bill would be withdrawn and the estate would continue 
the line to Blackpool for themselves unless the original 
agreement was adhered to.^78  ^ Similarly, the following 
month and again at Fair’s bidding, Clifton issued the same
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warning unless a new share issue was offered to existing
investors at what they considered to be more advantageous 
(79)terms. Otherwise Clifton preferred to remain at a
distance. He grudgingly filled up the subscription list 
of shareholders and, thereafter, rubber-stamped his agentfs 
decisions.
Again, Thomas Clifton could be persuaded to 
see the advantages of commercial investment, although that 
did not necessarily make him any the more enthusiastic.
This was evident in the estate fs dealings with the Ribble 
Navigation Company. Briefly, a new company had been 
established in 1836 with the object of developing a port at 
Preston which would have the cspacity to cater for large 
sea-going vessels. The operation involved dredging the 
River Ribble and its estuary and the construction of a light­
house, embankments and dock facilities at an estimated cost 
of £36,000.^^ At the outset the Cliftons were approached 
to participate in the venture. But, once more, it was 
James Fair who defined the estatefs objectives. ?,I have 
never had any faith in the scheme itself.” he wrote to
Thomas Clifton in 1840. ”Our task must be to make certain
( 82 )claim to the land along the foreshore.1 ^ 1 Indeed,
dredging work and deepening the river made several thousand 
acres available for reclamation along both banks of the 
Ribble. Securing the land along the foreshore in Clifton- 
with-Salwick basically lay behind Fair’s acceptance of a 
directorship in the company. Moreover, at first this aim 
seemed to have been met by the terms of the company’s 
original prospectus which declared that ”all lands gained
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or reclaimed by any future alterations in the channel and
bed of the river (should) become the property of the
owners of the lands adjoining thereto." In addition,
Fair negotiated a highly lucrative arrangements whereby 
the estate agreed to lease Lytham docks to the company for 
the purpose of unloading cargo until the dredging work had 
been completed. Improvements to the harbour at Lytham 
involved the estate in considerable expense yet the rental 
promised a return of over
As events turned out Fair's carefully laid 
plans backfired on him. Firstly, the directors of the 
Navigation Company came round to Fair's steadfast view that 
the land was in fact a better commercial proposition than 
the port itself. By 1847 it was clear to all concerned that 
the market value of 2,000 acres of reclaimed land would 
more than offset the losses which had been incurred in 
attempting to launch Preston as a major port. Despite the 
improvement work which had taken place, the channel provid­
ing access to the docks was too shallow to accommodate
/ n c  \
increasingly larger vessels. ' The export trade in coal 
from Preston did not materialise and there was no significant 
increase in foreign trade generally. With Lytham docks 
already running up annual losses^  the Irish famine and a 
sharp drop in the grain trade came as a final blow. Not 
surprisingly, the directors' report to company shareholders
/ ng \
in July 1847 concentrated on land reclamation.v } Moreover, 
it was in any case legally questionable whether the navig­
ation company had the powers to make a grant of any reclaimed 
land in the first place. The Duchy of Lancaster, as it came
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to quickly appreciate, probably had the strongest legal 
claim to land which lay below the original high-water 
mark. What then followed was a protracted court battle 
between the interested parties. In the end the Cliftons 
emerged from the fray with a certain amount of bruised 
pride and unanticipated expense. Their share-holding in 
the Ribble Navigation Company was virtually valueless and 
the reclaimed land along the foreshore of Clifton-with- 
Salwick had been purchased, with the proceeds divided 
between the company and the Duchy. On top of that there 
were the costs of five years expensive litigation. rp^ e 
whole experience reinforced Clifton’s prejudice against 
commercial speculation. "I left these affairs in your 
hands,” he acidly remarked to James Fair in 1850, "but I 
have always been of the opinion that we should not involve 
ourselves with a class of men who are little better than 
scoundrels.”(88^
The third and undoubtedly the most crucial 
area of non-agricultural investment concerned urban devel­
opment on the estate. Thomas Clifton’s obituarist saw the 
emergence of a residential resort at Lytham as a monument 
to the landowner’s greatest achievement: "Those who 
remember what the village of Lytham was thirty to forty 
years ago and contrast its present appearances, will be 
ready to award to the late lamented gentleman the praise 
bestowed upon a Roman Emperor; that he found the city 
composed of brick and left it in marble. Nothing can be 
more striking than the difference betwixt what Lytham was 
and what it is now."^8^  The reality, however, was somewhat »
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different. Not only is the scale of Lytham’s development 
exaggerated but Thomas Clifton is portrayed in a somewhat 
flattering role. The truth is that, left to the landowner, 
it is unlikely that what amounted to a humble beginning 
to the estate’s urban policy would have been made. When 
a local antiquarian, Edward Baines, pointed'out that 
Lytham ’was greatly improved under the agency of Mr. Fair" 
his remarks amounted to something more than a simple 
statement of chronological fact.^^ Inspiration came 
from the agent rather than the landowner.
Plans to invest in property development
appeared shortly after Fair’s appointment to the Clifton
estate. But he was initially attracted towards Blackpool
rather than Lytham for the good reason that Blackpool at
the time showed more promise as ”a favourite, salubrious
(91)and fashionable resort for respectable families.”v 7 It
was Fair who made the enquiries after property along the
sea-front in central Blackpool when it came onto the
market in 1837. On that occasion he failed to buy but
when the property again came up for sale in 1843 it
(92)finally came into Clifton’s ownership.w  7
Basically there were two related aspects 
involved in the estate’s policy towards its Blackpool 
properties. Firstly, investment in residential building 
around the central location of what was to become Talbot 
Square and, secondly, the consolidation of landholdings 
based on the Clifton’s Layton Hall estate which was situated
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about one mile directly inland from the town. The notion 
of laying out and developing select residential housing on 
the newly acquired property in central Blackpool stemmed 
from Fair or, to be more precise, from an exchange of ideas 
with a fellow land-agent, Jonathan Ashworth, of Turton, 
near Bolton. In fact it was Ashworth who suggested certain 
improvements to the resort including the construction of 
crescents around Talbot Square.(93) estate's involve­
ment in Blackpool is examined in more detail in a later 
(94)chapter 7 but suffice to say at this stage that plans 
to develop the area for high-class marine villas were 
never put into effect. The plots along Clifton Street 
leading to the sea-front were put up for auction and sold 
off in 1850.'95)
A second feature of estate policy involved 
the purchase of small properties to consolidate holdings 
in the immediate hinterland of Blackpool and, in effect, 
create a ring-fence which stretched from the village of 
Great Marton to the south-east of the resort through 
Layton Hall to meet with the corridor of land extending 
from the sea-front which had been purchased in 1843. In 
all, thirteen properties were acquired in Layton and 
Marton between 1840 and 1851 ranging from the 367 acres 
purchased from Hesketh-Fleetwood in 1841/2 to plots as 
small as 1£ acres. Clifton's attitude was basically
one of ambivalence. He approved all his agent's trans­
actions, he could recognise the lucrative potential of 
the investment and yet a nagging fear of costs and having 
to pay "extravagant prices" suggests that Clifton, by
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himself, would not have entertained dealing in the 
property market on the same scale as James Fair.^^
As interest in Blackpool began to wane, 
Lytham became the focus of attention. The coming of the 
railways in 1846 reinforced the decision to divert funds, 
previously ear-marked for residential building at 
Blackpool, into the construction of a promenade and show­
piece villas at Lytham.(98) Building land was opened up 
at the west end of the village with a view to leasing out 
plots to individual builders. The instrument of control 
was, of course, the lease system with built-in covenants 
to govern type and function of buildings. In this respect 
it was the agent who formulated the leases and assigned
them. All that was asked of the landowner was to give
(99)his assept and add his signature. 7 Clifton himself 
clearly had mixed feelings on the matter of Lytham!s 
transformation into a residential resort. In his own mind 
the prospect of an increased rental had to be weighed 
against the possibility that attracting a new residential 
clientele might also threaten his own social and political 
authority in the locality. Furthermore, he had reserv­
ations about the aesthetic attractions of even planned 
urban development. For instance, the sale of land for a 
station to the Preston and Wyre Railway Company compounded 
his anxiety. A long letter to his agent in September, 1845 
expressed an air of resignation rather than unequivocal 
approval. It also makes clear the locus of.managerial 
control. f,I hope you will not give up more land at Lytham
t
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for the terminus than is actually necessary,” Clifton 
wrote, "for, however profitable it may be and I admit it 
to be so, I feel regret at parting with every rood or 
rather piece of ground in that parish.
Nevertheless, whatever the points of 
difference between landowner and agent, Thomas Clifton and 
his heir were the first to admit the indispensability of 
James Fair to the management of their estates. The 
financially trying months of 1848 provided a sharp reminder 
of that fact. With the prospect of a stagnating if not a 
falling rent-roll, the expense of construction work at 
Lytham, a mounting overdraft at the bank and the diffic­
ulty of raising money elsewhere, Fair left his employer 
in no doubt that economies would have to be made and in 
an area which would do least damage to the estate - namely 
personal spending. Unfortunately, individual family 
members did not share Fairfs set of priorities. With 
personal debts running to £3,000 John Talbot’s most press­
ing concern was to be rescued from the clutches of his 
creditors. Thomas Clifton seemed unable to cure his son’s 
extravagant habits and he despairingly resigned the whole 
matter to Fair. "I am certainly not ignorant that our 
present embarrassment has caused you as much distress and 
discomfort as it has done me," he went on, "but I have 
hitherto the consolation that my affairs were entirely 
directed by you and that time and such measures as you 
might deem right to adopt would eventually extricate us 
from the existing difficulties." In that case Fair decided
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on a firm stand. After all it had “been who had been
making the personal sacriattfices by foregoing his own
salary. The impasse called for a test of his employer’s
loyalty and his own authority. He simply threatened to
resign his own position and it had an immediate effect.
John Talbot’s reaction is worth quoting in full in that it'
demonstrated the degree of dependency on the agent’s central
role in the management of the estate. "All I hope," Clifton
promptly replied "is that, on account of all this, you will
not leave us I would much rather owe £10,000 than you
should go away from the Lytham property....1 consider your
services would be a great loss to us and very much so in my
father’s case who has no inclination for business. I need
not say that if I am spared to succeed to my father I would
endeavour and with a might good will to make things as
(101)comfortable for you as I can."' 1
Thomas Clifton’s death in 1851 marked the 
end of a highly successful and productive relationship 
between landowner and agent. There can be no doubting 
Clifton’s genuine concern to exercise his trusteeship in a 
manner likely to improve the estate. He was naturally 
interested in increasing the rent-roll and augmenting his 
own disposable income. But he did not show how this was to 
be done and it is unlikely that the estate’s involvement in 
a widening range of non-agricultural ventures was initiated 
by him. Thomas Clifton did not adapt easily and readily to 
the more complex managerial demands'which running an estate 
like his own was bound to produce. In the decision-making
r
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process he did not instruct as much as receive instruction.
Ill
The 1850s brought changes to the central 
characters involved in the management of the Clifton estate. 
Thomas Clifton may have suffered from a myopic view of 
economic development on the estate but he had compensating 
qualities which were not apparent in his successor. In 
particular, a strong sense of duty and responsibility. By 
contrast, his son, John Talbot Clifton, had showed signs of 
a pragmatic, business outlook which had escaped his father.
As M.P. for North Lancashire between 1844 and 1847 he played 
an active part in numerous parliamentary committees examin­
ing railway bills and was in fact instrumental in steering 
through the Lytham railway bill. He was adaptable to 
change. He acknowledged the irreversibility of the repeal
of the Com Laws and he had a sound grasp of free trade in
(102)terms of its implications for the future of agriculture.' ' 
However, he failed to live up to this early promise. He 
was too easily distracted by the social whirl and had little 
time or interest in the detailed business of estate manage­
ment. For him an estate was to be enjoyed not endured. He 
preferred tb build his life as far away from Lytham as 
possible, pursuing a military career, enjoying London’s 
high society, hunting among socially fashionable circles 
and indulging his consuming passion for travel. Through­
out his later years his appetite for consumer spending 
became insatiable and his financial embarrassments a
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perennial problem to the estate office.
However, while the process of primogeniture 
could have unfortunate consequences in one respect, the 
dynasty of the Fairs continued to good effect in another.
The change of personnel in the estate office was less 
dramatic. James Fair soldiered on until his death in 1873 
but, from the late 1850s onwards, the managerial burden had 
been shifting gradually on to the capable shoulders of his 
son Thomas. No-one could have been better schooled for 
his vocation. Tactful and diplomatic in manner yet strong 
in opinion, he had a flair for administration, a diligent 
concern for detail, a sure grasp of financial affairs and 
a keen sense of foresight in his planning. And like most 
successful agents, Thomas Fair had the prodigious energy 
needed to oversee a multitude of tasks. On what was for 
him a typical day he began by attending to routine admin­
istrative matters in the morning, and then went on to a 
local husting, attending a meeting of the Warton school 
trustees in the afternoon, where he was "detained until 
late", and still found time to write an apology to his 
employer for the delay in replying to letters. It made no 
difference that it happened to be Christmas Eve 1869.
Colonel Clifton had no doubts himself about his own good 
fortune in having an agent of such stature, as he made 
clear on his departure overseas in 1855. "My sincere wish," 
he wrote, "is that you will continue to conduct the affairs 
of the property, feeling confident that they could not be 
in better hands and knowing that, from your high sense of
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honour, as a man of business and from your own personal 
friendliness to me, I may go with my regiment abroad with 
a feeling of security. I could not have done so if my 
affairs were looked upon as a mere matter of business 
Thomas Fair could not have expressed a view of his own 
position any better. In other words, he did not think 
purely and simply in terms of being well-paid for a job 
well-done. He embodied a keen sense of tradition, duty 
and pride in his personal commitment to sustain the esteem 
of the family name and the integrity of the estate.
Economic progress on the estate after 1850
can best be described as one of consolidation. Plans to
remodel farm units and extend the drainage system were
intensified. ^ long-standing aim to construct a
direct rail link between Blackpool and Lytham was finally
undertaken in 1863. In turn this addition to the
railway network synchronised with a policy to encourage
select, residential building at the western end of Lytham.
Similarly, laying the foundation stone to the new resort
at St. Annes in 1875 was the logical extension to plans for
(107)converting the barren coastal sands into building land.' ''
Considering the circumstances under which 
the agent had to work, it was a remarkable managerial 
achievement that the momentum of earlier years was sustained. 
As a glance at the account books after 1862 will confirm, 
the administration of the estate ticked over with meticulous 
efficiency. These sources as well as correspondence of
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"the period convey the picture of an agent who drew on an 
impressive technical knowledge and business astuteness in 
dealing with a wide range of subjects. He was an admin­
istrator, developer, agricultural manager and legal adviser 
rolled into one. But allied to his business acumen was 
Fair’s considerable ability as an accountant and there lies 
the key to his successful' management of the estate. Through­
out his long years of service Fair had to walk a precarious 
financial tight-rope in an effort to balance family expend­
iture with the capital requirements of investment in the 
estate. It was never an easy task and Fair often found 
himself in an invidious position. On the one hand he had 
to satisfy his employer’s demands for an increased allow­
ance and yet, on the other, he felt compelled by a 
conflicting sense of obligation to ensure that this did not 
threaten 'financial resources which were needed elsewhere.
As it was, balancing estate income with regular outgoing 
and increasing capital spending was, in itself, a major 
problem without the added complication of having to fund 
excessive family expenditure. Indeed, the high level of 
investment in the agricultural estate or in such projects 
as Lythamfs parks, baths, piped water supply and the rail­
way link with Blackpool meant accumulating annual deficits
(108 )in the account over the 1860s and 70s.
This conflict of interest was apparent from 
the start. Correspondence from the 1850s onwards was 
characterised by Fair’s often out-spoken defence of his 
investment plans against the extravagant spending habits of
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John Talbot Clifton and his son. Yet his warnings went 
unheeded. No amount of remonstrating by Fair or Lady 
Clifton could persuade the landowner and his heir to live 
within their means. Clearing the £16,000 worth of debt 
which John Talbot had run up at his London bankers, Scott*s, 
by 1866, was no isolated occurrence. The same pattern 
repeated itself time and time again. (^9) However, Fair 
proved to be just as stubborn in his defence of the wider 
interests of the estate. He refused to use current income 
to bale Clifton out of his financial problems. Instead 
he preferred to sell stock and shares. "I do not see any 
possibility of £2,000 being advanced out of the rents,1 he 
explained on one occasion, "if improvements are to go on 
and justice done to many of the farm tenants many of whose 
houses and buildings... .are deplorable and who have been 
put off this year on the understanding that something will 
be done for them next year, which would not be the case if
this office was called upon....This will be a most serious
loss and I am sure you will see the importance of it and 
the necessity in the meantime, to the most urgent wants of 
the property.
Under these circumstances it was perhaps 
just as well that John Talbot Clifton gradually abdicated 
his own managerial responsibilities. In fact the 1850s 
were really the only years in which, relatively speaking, 
Clifton was closely involved in estate affairs. Even so 
his role amounted to little more than rubber-stamping the 
decisions of his agent. It was Fair, for instance, who
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retained full control over the process of property disposal
in Blackpool despite Cliftonfs anticipation that "the
whole of the Layton Hall estate could be disposed of at 
(111)
once." Instead Fair pursued a plan to sell off land
in Blackpool in a slow, piecemeal but highly lucrative 
fashion throughout the 1860s, 70s and 80s.^112  ^ In the 
same way it is apparent that the urban development of 
Lytham remained under the agentfs firm supervision. Nothing 
was asked of Clifton other than signing the leases/115^
To choose a more detailed example, there is 
no better measure of the agent*s commercial outlook, his 
business aggression and his managerial control than his 
investigation into the possibilities of finding coal on the 
estate. There were serious doubts about the feasibility of 
the project from the outset, yet events give an indication 
of the excitement which surrounded the project of striking 
mineral wealth.
The search for coal on the Fylde was started 
by Thomas Fair. He brought the matter to Clifton*s attent­
ion in 1867 and invited a Wigan engineer to carry out a 
survey in Salwick. The resulting report disappointingly 
suggested that the deposits of coal were small and, at a 
depth of 1,500 to 1,800 feet, would be unprofitable to 
mine.^^ However, in 1872, Edward Young, a Sheffield 
engineer, published a survey which argued that a rich coal- 
seam did in fact exist traversing the Fylde from Gars tang 
in the north-east comer down to the Clifton estate in the 
south-west, and having a possible market value of at least
/ <1 >j j- \
£25 million. It was enough to revive dreams of a
mineral fortune. Fair was galvanised into exploring the 
idea a little further. He proposed organising a meeting of 
interested landowners to which Young would he invited to 
support his claims. In the meantime Fair researched the 
costs of exploratory boring and even drew up a draft 
contract, setting out lease terms and royalty payments, 
which he anticipated other landowners might want to adopt 
should mining actually take place on their estates.
The landowners* meeting took place on 26 October and Fair 
brought along Wilson-Patten M.P. to support his case that 
work should go ahead by sinking an exploratory bore-hole 
at Garstang. However, initial euphoria soon gave way to a 
more realistic assessment of the whole scheme and plans to 
start drilling were dropped. But Fair did not let the 
matter rest there. Acting on the assumption that specul­
ators would be prepared to finance their own operations if 
they confidently expected to find coal he kept negotiations 
open with Young. Moreover, Clifton was deliberately
left in the dark as to Fair’s intentions. His agent thought 
of enlightening him only when terms had been agreed with 
the mining company and if the test borings proved successful. 
Fair did not want Lady Clifton’s environmental objections
getting in the way of what might have turned out to be# a
(118)profitable venture.v
As events turned out plans to explore for 
coal on the Clifton estate never got beyond.the negotiating 
stage. Young wanted no restrictions on his drilling, a period
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of two years for the exploratory work and a royalty of 1d. 
per ton plus a personal "gift" of £2,000 from Colonel 
Clifton if coal was discovered. Such high demands
were unacceptable while doubts persisted about finding coal 
in any commercial quantity* Other geologists were far 
from confident that sufficient reserves of coal would be 
found to make extraction worthwhile. By 1873 Fair was 
prepared to let negotiations die a natural death. Once he 
had made known Lady Clifton*s insistence on restrictive 
clauses and on reserving the right to veto over boring 
operations, Young withdrew from further talks. The fact 
that the episode came to nothing is of little importance; 
what it does show is an agent*s business skill and, more 
especially, his complete control over managerial affairs.
By 1870 Clifton had virtually bowed out of 
any involvement in estate business. His self-imposed exile 
abroad, in London or at his hunting lodge in Northampton­
shire had created a vacuum in the managerial hierarchy 
which, to his credit, he at least attempted to fill.
Accordingly, responsibility for supervising the management
(12)of the estate was handed over to his son Thomas Henry.v '
Unfortunately he was of much the same mould as his father
and had no intention of taking an active and constructive
part in estate affairs. As he flatly pointed out to Fair,
(121)he did "not care much for the responsibility.11N ' He also
was too easily distracted by the widening social horizons
(122)which an increased personal allowance had opened up.
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As a matter of course, Thomas Clifton was 
still kept informed of business developments, yet he merely 
echoed decisions which had already been taken in the 
estate office. Fair, for instance, negotiated the sale of 
the Blackpool/Lytham line to the London and North-Western 
in 1871 and he also determined how the proceeds were to be 
spent. Clifton was given very little choice in the matter. 
"There is a certain sum to receive next year from the 
railway company and, as I have no doubt it will be your 
wish that this sum should be devoted exclusively to improve­
ments on the property, I think a portion of it might be 
expended with advantage on Warton." The rest Fair set 
aside for the purpose of buying young Clifton an influent­
ial seat on the directors* board of the L. & N.W.
In face of John Talbot*s and his son’s 
detachment from the business affairs of the estate, for 
the most part Fair addressed himself to Clifton*s wife,
Lady Eleanor. She was the one family member to emerge with 
any distinction. She had a passionate interest in the well­
being of the estate and its community and she fought a 
relentless battle against the financial recklessness of 
her husband and son. Understandably her principal inter­
ests embraced matters of a largely social nature - cottage 
provision, the welfare of the poor, education, the endow­
ment of churches.^ 2Zf^ However, Thomas Henry’s death in 
1880 threw an even greater burden of responsibility on to 
her shoulders. In his own absence Clifton instructed his 
wife to liaise with Thomas Fair in the management of the
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estate though he insisted that ,fall great changes” should 
first be submitted to him for approval. (^ 5^) Yet, in 
reality, no significant alterations were made to existing 
managerial arrangements. Questions of finance and policy 
lay outside the reach of Lady Clifton*s capabilities and, 
in any case, ”it was difficult to write and understand and 
give advice at a distance. Even so, on the occasions
when she did venture an opinion, Fair left her in no doubt 
that she should not interfere in the financial affairs of 
the estate. ^ Responsibilities of a social kind she 
was able to discharge; but a whole host of decisions 
concerning tax problems, appointments to vacant tenancies, 
land sales and investment on the estate remained the 
exclusive preserve of the agent.
The participation of Thomas and John Talbot 
Clifton in the complex business affairs of their estate 
sheds an interesting light on landowning attitudes as well 
as on the way in which a large estate was managed. Admin­
istrative arrangements on the Clifton estate also remind 
us that there was no single pattern of managerial organis­
ation throughout the estates in Lancashire. At one extreme 
there were landowners who, like Charles Scarisbrick, were 
the major source of initiative behind business decisions 
and who had a well developed attitude towards risk-taking. 
But possibly Scarisbrick was exceptional. Extensive non- 
agricultural interests did not necessarily make shrewd 
businessmen out of landowning figures. Both Lilford and 
Hesketh demonstrated that their intervention in managerial 
decisions were not always dictated by sound business
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judgements. Furthermore, it is likely that the increasing 
complexity of affairs called for close contact with the 
estate, informed decision-making and a range of professional 
skills which a landowner himself was unable to provide in 
full.
All these. factors influenced management on 
the Clifton estate where, as the 19th century wore on, the 
agents assumed greater and greater responsibility over 
business decisions. For all his devotion to the property 
placed in his trust, Thomas Clifton was unable to come to 
terms with the wider business dimensions of his estate.
He could cope with the grand design for agriculture, but 
the world of railway speculator or property developer 
simply left him cold. In these crucial areas of expansion 
it was the agent who made all the running. By contrast 
Thomas Cliftonfs son, John Talbot, showed signs of a 
considerable business acumen, but turned out to be less than 
enthusiastic in applying it to the estatefs advantage. His 
truly was the decorative role. To a large extent, then, the 
Cliftons were more than adequately compensated by the 
dedication, resourcefulness and ability of the men who 
served them. For better or worse their agents shaped the 
destiny of the Clifton estate and, but for their efforts, 
the dismemberment of this ancestral estate would have begun 
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CHAPTER IV
LANDOWNERS AND AGRICULTURAL IMPROVEMENT
The key to economic policy on the Clifton 
estate, at least until the late 1870s, was the way in which 
both landowner and agent gave priority to improving the 
agricultural property. At the same time the Cliftons* 
agents, James and Thomas Fair, clearly recognised the 
potential of investing in ventures of a non-agricultural 
nature - building, railways, commerce, even mining - but 
not at the expense of running down the agricultural sector. 
There were various reasons involved. No doubt sentiment, 
a sense of tradition, landed obligation, all played their 
part in influencing broader decisions and ought not to be 
under-estimated. Yet, from a purely business point of view, 
both alsq worked on the confident assumption that agricult­
ure had a bright future, that farm rents would continue as 
the main financial prop to the estate and, therefore, that 
farming prosperity would generate the means to undertake 
any additional investment in other areas.
I
Admittedly, contemporary views of Lancash­
ire agriculture in the early 19th century were none too 
promising. The attitudes of these commentators no doubt were 
coloured by their own models of ideal farming practice but, 
nevertheless, there was an unmistakeable consensus about 
the backward state of Lancashire agriculture, at least in
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the early decades of the century which did not augur too 
well for the future.
According to one observer, writing in 1810, 
Lancashire farmers were "lamentably behind whose of other 
counties in agricultural knowledge and practice.
R.W. Dickson's survey of 1715 leaves much the same general 
impression. Apart from occasional pockets of enterprising 
farming most farmers struggled along with the seemingly 
intractable problems of dealing with the clay loams which 
characterised soil types over a large part of Lancashire. 
Generally the clay was wet and poorly drained; fallowing 
was still very much the order of the day; cropping systems 
everywhere and particularly on the lighter soils on the 
south-eastern corner of the county were "glaringly severe 
and exhausting." Much of the grassland was badly laid down 
and of an inferior quality; and most farms had "no order, 
method or design" to them. Farmers were largbjLy dependent 
on marl as their only fertilizer and, apar^from the 
threshing machine, they made little use of new technology. 
Moreover, despite the extension of cultivation on to a part 
of Lancashire's large acreage of mossland, vast areas of 
the region still awaited agricultural reclamation. Dickson 
calculated that the county's wasteland extended to 82,000 
acres of moor and common and a further 26,500 acres of moss 
and fen.^
In many respects Dickson could have been 
describing the Clifton estate. Prolonged absenteeism by 
the landowner, mismanagement by the agent, exhaustive land-
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use, inadequate drainage and an archaic leasing policy
had all left their mark. Surveys of the 1820s and 30s
leave a strong impression of poorly maintained ditches and
hedges, of fields "lying wet and cold" and neglected farm
buildings situated among large tracts of unreclaimed moss 
(3)and marsh land. Farms were generally very small, ten
to thirty acres typifying the pattern of landholding across
the estate. Only Westby-with-Plumpton boasted farms of
any substantial size with thirty units of between fifty and
one hundred acres each. By contrast Lytham and Clifton-
with-Salwick between them contained only five farms which
fell into that category. There is evidence that seven and
nine year leases were in use but nothing in the way of
farming agreements specifically designed to safeguard the
condition of the land. But, more often than not, land
was let without a lease or agreement of any kind. Moreover,
many of the small farms on the Clifton estate were governed
by life-leases which, in total, affected about 1,300 acres
in 1827. And, judging from the number of life-tenants
the Cliftons inherited when they bought land from Lord
Derby and Hesketh-Fleetwood in the early 1840s, the amount
of land held under this tenancy arrangement might well have
(4)been greater on other estates.'
So, when James Fair was appointed the 
Cliftons1 agent in 1826, he found "a property (which) had 
long been neglected. And yet he was far from being
pessimistic about future prospects. "With good farmers on 
the land, guidance and good husbandry," he told Thomas 
Clifton, "there is every reason to believe that the estate
- 148 -
can look forward to times of increasing prosperity.
There was more to Fair's confident outlook than just wish­
ful thinking. By the mid—1830s there were signs that 
agriculture generally was entering a more prosperous period 
after the sharp recessions which had plagued English farm­
ing from 1815 onwards. Moreover, Lancashire farmers were, 
fortunate in having access to the rapidly expanding 
markets of the county's industrial towns. It was presum­
ably this steady growth in demand which in fact shielded 
landowners and farmers against the worst effects of the 
depression in the early 1820s. Rent arrears which had 
built up between 1821 and 1823 quickly subsided thereafter. 
There was generally no difficulty in finding tenants and, 
indeed, over the twenty years after 1815 most estates
(•7\
recorded a healthy enough increase in farm rentals.v 1
Nevertheless, there were problems which 
had to be tackled if farmers and landowners were to exploit 
Lancashire's market potential to maximum advantage. In 
this respect the future lay with expanding dairy product­
ion and reducing the cultivation of cereal crops, and wheat 
in particular. However, in the wake of high corn prices 
during the Napoleonic wars and in the immediate post-war 
years, wheat acreage and production had increased in 
Lancashire as much as anywhere else. In fact there is 
evidence of wasteland being brought into cultivation and 
pasture land being broken up for the purpose of growing 
corn.^ The end result was over-production. Moreover, 
farmers in Lancashire and Cheshire, and especially those in
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the vicinity of Liverpool, had to compete with the threat 
of Irish imports which drove down cereal prices in the local 
markets still further. Eventually many farmers must have 
found themselves trapped in a system from which it was 
difficult to escape. They needed to continue growing wheat, 
even though prices were falling, simply in order to pay 
the rent. Other cereal crops - oats and barley - suffered 
from equally depressed prices and, in any case, produced 
smaller yields per acre. And the more radical alternative - 
a shift in productive capacity from arable into livestock 
and dairying - was not a practical proposition for many 
because of the time delay in converting land to grass and 
because of the heavy capital costs involved.' '
Despite these problems, as James Fair 
recognised, grass held the key to agricultural prosperity 
in Lancashire. Indeed, as early as 1815, landowners and 
farmers were being urged to reduce their arable acreage 
and cut back on wheat production. In many parts the soil 
had been exhausted by severe cropping. Furthermore, the 
arable farm was more labour intensive and therefore profit 
margins were likely to be put under more pressure in a 
region where comparatively higher industrial wages were 
having the effect of pushing up the wage rates in the 
agricultural s e c t o r . A b o v e  all, the expansive demands 
of the industrial towns had already been reflected in the 
increased prices of milk and butter. The value of grass­
land to both the landowner and farmer had risen accordingly. 
In 1833 the most profitable farms were said to be the milk 
farms within easy striking distance of Liverpool and
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Manchester which were letting for as much as £4 per acre* 
According to one authority grassland in the vicinity of 
Lancaster was fetching the still higher price of £7-10-0 
an acre. Even the smaller manufacturing outposts seemed 
to have had a dramatic effect on local land values. In 
the neighbourhood of Garstang and Catterall on the east 
Fylde, for instance, "the printing works and other manu­
facturers established there" had pushed up rents for 
dairy farms to £3-4 per customary acre. But, even well 
away from urban and industrial locations, rents for grass­
land averaged 24-25/- per acre, and this figure held
(1 1 )steady during the periods of recession.N y
II
By the mid-1830s there were signs of a 
change in attitude. Exceptionally low prices brought a 
tailing off in wheat production and finally forced farmers 
into looking for alternatives. Of course this did not 
apply everywhere. In general wheat continued to be grown 
on the lighter soils of the south and east where it was 
best suited. Over much of the north and west, however, 
attention turned increasingly to livestock as the staple 
product.
Contemporaries complimented James Fair and 
other local agents and landowners on recognising that "their 
neighbourhood was not a wheat-growing district but one 
specially adapted for the growing of g r a s s . I n  fact 
James Fair did not have to look very far for proof of this
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basic truth. In 1838 wheat yields in the locality were 
substantially lower than the national a v e r a g e s . H e  
therefore set about reviewing land-use and farming practice 
throughout the estate. His plans envisaged a shift in 
emphasis towards pastoral production in what was basically 
a "mixed" farming system. This involved making complement­
ary use of crops and livestock and specifically encouraging 
the expansion of dairy farming within the system. Such a 
policy clearly had far reaching implications for agricult­
ural management. It called for the reorganisation of farm 
units, the implementation of new husbandry techniques, the 
re-education of tenant farmers and a heavy and long-term 
programme of capital investment. At its fullest Fairfs 
strategy embodied the principles of "high farming", a term 
more generally used to define a broadly held agricultural 
policy which increasingly dominated British farming from 
the early Victorian years to the onset of the "Great 
Depression". "High Farming", as expressed by its high
priest James Caird, meant high productivity, his efficiency
(15)and high investment. '
Fairfs first line of attack was to tackle 
the problem of farming standards and husbandry practice on 
the estate. His major weapon was the use of far more 
sophisticated farm leases. However, by no means have either 
contemporaries or later historians been universally sympath­
etic towards the lease system as an instrument of agricult­
ural change. But, to begin with, some authorities of the 
day clearly regarded improvement as being synonomous with 
the adoption of the long lease. To James Caird in the
mid-19th century long leases ensured at least basically
good farming for they provided the tenant farmer with a
measure of security which ill—defined custom—right could
not possibly p r o v i d e . B y  1878 he saw no reason to
change his opinion. He continued to associate yearly
tenancies with insecurity and consequently claimed that it
was "vain to look for enterprise and progress where there
is no real security. Criticial as he was of the land
system Broderick himself had no doubt in 1881 that "the
best agriculture (was) found on farms whose tenants are
protected by l e a s e s . A t  Netherby, Sir James Graham*s
agent, Yule, expressed a Scottish dislike for annual leases
in describing them as "a complete bar to all improvement
(19)and no good tenant would work under it."v y But, it has 
also been established that in some counties long leases 
were the exception rather than the rule. In Staffordshire, 
for example, annual leases prevailed throughout the 19th 
century. Landlord-tenant relations were generally good, 
there were no fears of dismissal and, in reality, tenants 
enjoyed what amounted to fixity of tenure. The same
was true of Lindsey where an elaborate system of tenant- 
right embodied in local custom gave a substantial measure 
of protection to tenants* interests. Consequently, commend­
able agricultural improvements were carried out by farmers 
without the security which was said to stem from long-term 
leases/21  ^ In fact, custom-right, providing compensation 
to the out-going tenant both for capital improvements and 
crops left on the land, was "so well defined and understood"
throughout Lincolnshire that most farmers operated without
(22)either lease or agreement.N
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The lease system was not without its 
critics among Lancashire agriculturalists either. Accord­
ing to one observer leases imposed conditions which were 
far too restrictive, were sometimes absurd and impracticable 
and resulted in na check to energy and enterprise.
Recent scholarship has treated 19th century farm leases 
with little more sympathy. Though specifically concerned 
with tenure and tenant-right in Lincolnshire, J.A. Perkins 
has argued that leases generally did not produce the 
benefits anticipated by the landowners and agents who 
imposed them. His conclusions were that "the long lease 
was both inapplicable and unnecessary in the conditions 
of farming that obtained in the later 18th and 19th cent­
uries." It impeded rational adjustment and re-arrangement 
of farm units and rents; the lease system made the assumpt­
ion that land would be brought back into condition at the 
end of the term, a condition which was seldom implemented; 
contrary to popular belief, leases were not a prerequisite 
for agricultural improvement and at least comparable 
progress had been made in those districts where leases were 
the exception rather than the rule. In short, leases were
only relevant in a static but unreal world of fixed prices,
(24)costs and techniques.
However, these criticisms were not applic­
able to the conditions which prevailed in Lancashire 
agriculture at least throughout the first half of the 19th 
century. True, there were places where a policy of offer­
ing leases for a specific term was never standard practice. 
On the Devonshire*s Furness estate, for instance, leases
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were neither asked for nor granted. Nevertheless, tenant 
farmers were required to observe a code of farming practice, 
and arrangements existed to pay compensation, on a sliding- 
scale basis, to those tenants who carried out "unexhausted 
improvements". But no doubt the lighter limestone soils 
in the extreme north of the county had always acted as a 
natural inducement to good, efficient farming. Similarly, 
arable farmers on the extensive Scarisbrick estate in 
the south-eastern quarter of the county worked the light 
moss-lands on annual agreements. Elsewhere, however,
particularly on Lancashirefs predominant clays, landowners 
preferred to operate a lease system. Terms and conditions 
varied from one estate to the next especially in the early 
part of the century. Yet, broadly speaking, leases of one 
kind or another prevailed on the aristocratic properties 
of Lords Derby, Wilton, Sefton and Lilford as well as on 
the lands of the substantial squires - the Cliftons,
Heskeths and Horabys. According to Dickson, writing in 
1815, leases usually ran for terms of seven to nine years. 
Much longer leases were uncommon but occasionally granted 
on "improveable land" and to tenants with capital to 
invest. Farming covenants usually made specific reference 
to the maintenance of the property and cropping arrange­
ments at the end of the term in order to protect the land­
lord *s interests as well as those of the in—coming tenant. 
However, conditions which bound tenant farmers to certain




The available estate papers show that 
the long lease with built-in fanning agreements was an 
established feature of management policy on many Lancash­
ire estates until at least mid-century. This contrasts 
with a broad movement in English agriculture in favour 
of annual leases evident in many regions from the early 
decades of the century. No doubt the serious decline in 
prices in the post-Napoleonic period will largely explain 
quite radical modifications to tenurial arrangements 
whereby long leases were changed to annual agreements. 
Tenants were reluctant in times of uncertainty and price
fluctuations to tie themselves to long term leases and
(27)long term rents. ' However, severely adverse market 
conditions were not applicable to Lancashire. Only for 
brief periods (i.e. the early 1820s) was it necessary to 
grant reductions in rent. Hence it is unlikely that 
tenants would have been under the same pressure as else­
where to secure annual tenancies. Of course, it is 
impossible to determine whether or not tenant farmers were 
entirely sympathetic to a system of long leases but, what­
ever the attitudes among the tenantry, it is clear that 
improving landlords and agents were insistent on long term 
leases especially on the larger farms and recently 
reclaimed land. The long lease system, despite all its 
drawbacks of which contemporaries were fully aware, was 
generally regarded as providing a firm basis on which to 
build greater agricultural prosperity. Neither life-leases 
not annual agreements were looked upon as being suited to 
the immediate and crucial task of providing stability and 
continuity in improvement work.
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These conditions fitted the Clifton 
estate exactly. As Fair himself recognised, the pre­
condition of an increased rental was more efficient farming 
and improved productivity. In this respect the immediate 
problem facing him was organisational. The arable needed 
to be reduced, the quality of grassland improved and a 
system of husbandry implemented which would maximize the 
productivity of both. By contrast, customary practice 
among tenants on the estate in 1836 involved an exhaustive
succession of white crops, the extensive use of unproduct-
( 28)ive fallowing and insufficient manuring.' ' This picture
was apparently typical of the mode of farming throughout
the Fyide region. Stringent measures were needed to
re-educate a body of farmers who were entrenched in their
old ways, and this entailed a long up-hill struggle. In
1841 a neighbouring landowner complained to James Fair that
his tenants still persevered with successive white crops
and kept half their land under the plough.' Lord Derby,
whose estates embraced the township of Wee ton as well as
parts of adjacent parishes in the central Fylde, had been
faced with a similar kind of problem. Formal leases were
a means of counteracting the effects of formerly leaving
farms on life-leases and "in the hands of men without
(30)capital or will to improve•"
Leases, then, governing the larger and more 
compact farm units and imposing prescribed forms of husbandry 
were the instrument of improvement. Admittedly, Beesley 
indicated in 1849 that only a fraction of farmers had in 
fact an agreement of any kind. Yet it is also important
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to point out that a small number of substantial farmers 
controlled by far the largest proportion of the land on 
the Clifton estate at least and it was on their farms that 
leases and covenants were applied. Gradually, during the 
course of the 1830s, 40s and 50s, more fields were laid 
together, larger field units came into being and more 
compact and engrossed farms created. True, the small hold­
ing of under 50 acres continued to characterise farms not 
only on the Clifton estate but elsewhere in Lancashire
down through the 19th century. In 1894 50% of farms on the
(31 )Fylde, for instance, were under 50 acres.w  1 Nevertheless,
substantial inroads had been made into the numbers of the
smallest farms in the pursuit of more efficient land
management. For example, according to a survey of Lytham
carried out in 1812 only eight farms registered above 50
acres. By the time of the tithe survey in 1839 the figure
stood at seventeen and, in 1894, it had reached twenty-three.
Much the same pattern can be discerned on other parts of
the Clifton estate. Further, and more crucially, the
larger units, though few in number, accounted for an
increasing proportion of farmland. Indeed, by 1866/7, 93%
of farmland in Westby-with-Plumpton belonged to twenty-
three farms- ranging from 52 to 380 acres in size. In
( 32)Warton the proportion amounted to 79%.
That agricultural improvement in other 
parts of the country was possible without leases is not in 
question. But in Lancashire the long lease.seems to have 
been a reasonable policy for landowners and agents to have 
adopted. A leasing policy, after all, had to be considered
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not only in relation to prevailing farming conditions but 
existing tenurial relations. The facts were that, on the 
Clifton estate, systematic restoration and a re-orientation 
in land use were needed and this called for farmers of 
ability and substance. For his part, the tenant who 
invested his capital in the larger farm unit required a 
measure of security other than the good will of the land­
owner. Farming covenants applicable to the reorganised 
farms invariably committed tenants to making considerable 
outlays. This was certainly the case during the first half 
of the century when the respective roles of landlord and 
tenant in the matter of capital investment were ill-defined 
and much was asked of the farmer’s own resources. Demands 
on the tenant’s own capital obviously varied from farm to 
farm and individual to individual; but, in general, stock 
farmers needed greater financial resources than their 
arable counterparts.'^ ' It has been estimated that even 
in the early years of the century the cost of stocking
( 34)farms in most districts of Lancashire ran to £7-8 per acre ' 
Indeed, tenants on the Clifton estate were required to keep 
a certain head of cattle in relation to the size of their 
farms. Further, most were compelled to purchase a pre­
scribed amount of manure on an annual basis, to clear old 
fences and to provide grass seed for new pasture land. In 
addition, several tenants were called upon to carry out 
the reconstruction of farm buildings and to see to drain­
age on their land.^^ It was an expensive business and, 
not surprisingly, landowners were keen to attract on to 
their estates not only farmers familiar with up-to-date 
farming techniques but also those with sufficient capital
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behind them. Thomas Clifton, for instance, introduced a 
number of Scottish tenants on to farms of 3-400 acres 
during the late 1830s and early 40s. They adapted their 
farms to what in the locality was an experimental system 
of husbandry which made little use of permanent grass land 
but instead extended the growth of artificial grasses and 
turnips as fodder for sheep and cattle stock. Clearly 
reorganisation on this scale involved heavy investment by 
the landowner in new purpose-built farm buildings. Never­
theless, the outlay by individual tenants was impressive.
They tile-drained their own land, removed hedgerows, filled 
ditches, created new enlarged enclosures and invested in
f 7 ^ \
the new technology of steam engines and threshing machines. '
A system of longer leases, then, basically 
reconciled the interests of the landlord and tenant in a 
county that lacked the well established and well defined 
tenant-right customs which were evident in other parts of 
the country. Land agents wanted to attract tenants
with capital and they reasonably assumed that leases gave 
the tenant the incentive to invest where the added safe­
guard of tenant-right did not exist. The lease gave
the landowner a measure of control over the way in which 
his land was farmed and the tenant had the satisfaction of 
a fixed rent and the prospect of a return on his own capital 
over the term. But where tenant-right was most contracted, 
one agent argued - as was the case in Leicestershire, 
Derbyshire and Cheshire - and where the alternative of a 
long lease was absent, then farming was at its worst.
An agent from the East Riding took a similar view, arguing
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that any shift towards high farming and greater product­
ivity depended on making improvements to the land. And 
yet it was unlikely, he went on, that tenants would be 
willing to take the initiative when customary tenant-right 
to compensation did not usually extend to drainage, manur­
ing and other improvement work carried out by the tenant 
himlself.^^^ Therefore on the Clifton estate it was 
anticipated that enterprise would be rewarded by the offer 
of medium and long-term leases. In 1847 one Westby tenant 
had his eleven year lease extended by a further three years 
in return for modernising a number of farm buildings. 
Similarly, the bait held out to another Salwick tenant was 
a nine year lease "if the improvements go on satisfactorily."
And Warton tenants were given trial periods before being
(41}offered medium term leases on their farms •v *
Most leases on estates in Lancashire 
involved 7,9 or 11 year terms. Occasionally the longer 
leases of 14,19 and even 21 years were granted but usually 
to tenants of proven ability and substance taking on large 
farms in need of extensive improvement. Hence the appear­
ance of the long lease on the Clifton estate in the early 
1840s following the reclamation and laying-out of the moss- 
land covering a part of Lytham and Westby-with-Plumpton, or 
the 14 year terms granted to certain Quernmore tenants 
involved in improving heathland on William Garnetts estate 
during the same p e r i o d . L e a s e s  were invariably accom­
panied by farming covenants which became increasingly 
specific and detailed as agents standardized husbandry 
practice and land-use arrangements. In 1822 farming agree-
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ments on Lord Lilford*s Atherton estate made only loose 
reference to the land being "farmed according to the best 
modes of husbandry used in the township." By the 1830s 
more precise instructions were being issued and adjusted 
to meet the conditions on individual farms. Covenants on 
the Sefton, Hesketh, Garnett and Clifton estates evolved 
along similar lines. They formed an integral part of a 
policy to enlarge the grasslands, protect and improve the 
fertility of the soil and devise cropping arrangements 
capable of supporting larger stocks.
By the 1840s standard farm assignments 
were in use on the Clifton estate specifying husbandry 
arrangements on individual farms throughout the term of the 
lease. Generally, two-thirds to three-quarters of the farm 
was kept under permanent grass or meadow and the remainder 
made subject to a fairly stringent arable rotation which 
interspersed corn with fodder crops on a four to seven year 
cycle, depending on the size of the farm and soil condit­
ions. Otherwise, farmers on smaller holdings or whose 
land was in poor heart due to intensive cropping were 
instructed to grass the whole of their properties. At the 
same time various clauses were gradually built into agree­
ments to encourage larger yields of grass and fodder crops. 
They included the usual restrictions on taking successive 
white crops and the excessive cutting of meadow, the 
preservation of specified grassland, the consumption of all
hay, turnips, straw and other fodder crops on the farm and
(44}the rate at which the fields were to be manured.v ' Farm­
ing agreements also responded to changing agricultural
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orthodoxies. Turnip husbandry, for instance, was said to 
have dramatic effects on productivity and profitability. 
Indeed several enterprising farmers on the Fylde claimed 
that turnip cultivation had produced greater crops than 
ever before and that their land was capable of supporting 
three times more cattle than had formerly been the case. 
James Fair was sufficiently impressed to embark on his own 
turnip experiment and, by 1840, a large acreage in Lytham 
and Westby had been put under an extended rotation of
grasses and turnips covering the farms on which the estate
had installed its new Scottish tenantry. But it turned 
out to be a short-lived experiment. By 1843 a certain 
disillusionment had set in at least with turnip farming 
on this scale, although the turnip culture remained an 
essential component of many farm covenants.Fair was
more impressed with clover and artificial grasses and this
new emphasis eventually found its way into the detailed 
farming agreements which were part of the standardised 
assignments of the late 1840s. And again, after carrying 
out satisfactory trials with various kinds of guano, Fair 
later specified its use in a number of tenancy agreement^8 
(See Appendix I).
But improving farming practice throughout 
the estate was a long, painstaking business. It involved 
a blend of coercion and persuasion. The Clifton leases, 
along with those operating on other Lancashire estates, 
contained the usual penalties for serious breaches of the 
conditions laid down in the farming covenants. There is 
no evidence that these penalties were actually exacted, yet
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every reason to suppose that they were taken seriously 
by landlord snd tenant alike. Detailed inspection of every 
farm on the Hesketh estate by landowner and agent ensured 
that the stage was rarely reached when tenants were penal­
ised for default. Similarly, Clifton tenants were left 
in no doubt as to who determined farming policy on the 
estate. Since Fair was personally opposed to the use of 
broad beans in crop rotations, broad beans were not sown 
despite the reasonable claim by one tenant that beans would 
pay his labout bill and leave the soil in better condition^^®^ 
Moreover, whereas tenants with arreas of rent were often 
treated with paternalistic leniency agents were far less 
tolerant towards farmers found doubly guilty of financial 
mismanagement and bad farming practice and particularly 
those who compounded their sins by seemingly demonstrating 
an unwillingness to adopt recommended husbandy techniques. 
Lord Sefton*s agent was instructed "to draw a fair and 
honest line of demarcation between the truly industrious 
and all grades below." Eight farmers were singled out for 
dismissal in 1845. All had arrears of rent but, more 
seriously in the management*s view, all were either described 
as lacking in capital or deemed inadequate in farming 
ability.Likewise, Thomas Clifton approved the dis­
missal of one tenant on the grounds that "the old system 
cannot be tolerated (and) if he will not change, he must go 
elsewhere." ^
In the main, however, agricultural improve­
ment on the Clifton estate, as on so many others, lay 
through a process of education and emulation. Stringent
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leases constituted only one line of attack. Another of 
Fair’s early measures was to establish a local agricult­
ural society in Lytham which was designed to disseminate 
the agent’s own ideologies. Certainly James Fair set 
great store by its effectiveness. No less a figure than 
the eminent agriculturalist and founder of the Agricultural 
Association, George Webb Hall, opened and addressed the 
first meeting of the Lytham society, ^ "0 the tenants
on the estate were required to be members and take part in
the society’s annual award scheme which covered all areas
( 62)of farming activity.w  1 Premiums reflected Fair’s own
emphasis on those aspects which he considered needed
developing and improving. In the same vein he advised the
larger North Lancashire Agricultural Society that they too
should include a premium for green crops in order "to
( 53)encourage modern animal husbandry. *
Furthermore, a home farm of 450 acres 
served as an experimental station and as a model of good 
farming to the tenants at large. It was regarded as a 
means of improving breeding and as a distribution centre 
for the whole estate rather than as a purely profit-making 
concern. In fact, in the post-1860 period for which full 
farm records are available, the home farm often operated 
at a loss. Nevertheless, in so far as it was Fair’s 
primary objective to improve stocking and expand dairying, 
the venture was a success. On an annual basis large 
numbers of West Highland heifers, short-homed cattle and 
Leicester ewes were bought in for the purpose of building 
up stocks on farms throughout the estate, and as the
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grassland improved and dairying intensified in the 1860s 
and 70s, so the turnover of stock on the home farm 
increased accordingly. In addition the farm served as a 
distribution centre for steam engines and threshing 
machines together with chemical fertilisers, guano and new 
grasses all of which invariably underwent careful trials 
before being offered to the estate tenantry.
How much had been achieved by Lancashire 
landowners during the first half of the 19th century? 
Certainly there were some solid achievements to record. 
Dickson talked about "a spirit of agricultural pursuits” 
running through the county in 1815 and about landowners 
taking a more active role in the management of their 
estates and ”in promoting their improvement. ,|W^/ How far 
this really extended is difficult to say, but the Cliftons 
can be included among a small, pioneering group of land­
owners such as Hesketh of Rufford, Wilson-Ffranee of 
Rawcliffe, Garnett of Guemmore and Bankes of Winstanley, 
all of whom had commenced extensive improvement work on 
their estates by the mid-1830s. Yet Lancashire farming as 
a whole in mid-century seems to have been characterised 
more by confused practice, haphazard and piecemeal devel­
opment, ignorance and indifference than by any systematic 
and evenly spread adoptiong of improvement policies. This 
was certainly William Garnetts firm conclusion in 1849 
when he described Lancashire as an ”ill-drained, badly 
cultivated and neglected district" where the standard of 
farming fell well below that in the southern counties. Even 
on the Fylde, which Dickson incidentally thought worthy of
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a word of praise in 1815, "there was little improvement 
on the old system and the dislike to alteration prevails 
here as elsewhere. The fields in many parts for whole 
districts bear the appearance of being ploughed till they 
could produce nothing, and the miserable hedgerows with 
long rushes in the farrows show for plainly the want of 
draining and management in the occupier." At the same time 
Beesley echoed Garnett*s view that the clays, particularly 
north of Preston, were the least productive and worst 
cultivated land in the county.
Yet there were still grounds for optimism.
A start had been made and all that Lancashire agriculture 
suffered from, as Beesley remarked, was "the insufficient 
working of the system.**X-M 7 What he meant was that a 
system of mixed farming with a strong pastoral emphasis 
was suffering from a lack of investment, especially in 
underdrainage.
II
In terms of the expansion in pastoral 
farming, the more widespread adoption of new farming tech­
niques and, above all, the level of capital investment, 
Lancashire fanning underwent its major transformation during 
the third quarter of the 19th century. But it is difficult 
to be more precise than that about the chronological pattern 
of investment across estates or the exact size of land­
owners* investment.
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Firstly, investment decisions by individ­
ual landowners were influenced by various factors such as 
the accident of personality, the current level of estate 
maintenance, problems of inheritance and the financial 
resources of the landowner himself/58  ^ A further diffic­
ulty lies in the nature of the evidence itself. A 
continuous series of estate accounts is a rare find. 
Accounts which also provide data on separate items of 
capital expenditure are rarer still. Only the very large
and expertly managed estates, such as Lord Sefton’s seem
(*59)to fall into that category.w  ' Otherwise many estate 
accounts offer a statistically confusing picture. The 
major problem if the lack of standard accounting procedure. 
In this respect James Fair may have been a keen and gifted 
agriculturalist but his qualities did not extend to keeping 
clear, informative accounts. Itemized ledger books 
eventually made their appearance on the Clifton estate when 
Thomas Fair assumed full managerial responsibility in the 
early 1860s. Even so, Fair’s categorisation of expenditure 
does not provide a clear statement of capital formation on 
the estate. Very often, for instance, it is impossible to 
distinguish between annual costs of repairs and the invest­
ment in new. buildings. (see Appendix II).
There is the additional problem of deciding 
which sums should or should not be included in any estimate 
of capital expenditure on estate improvements. Spending 
on such estate embellishments as houses and parks should 
reasonably be excluded from calculations of investment in 
the agricultural estate yet these sums were often merged
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with other accounts. The outlay on cottages, however, is 
a different matter. Contemporaries themselves tended to 
regard a well-housed labour force as being conducive to 
improve productivity.There is an even stronger case, 
though, for the inclusion of sums spent on plantations, an 
area of notable expansion on Lancashire estates as it was 
elsewhere. Timber was an important source of income in 
its own right, as well as catering for the demands of 
building work and the need to fence rearranged farm units.
Furthermore, a number of Lancashire’s great 
landowners were involved in urban development and business 
ventures of various kinds. It is not always possible to 
distinguish clearly between the sums the Cliftons, for 
example, spent on their property in the Fylde resorts and 
their investment in their purely agricultural estates. The 
same was also true of the Heskeths and Lilfords. One final 
area of difficulty remains. A landowner’s capital provision 
will not account for the total investment in agriculture. 
Whilst it is true that the financial burden shifted 
increasingly on to the shoulders of the landlord, tenant 
farmers continued to make their own contribution to such 
capital items as drainage and building work. And it is 
this changing relationship between landlord and tenant, 
regarding their respective contributions towards capital 
equipment, which is one of the most difficult aspects to 
determine.
Nevertheless, despite all the deficiences 
in the evidence, it is clear that the county’s major
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landowners assumed a much greater responsibility for 
capital investment after 1850. Moreover, they were gener­
ally far more enthusiastic about agricultural improvement. 
In part this was no doubt a defensive reaction by some to 
the temporary recession which followed in the wake of the 
Corn Law repeal and to the widespread anticipation that 
the domestic producer would be swamped by foreign compet­
ition unless he improved his efficiency and productivity. 
James Caird put it this way: "In this country", he wrote,
"the agricultural improver cannot stand still. If he tries 
to do so, he will soon fall into the list of obsolete men
being passed by eager competitors willing to seize the
(61)current of events and turn them to their advantage."v J 
But landowners were put under more immediate pressure. Low 
prices inevitably triggered farmers1 demands for rent 
reductions in face of which landowners were confronted 
with two alternatives, either to make abatements or to 
cany out improvements.Many opted for the latter.
John Talbot Clifton, for instance, was firmly opposed to 
any general reduction in rents on the Lytham estate "in 
view of the money that has been and is being spent on it." 
Both the landlord’s and tenants’ interests, he pointed out, 
"rested in the future of economic management and high 
productivity. ”^3) similarly, William Garnett informed his 
Quernmore tenantry that improvement work - particularly 
drainage - would be carried out rather than a reduction in
But it would probably be misleading to 
describe the hectic improvement work which took place after
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1850 simply as a "rescue operation.”(65' The events of 
the late 1840s had the effect of persuading early improv­
ers like the Cliftons to intensify their efforts as opposed 
to impelling them into a new and desperate survival plan.
It is worth recalling that important developments had also 
taken place by mid-century which actively encouraged 
improvement and cultivated a widely held assumption that 
investment would actually pay.
Firstly, landowners had access to widening
sources of capital specifically intended for agricultural
improvements. The Drainage Bills of 1846 and 1850 made
public money available on a limited basis. Alternatively,
the Private Money Drainage Act made it possible for the
owners of settled estates to borrow from various private
improvement companies and, at one time or another, most
of the landowners mentioned in this study took advantage of
this facility. Secondly, cheaper materials and
technical advances in drainage methods, in fertilizers and
in the quality of seed now made the improvement of heavy
C 67)land much more of a practical proposition.
But the greatest stimulus came from the 
railway. Agricultural improvement and, more importantly, 
the expansion in the dairy industry after mid-century, 
marched in step with the completion of the regional and 
national railway networks. In short, the railway age was 
the age of railway mi Ik /  88 ^ An efficient transport 
system solved production and marketing problems which had 
long restricted Lancashire farmers in the more remote 
districts of the county. Railways gave direct access to
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Lancashire*s industrial towns whose markets could absorb 
”an unlimited supply of milk.1 And, as a survey of
the Clifton estate recognised in 1890, the coming of the 
railways enabled almost every tenant farmer to convert to 
dairy farming. Moreover, the railway made it possible
for the farmer to take advantage of fertilizers and such 
cheaper feedstuffs as oil-cake and grain. Indeed, these 
benefits will partly explain why more and more landowners, 
including the Cliftons, encouraged the construction of 
branch lines across their estates and why the 1863 improve­
ment of Land Act specifically empowered life-tenants to
(71)borrow money for the purpose of investing in new lines.v 7
Landowners* investment focused primarily on
improving the drainage of the heavier land. Drainage,
after all, lay at the basis of what has been justifiably
(72)called the "revolution on the English c l a y s . 7 For, as
Beesley pointed out, it overcame the major obstacle in the
(7 5^)way of an efficient mixed farming system.v 7 Well-drained 
clay land made it possible to produce higher yields of 
fodder crops on a reduced arable acreage; meadow land, 
hitherto fiercely protected, could then be released for 
pasture enabling farmers to keep a larger stock on more 
extensive and better quality summer grazing. This ideal, 
however, was not easily achieved. Early efforts to improve 
drainage were bedevilled by scepticism, an inadequate 
technology and the lack of a systematic approach to the 
problem.
Draining the heavier soils oh any extensive 
basis was not effectively tacked until at least the 1840s.
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Instead, improving landowners tended to concentrate their
earlier efforts on the reclamation of Lancashire*s vast
acreage of waste land/7Zf^ The draining of Trafford and
Chat mosses near Manchester in the 1790s and first decade
of the 19th century set the pace. The expense of bringing
one customary acre of marshland into cultivation amounted
to £11-10-0 which included the costs of draining, ploughing,
marling and seeding. But an impressively high return was
anticipated in that rents were expected to rise from 2/-
to 30/- per acre.^^ Not surprisingly the first decades of
the 19th century recorded a number of reclamation works
throughout the county. By a private act of 1800 the major
landowners south of the Ribble in Croston, Bretherton,
Mawdesley, Rufford and Tarleton undertook the draining of
2,800 acres which had been subject to heavy flooding by the
River Douglas. A further 430 acres were privately drained
on the Rufford Hall estate of Sir Thomas Hesketh at a cost
of £7 per acre.^^ Similarly, in 1820, Edmund Dawson of
Aldcliffe Hall, Lancaster, reclaimed 166 acres near the
mouth of the River Lune. He had a few personal doubts that
such investment paid. After allowing an interest charge
of 5% on the capital expended, each acre returned 25/- as
opposed to a former 2/6d. On the Fylde, Wilson-Ffranee of
Rawcliffe Hall outlayed £7,000 draining 736 acres of
(77}Rawcliffe Moss and expected a return of 10%.w 'y Close by 
at Lytham Hall, the newly appointed James Fair made a close 
study of the methods, costs, and benefits of major local 
drainage works, notably the draining of Martin Mere which 
commenced in 1836. Thereafter, much of his own experience 
stemmed from supervising similar reclamation schemes in his
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own locality in the late 1830s and early 40s, namely on 
Lytham and Weeton mosses and Kirkham Carrs.(78)
To some extent reclamation work on the 
lighter moss lands contributed to an expansion in dairying 
within the mixed farming system envisaged by agents like 
James Fair. In fact he established several 3-4,000 acre 
mixed dairy farms on the extensive tracts of mossland to 
the north-east of Lytham in the early 1840s. Nevertheless, 
any substantial improvement to the mixed farming system 
ultimately depended on finding a cheap and effective 
solution to the seemingly intractable problem of draining 
the clays. In this important respect Lancashire farming 
had to wait until mid-century before a breakthrough was 
made. For, as one observer pointed out in 1843, draining 
was still "in the early stages and (had) scarcely yet been 
applied to the ploughed land."w ' That so little had 
been achieved was no doubt partly a matter of attitude - 
apathy, indifference, perhaps abject surrender in face of 
what might have been regarded as a problem of unsurmount- 
able proportions. Indeed, John Cunliffe of Myerscough Hall 
sceptically dismissed a newly proposed drainage bill of 
1843 as a "totally useless measure so far as this county 
is concerned." He much preferred to see stricter and 
more immediate legal recourse available to landowners in 
the event of poor drainage maintenance by one causing 
damage to the property of another.
In the main,1 however, effective drainage 
was a problem of technological means, organisation and
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financial resources* True, earlier years had seen one or 
two notable efforts to undertake comprehensive drainage 
schemes. The Bankes family of Winstanley Hall had been 
one of the first to carry out drainage work in the Newton 
district. 2,600 acres belonging to the Jacsons* Barton 
Hall estate, seven miles north of Preston, were largely 
drained in the late 1830s and early 40s, and 2,000 acres 
on the Claughton Hall estate, near Garstang, were drained 
between 1821 and 1849.^^ Nevertheless, drainage schemes 
in the early decades of the 19th century enjoyed limited 
success. They invariably suffered from the lack of an 
adequate technology and expertise, poor planning and a 
confusion of contradictory theory. Enterprising as these 
landlords were, their drainage projects were regarded as 
highly experimental. In effect they groped towards a 
proven system of land drainage arguing and debating the 
merits of various techniques - turf against a cobblestone 
composition, a triangular as opposed to a square-cut design,
f 82 )
deep or shallow drains. ' The subject dominated discuss­
ions at local agricultural society meetings and a keen 
debate continued in the correspondence between county land­
owners and agents. James Fair had his own firmly held 
views which.he strenuously attempted to impress on others.
He claimed to have drained every type of soil. He had used 
a wide variety of materials and was strongly opposed to the 
use of "wedge" turves which was a preference shared by 
William Garnett of Quemmore, Hesketh of Rufford and Wilson- 
Ffrance of Rawcliffe Hall. Fair cut drains .varying from 
two to three feet in depth. Thomas Hesketh preferred a 
minimum of four feet. Just as open a question was whether
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to cut parallel drains or to turn them across the slope 
(83)
of a field. Needless to say, failure stalked some of
these early efforts. For instance, Fitzherbert-Brockholes 
of Claughton drained his own 2,000 acres by a system of 
shallow drains filled with stone but was later forced to 
redrain his land using the much more effective drainage 
tile.^®^ Doubtless this was not an untypical experience 
regionally or nationally. A similar ignorance of technique, 
poor execution and inadequate materials brought little 
success to the drainage schemes carried out on the Staff­
ordshire clays during the first half of the 19th century.
Furthermore, part of the problem lay with
the lack of central control and direction. Comprehensive
drainage schemes conducted by the estate office and carried
out by professional teams of drainage engineers belonged to
the future. It was far too often the case that drainage
was carried out by individual tenants on a piecemeal,
haphazard basis which led one local agricultural society
to recommend in 1848 that landlords should do the draining
(86)themselves simply because tenants did it badly. ' Indeed, 
even under the enlightened management of James Fair, tenants 
on the Cliftons* Warton estate in the 1830s were required 
to carry out their own improvements and, in the case of 
drainage work, a 12-£% reduction in rent was allowed. As 
late as 1845, by which time tile drains were being exten­
sively used on the estate, turves were still being sent 
out to numerous tenants so that they could undertake their 
own drainage • Nor did it always follow that profess­
ional standards should follow in the wake of improved
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techniques and materials. In 1856 it was customary 
practice on the Scarisbrick estate to provide tenants with 
draining tiles and allow them to carry out their own work.^®^
Nevertheless, despite all the imperfections
of these early improvement schemes, a marked feature of
changing agricultural attitudes during the second quarter
of the century was a growing confidence in the profitability
of effective drainage. It was shared by landlord and tenant
alike. Poor crop returns, the inability of tenants to pay
full rents and mounting arrears convinced at least one local
landowner that only drainage would arrest the complaints of
local farmers. Moreover, he estimated that drained land
could be let at twice the former value. Equally, a tenant
farmer maintained that the costs of improvements had been
well worthwhile. Seed could be planted early and "a good
and early crop (was) always more certain." In stressing
the central importance of drainage, the Ashton Agricultural
Society echoed the sentiments of a growing majority of
landowners and tenants. "Thirteen years ago," it reported
in 1848, "the propriety of thoroughly draining the land
was much doubted. Now it was generally admitted that
draining was the foundation of good farming. No doubt
the costs of draining appeared a daunting obstacle to some
tenants, yet the same farmers complained of losing £3-£4
per acre on their crops at harvest time in the event of a 
(91)wet spring. '
The main thurst in drainage.work, then, took
?.
place from mid-century onwards rather than before. Moreover,
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it involved landowners in unprecedented levels of expend-
(92)
iture. ' This shift of financial responsibility on to 
the shoulders of the landowner was in part due to the 
general acceptance of the fact that the competitive cond­
itions which a free-trade market was expected to produce 
demanded an urgent and positive response by agricultural­
ists. Well-drained land and good buildings were also 
essential in encouraging tenant farmers to put capital into 
stocking their f a r m s . ' How much land was actually 
drained during the period of nhigh farming** is impossible 
to determine with any precision,as is the full geographical 
extent of landowners* undertakings or the effect on agric­
ultural productivity. The nature of the data will not allow 
for that. Nevertheless, the weight of evidence from a 
variety of sources does highlight the intensity of drainage 
schemes particularly from the 1840s onwards.
James Fair instigated a long-term project 
for the comprehensive drainage of the Clifton estate in 
1839. The central feature of his scheme was the construct­
ion of a main drain to serve the properties concentrated in 
the south-west corner of the Fylde. It was designed to 
bisect the estate on a line running from Marton down through 
Westby and Lytham to an outlet on the Ribble estuary. The 
main drain and the branch system, altogether extending over 
ten miles in length, provided the basis for underdraining 
some 6,000 acres half of which had previously been liable 
to severe flooding. The other distinguishing feature
of Fair*s scheme was that it was as costly as it was 
impressive. Despite the availability of mass-produced and
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cheaper tiles and pipes by the 1840s, drainage was still 
an expensive business - about £5 sin acre in mid-century and 
considerably more than that by the 1870s. The Cliftons1
main drain in itself cost £3,000 and a further £3-£5 per 
acre was spent on extending the subsidiary drainage system, 
even though the estate was producing its own tiles and 
pipes after 1843. The costs were eventually absorbed by 
the £10,000 loan arranged with the Inclosure Commissioners 
in 1847.
In due course drainage on the remainder 
of the estate was systematically tackled. The Lands 
Improvement Company provided a total of £14,456 between 
1859 and 1880 and a further £15,500 over the period 1881- 
1911 to enable the major construction works to be carried 
out - the principal spinal drains, bridges, culverts, dikes 
and outlet spanners. Individual farms were drained as 
required, though in the 1860s and 70s operations were 
especially concentrated on the newly acquired properties 
in Warton and on the heavier clays in Westby and Salwick.
The practice of farmers carrying out their own drainage 
clearly did not die away completely, but, in most cases, 
the work was undertaken by teams of engineers appointed by 
the estate office itself. For their part tenants were 
required to contribute a proportion of the cost, though 
their respective contributions depended on individual 
circumstances and location. Generally speaking, tenants 
were contracted to cart materials and provide some of the 
labour as well as pay an interest charge of 5% once the
f
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work had been completed. Nevertheless each tenant and 
his requirements were dealt with on their merits. For 
instance, when Richard Dingle took out a new lease on his 
Salwick farm in 1851 he was charged the usual 5% of the 
outlay on drainage carried out by the estate. Yet two 
fields were drained entirely at the landowner’s expense and 
the tenant supplied with liberal amounts of guano to improve 
the fertility of the land.^®^
Newspaper reports and the descriptions of
interested agriculturalists make it clear that extensive
drainage work was being carried out elsewhere in the county
at about the same time. Certainly progress reports on
current drainage operations, engineering techniques and
methods of laying down land to grass seemed to have been
the topical and dominant themes at the meetings of the
county’s numerous agricultural societies, which lends
credence to William Garnett’s claim in 1848 that "works of
drainage (had) been carried out throughout north Lancashire
to a greater extent than had been known for years." In fact
Garnett himself, on his own Quernmore estate, had set a
standard for others to follow. The 1840s and 50s were a
period of intense activity at both Bleasedale and Quernmore
during which under-drainage was carried out on virtually
(99)every farm on the estate. 7 Close by on the Duke of 
Hamilton’s Axhton estate, near Lancaster, the construction 
of a tile-kiln in 1845 resulted in 62 miles of pipe-drains 
being laid in the following three years. O n  the Fylde 
itself, Fitzherbert-Brockholes looked to rectifying the 
inadequacies of the early stone-filled drains at Claughton,
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whilst on the neighbouring Hornby and Derby estates, 
comprehensive schemes were implemented in the 1850s. (^1) 
Down at Penwortham, outside Preston, William Rawstome’s 
drainage works got underway in 1854 and were finally 
completed eighteen years later. In the Blackburn area, 
local landowners had completed the underdraining of 3,000 
acres in 1848, making it possible for a "turnip culture" to 
be adopted "on a large scale." And at Parbold Hall, near 
Standish, 55 acres of stony marl were drained between 1845 
and 1847.^^^ Similarly, a few miles away at Rufford,
Sir Thomas Hesketh’s estate was receiving the same system­
atic treatment. During the early part of the century there 
is no evidence to suggest that the estate office attended 
to drainage work apart from what was required on the Home 
Farm. By contrast, by mid-century, operations on an 
impressive scale were being financed and supervised by 
landowner and agent. Between 1848 and 1860, for instance, 
over £16,000 was expended on underdraining ancestral 
property in Rufford, Mawdesley and Wrightington, though 
this sum was eventually dwarfed by the amount needed to 
drain and reclaim land from the Hesketh and Becconsall 
marshes between 1860 and 1885.^^^
But drainage by itself could not have 
produced any dramatic improvement in agricultural product­
ivity. The productive capacity of the soil is tied to its 
fertility which in turn depends on revitalizing inputs as 
well as balanced land-use. But the possibility that heavy 
land could be properly drained coincided by mid-century 
with the availability of new and more effective fertilizers.
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However, until the 1840s, the efforts of agents and 
farmers in tackling the problem of soil deficiences had 
met with limited success. Marl was by far the most common 
method of manuring despite its limited recuperative value. 
Liming was also a well-established practice particularly 
for restoring meadow land but, again, transport costs 
restricted its use. The success enjoyed by Cheshire 
farmers in restoring exhausted pasture through the use of 
bone was widely recognised and, to a limited extent, tenants 
on the Clifton estate resorted to the same method. Never­
theless, its wider application suffered from the same 
constraints of transport costs as did lime and other  ^
materials • ^ E q u a l l y ,  the lack of yards and stacks 
meant that farmers only had limited amounts of manure to 
put back on to the land, which was why leases usually 
imposed such heavy restrictions on the removal of dung from 
farm premises. And very few had access to readily trans­
portable town manure. To some extent James Fair got round 
this particular problem by having a depot built on the 
Lancaster canal which at least enabled the tenants from 
Clifton-with-Salwick to boat manure up from Preston.
So clearly guano and the chemical fertilizers, both of which 
were being extensively used on the Clifton estate and else­
where by the late 1840s, filled a vital role until the 
cycle of organic manuring had become firmly established on 
well equipped dairy farms.
Moreover, essential as drainage was, drained 
fields were not enough to support large increases in stock. 
In its report of 1845 the Parliamentary Select Committee,
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which examined the legality and financial viability of 
landowners raising money to carry out improvement work on 
their estates, concluded that "the full advantage to be 
derived from thorough draining (could) not be obtained 
without the erection of farm buildings suitable to the 
improved state of the land drained"; and they reinforced 
the view of several witnesses who stressed that existing 
building provision was insufficient to cater for an antic­
ipated increased production of root-crops, straw and 
(107)stock. f/ In short, the full value of a well-drained 
field-system could ultimately only be realised through the 
provision of adequate farm accommodation. This was the 
second major area of landowners* investment. Again, the 
level and timing of such investment depended on the fore­
sight of the individual landowner, the particular condit­
ions of his estate and the financial resources avsilable to 
him, but, generally speaking, most building activity was 
concentrated in the third quarter of the century even on 
those improving estates which had set the pace in earlier 
years. Widening price differentials from 1850 onwards, 
expanding livestock production on farms and a wider 
acceptance by landowners and agents as a matter of estate 
policy that buildings should be provided when required
injected a greater urgency into building and improvement
(108) programmes.v
Studies in recent yeaurs have identified a 
similar pattern of expenditure on estates scattered through­
out Britain’s pastoral district. For instance, a more 
consistent and higher level of investment by landowners in
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farm accommodation is evident on many of the Staffordshire 
estates during the second half of the century. A commens­
urate level of spending on repairs and new buildings was 
equally a marked feature on a number of predominantly 
livestock estates in Cheshire, Northumberland, Yorkshire 
and Gloucestershire, particularly during the 1870s. Like­
wise, although it was apparently not until the 1860s that 
the Earl of Scarbrough embarked on his own energetic 
investment scheme, he then proceeded to lay out over 
£110,000 on repairs and permanent improvements over a 
period of sixteen yesrs. There is evidence of extensive 
repair work and improvements being carried out on the 
larger Welsh estates from the 1820s onwards, but clearly 
the stimulus of certain factors after 1850 - the rise in 
the price of livestock products and the opening up of 
remote areas by the railways - spurred landowners on to 
greater efforts. On Lord Bute*s Glamorgan estate large 
sums were being spent on buildings and repairs after 1814 
simply in order to rescue the estate from its extremely 
ruinous condition, yet this item of expenditure reached 
even greater heights in the years after 1850 and was 
consistent with a similar heavy outlay on a comprehensive 
drainage scheme.
Renovation and new building work on the 
Lancashire estates would appear to fall into a similar 
chronological pattern. There^were, of course, instances 
of early endeavour - notably Charles Scarisbrick who 
financed the construction of numerous farmhouses and out­
buildings throughout his estates between 1835 and 1843, and
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the Earl of Sefton who, it was reported in 1845, had 
already "expended large sums on the repair of buildings.
On the Fylde the standard had been set by the Jacsons’
Barton Hall estate where larger and more efficient farm 
units had been created, involving an outlay of £27,000 on 
farm buildings between 1833—49.^^^ However, as regards 
the county as a whole, farm buildings were generally 
considered to be in a very dilapidated state in 1845.^^^
But the evidence of available estate accounts suggests 
that activity reached a peak in the third quarter of the 
century, both to correct past neglect and to equip farmers 
to meet changing market demands. Between 1838 and 1894 
the Cliftons, for instance, spent over £236,000 on farm 
buildings, an average annual outlay of £4,577. In fact, 
their agent claimed that all the farms, buildings and
f 1 1 -z\
cottages had been "practically rebuilt" over the period.v 
Admittedly, there are problems with outlining the scale 
and timing of landowners1 investment. On the Clifton 
estate there is the absence of continuous accounts until 
after 1862. Furthermore, as has already been indicated, 
the accounting methods of the Cliftons* agents lumped 
together expenditure on both the urban and agricultural 
estates. Approximately £20,000 was spent on building work 
in Lytham. However, since most of this spending was 
concentrated in the mid-l840s and again in the early 1870s, 
it is possible to measure investment in agricultural 
property with a certain amount of accuracy. Finally, it 
is also worth stressing that the landowner’s investment 
did not represent total expenditure. Although the financ­
ial burden shifted emphatically on to the shoulders of the
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landowner during the second half of the century, never­
theless, tenants continued to sink some of their own 
capital into drainage systems and new farm buildings and 
they therefore made a significant contribution to the over­
all outlay on agricultural improvements. ^  ^
On the Clifton estate the injection of 
substantial amounts of capital into farm property coincided 
with the major drainage scheme of the early 1840s which 
made it possible to create the 3-400 acre farms on the 
Lytham and Westby mosses. That involved the landowner in 
the construction of "commodious and extensive farm build­
ings....at a cost, in some cases, of £2,000 to £3,000 and 
in others exceeding £4,000." They were architecturally 
designed and purpose-built dairy farms incorporating the 
principle of covered yards, adequate stacks and storage 
facilities. Predictably, spending on repairs and new
buildings dropped away during the financially difficult 
years of the early 1850s. However, the high point of the 
1840s was matched by a longer period of equally intensive 
investment in the 1860s and 70s. Between 1838 and 1863 
approximately £105,000 was spent on estate buildings. By 
contrast, over the course of the following fifteen years, 
a further £75,000 was spent and, significantly, the rebuild­
ing of farm houses and the provision of additional shippons 
and bams figured largely in the payments. So, whereas 
building expenditure averaged £4,227 p.a. in the 40s and
50s, the annual outlay averaged £5,111 between 1863—70 and
(116)
climbed still further to £5,598 between 1870-78.
Likewise, though the data are far from
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complete, it is nonetheless evident that building expend- 
the Hesketh estate was consistent with the very 
heavy outlays on drainage schemes. In the 1820s and early 
30s surviving building accounts suggest concentrated 
spending on improvements to the family residences at 
Rufford. Later accounts reflect an increasing outlay on 
a variety of repairs and new buildings, including shippons, 
pig—sties and cottages. Clearly much of this spending was 
bound up with the estate’s ambitious reclamation work on 
the Croston and Hesketh marshes. A further 2,000 acres of 
Croston Moss were drained in 1843 and, in 1849, reclamation 
of another 800 acres of Martin Mere began. improvement
work in this area of the estate progressed continuously 
from the mid-1840s onwards but was characterised by two 
periods of intense activity, 1862-8 and 1879-84. New farms 
had to be built and others expanded as individual holdings 
were doubled and trebled in size. Drainage, embanking and 
enclosure accounted for a large proportion of the total 
capital investment. Yet, the costs of new farm accommod­
ation and laying new roads were by no means small and, for 
instance, ran to £11,000 over the last period of reclamat­
ion work.^®^
The details of building expenditure else­
where in Lancashire are patchy but nevertheless support the 
view that both large and, to a lesser extent, small land­
owners embarked on substantial investment programmes from 
the 1850s onwards. John Binns, writing in 1851, applauded 
the efforts of two other substantial Fylde landowners, 
Wilson-Ffrance and tfilson-Patten (Lord Winmarleigh).together
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with the Rothwells of Foxholes, near Lancaster, and the 
Saunders family of Wennington. ^ 9 )  ^  QQernmore^ William
Garnett spent £1,400 on new buildings on one farm alone, 
which was not untypical of the scale of capital investment 
throughout the estate during the 1850s in particular.
The same period was significant for permanent improvements 
on the Devonshire estate in Furness. General accounts and 
the pattern of expenditure on individual farms would 
indicate that spending on new farm buildings began to assume 
a larger proportion of total outlay on permanent improve­
ments from the mid-l850s. In fact, it has been suggested 
that, for much of the 19th century, new work on the large 
estates accounted for between 10-20% of the total expend­
iture on farm buildings nationwide. Spending on the
Devonshire estate would appear to confirm this general 
view of capital investment. Fortunately, account books in 
this case do supply details of new work as distinct from 
regular outgoings on maintenance and repairs. Spending 
on new farm buildings reached 23% of total building expend­
iture by 1860 which was consistent with intensive drainage 
work undertaken throughout the estate during the 1850s.
Investment fell back to c.13% in 1870 but, by 1880, had
(122)returned to its former level.v *
Furthermore, there is an indication that 
the spirit of improvement did not confine itself to the 
great landowners. On occasion it reached down to the 
lower levels of landed society. The estate spending of the 
Chavannes family, owners of the small Myers dough Hall 
estate in the east Fylde, serves to illustrate this point.
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In a despairing letter written to the Cliftons' agent,
James Fair in 1865, Mrs. Chavannes complained that, over 
the previous ten years "rents had been increasing every­
where except on (their) property.” The Fairs were invited 
to make an inspection of the estate and they subsequently 
implemented what amounted to an over—ambitious and very 
expensive programme of improvement work. In 1869 a loan 
of £300 was raised for drainage work. The following year 
James Fair received further instructions to carry out 
repairs, drainage and other improvements. In fact the work 
had to be scaled down in face of the not altogether unsurp­
rising opposition on the part of the heir to the estate 
to the amount of borrowed capital required. However, it 
would appear that the restraint on expenditure was short- 
lived. In 1873/4 another £355 had been spent on drainage 
and repairs, a sum dwarfed by the amount expended on a new 
weir and embankments - £930 in 1877 and £1,276 in 1878/9.
For a small estate of 535 acres producing a rental of 
£1,249 in 1878/9 this level of spending suggests something 
of the reckless confidence expressed by many landowners, 
big and small, in the benefits of agricultural investmentP2^
The scale of investment by individual 
Lancashire landowners in their estates compares favourably 
with what is already known about landowning enterprise 
outside the county. Unfortunately, precise correlations 
are impossible to make because of the nature of the data. 
Comparisons can be made on the basis of the proportion of 
gross incomes spent by individual landowners on capital 
improvements, but it is worth bearing in mind that the
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extent to which gross incomes were inflated by non- 
agricultural sources varied from one landowner to the 
next. At the same time, there were many Lancashire land­
owners who were almost totally dependent on farm rentals 
and this fact must have shaped their ability and willing­
ness to invest. Furthermore, investment policy was closely 
related to the prevailing condition of the individual 
property and intended land-use. There are also problems 
of a methodological kind which have already been mentionedP^^ 
Estate accounts are far from being complete financial 
statements and sometimes fail to make specific reference to 
large-scale and expensive undertakings for which loans 
usually had to be raised. However, another line of invest­
igation exists which is worth mentioning. Since rents were 
often derived from a wide range of sources and since they 
were subject to even wider fluctuations, equating the 
amount that was laid out per acre across estates might be 
more useful as a comparative measure. There again, as an 
approach it has its own inherent drawbacks. The reclam­
ation of waste - such a pronounced feature of the 
agricultural scene in 19th century Lancashire - together 
with the buying and selling of land, obviously meant that 
the size of most estates was constantly changing. Never­
theless, where detailed accounts are unavailable, this
method sometimes makes it possible to generalise about
(128^
landowners1 investments at particular times.v
Accepting all these reservations, the out­
lay of Lancashire*s great landowners compares with that of 
their national counterparts. F.M.L. Thompson has estimated
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that capital investment by landlords averaged 27% of gross
rentals by the early 1870s. On estates in the livestock
counties investigated by Perren, spending on land and
buildings rarely fell below 20% in the same period. These
estimates are broadly in keeping with those of R.J. Thompson
who calculated that the average annual outlay on repairs
and improvements on various 19th century estates stood at
25% of gross rents. Those landowners whose incomes
were well buttressed by non-agricultural wealth could well
afford to be even more generous in the outlay of money on
their agricultural properties. W.E. Hale, Lord Derby’s
agent, reported that 30-35% of the gross rental was "the
average amount spent annually on the agricultural tenants."
The Earl of Sefton’s spending on his estate in the 1870s
ranged between 18% and 59% of gross income. Indeed, an
outlay of £25,000 in just two years - 1873 and 1874 - was
(127)impressive by any landowner’s standards. 7 The Devon­
shire estates tell a similar story. During the 1870s it 
was commonplace for between 30% and 46% of gross income 
from the largely agricultural properties of Kirby and 
Cartmel to be reinvested in improvement work. At that time, ■ 
the burgeoning iron-ore royalties from Furness permitted
a large measure of generosity in recycling revenue from
(128)the agricultural estate.v
Clearly most gentry families were not in 
the position of such aristocratic figures as Lord Derby or 
the Duke of Devonshire in being able to subsidise agricult­
ure out of other sources. Yet, in terms of'the proportion 
of their total incomes which was channelled into agricultural
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improvements, it would appear that the lesser landowners 
were not necessarily any less generous/1^^ Indeed, the 
evidence suggests that their collective contribution was 
as significant as that of their aristocratic counterparts. 
For instance, in 1848 the Standish family commissioned a 
survey of their 3,000 acre estate in central Lancashire.
It concluded that the whole of the property was in urgent 
need of draining, which would add 50% to the annual value 
of the estate. On the strength of this estimate a loan of 
£130,000 was taken up for drainage and other improvement 
work as well as clearing existing debts. Repayments on a 
loan of this size subsequently absorbed no less than 63% 
of a gross income which came not only from farm property 
but also coal royalties and the leasehold rents of a 
number of factories and public houses.^^0) Equally there 
can be little doubt about the commitment of the Garnetts 
to the cause of agricultural improvement nor about the 
extent of the financial sacrifice they had to make in the 
process. By 1870 almost £207,000 had been spent acquiring 
and improving an estate of approximately 4,000 acres. 
Considerable industrial and commercial interests had to 
be sold off to make this possible, to the extent that an 
income averaging over £10,000 p.a. in the 1840s had fallen 
to c. £7,000 p.a. in the following decade. Restoring the 
poor condition of the Bleasedale estate during the 1850s 
absorbed an average of 28% of gross rentals from the 
property and in the 1860s and 70s repairs, new work and 
improvements continued to draw off a steady ^ 12% of estate 
income/151 ^ Similarly, Lawrence Rawstorne’s spending on 
his Penwortham and Hutton estates totalled over £50,000
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between 1852 and 1881. Assuming an investment of approx­
imately 8/— per acre per annum over the 29 year period, 
between 20-25% of estate income must have been channelled 
back into maintenance and improvement work/1^^
The accounts of the Clifton estate demon­
strate a remarkably consistent pattern of investment. 
Excluding the years 1870 and 1871 when exceptionally large 
sums are known to have been spent on the urban estate 
between 20-22% of gross income was regularly reinvested in 
building work, drainage, plantations and fences, roads, 
allowances to tenants and on the repayment of capital sums 
borrowed from government sources and the Lands Improvement 
Company, (see Appendix III). The percentage of income 
from purely agricultural sources reinvested in the land 
was, of course, higher still. In 1866, when accounts make 
a clear distinction between agricultural and urban income, 
improvements and maintenance absorbed 28% of farm rentalil^^ 
Yet even these estimates must be considered on the low side. 
For, as the agent himself made clear, once fixed outgoings 
had been taken care of (that is family payments, annuities, 
current interest charges, agency expenses, insurance, 
taxes) the residue was rarely sufficient to cover the costs 
of repairs and improvements on the e s t a t e The deficits 
were usually carried by the bank for a time and eventually 
converted into a mortgage. It is impossible to put a 
figure on the sum involved but growing interest payments
must have included considerable amounts which in fact
(1 35)serviced annual capital spending on the estate. To
what extent this situation applied to other landowners is
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difficult to say, but it seems probable that some of the 
most heavily indebted individuals could have found themselves 
financing regular estate outgoings on borrowed money. Given 
their level of indebtedness and estate spending in the 1860s 
and 70s the Heskeths of Rufford Hall immediately spring to 
mind.
At all levels, then, investment in agricult­
ure by Lancashire landowners was high. By contrast, the 
return on their investment was not. It certainly fell well 
short of the confident expectations which many agents and 
landowners shared when first embarking on their improvement 
schemes. "By keeping the land in good heart", Thomas Fair 
wrote to Colonel Clifton in 1866, "it is my belief that you 
can look forward to a steady and improving income."(^6)
His view was clearly based on the assumption that the recov­
ery of improvement costs would be met by substantial rises 
in rent levels over an admittedly long-term period. However, 
the years of rising rents were all too brief. The £6,000 
increase in the annual rentals on the Clifton estate between 
1836 and 1850 can be put down to the £24,500 laid out on the 
purchase of additional agricultural land, the revision of 
life-leases and a steady increase in urban ground rents, as 
much as the return on improvement work. From 1850 until 
1866 farm rents barely moved. The only significant rise in 
agricultural rents was concentrated in the years 1866—79 
when an overall increase of 13% took place. Nevertheless, 
this figure conceals sharp differences across the estate.
For instance, rents from the Lytham farms, having the 
advantage of being located within easy reach of the Fylde
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railway network and the urban markets of the Fylde coast, 
increased by 24^% which amounted to no less than half of 
the total increase in the estate’s income from agricultural 
rents. The upward movement in farm rentals elsewhere on 
the estate was far more modest. The properties of Westby— 
with—Plumpton and Clifton—with—Sal wick, comparable in size 
to Lytham’s farm acreage, produced only 5—6% increases in 
rental over the same period. In fact, in both places, 
rents were actually stagnating from 1876 onwards / 1 7^)
(see Appendix IV).
On other Lancashire estates rent increases 
were on a similar unremarkable scale. The Clayton farms 
belonging to the Trappes-Lomax family showed increases 
ranging from 6% to 26% over the period 1849-89, depending 
on the amount of capital which was invested in individual 
farms. The expensive improvement work on the Myerscough 
Hall estate, which Thomas Fair so enthusiastically 
impressed upon its owner, resulted in a disappointing 4% 
increase in rentals. The Heskeths of Rufford lavished the 
same amounts of money on an estate similar in size to the 
Cliftons’ and their efforts produced an increased rental 
of 13% over the period 1859-76. On the Cartmel and Kirkby 
Ireleth properties belonging to the Devonshire estate 
increases in farm rents between 1846 and 1885 again ranged 
between 13i and 15%. Rents on Lord Lilford’s Bank Hall 
estate, situated between Preston and Southport, increased 
by 16% over a 20 year period 1860-80. Only on the Queramore 
and Bleasedale estates belonging to William’Garnett did the 
heavy investment of the early 1850s produce at least a
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commensurate increase in farm rentals - in the order of 
40% between 1858 and 1879/1-^
Modest increases in rentals, of course, 
meant an even more modest return on the landlord’s invest­
ment. By the mid-l870s the over-confident assumptions of 
the early 1850s had given way to a more sobering appraisal. 
In its report of 1873 the special committee of the House of 
Lords concluded that "the improvement of land....as an 
investment is not sufficiently lucrative to offer much 
attraction to capital.t»039) indeed, even the most gener­
ous improvers in the mould of the Dukes of Cleveland, 
Northumberland and Bedford realised only 2-24% on their 
investments at a time when the commercial world could 
comfortably reckon on a net return of twice that amount/1 
The actual return on agricultural investment was influenced 
by a number of factors. Firstly, much depended on the 
landowner’s own objectives. In the case of Lord Bute’s 
Glamorgan estate, for instance, income from non-agricultural 
sources allowed him to subsidise the agricultural sector 
and leave farm rents basically unchanged. Consequently, 
"over the nineteenth century as a whole..... the estate’s 
return on investment through increased rents must have been 
negligible."^1^1  ^ The Devonshires were sufficiently well- 
endowed with lucrative industrial and commercial interests 
to adopt a similarly generous policy towards farm rents.
The valuation of much of their Lancashire farmland remained 
unchanged throughout the century which meant that some 
large farms continued to pay rents in 1894 based on a 
valuation of 1826.(1^^
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But clearly the prevailing condition of 
the property not only determined the amount of capital 
needed to improve it but the size of the resulting profit. 
Garnett may have increased his income from farm rentals by 
an impressive 40%, yet, set against the massive expenditure 
needed to modernise the Bleasedale estate in particular, 
the return on his investment peaked at just over 34% by 
the early 1870s/1 But Garnett was singularly fortunate. 
Few landowners can have realised a return that would in 
any way have done justice to the size of their investment; 
and certainly fewer still would have shared the views of 
Bailey Denton, engineer to the General Land Drainage and 
Improvement Company, who claimed in his report to the 
Parliamentary Select Committee of 1874 that "land which had 
been drained twenty years ago paid double the charge that 
was first put on the land for i m p r o v e m e n t s . T h e  
return on a landowner’s investment was in fact governed by 
various restrictive conditions. Firstly, where the costs 
of any improvements could be passed on to the tenant by 
way of an increased rent, this could rarely be done 
immediately. Any rent adjustment had to wait for a change 
of tenancy, a new valuation or the expiry of a lease/^5) 
And, up to at least mid-century, medium and long-term 
leases were a strong feature on the Clifton and other 
Lancashire estates. Hence, any really significant increase 
in farm rents only occurred on the Clifton estate between 
the mid-1860s and mid-1870s and that followed the revaluat­
ion of 1867 and the marked shift towards a policy of grant­
ing annual leases/1*^
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In any case,it did not always follow that 
a landowner would be in a position to pass on the full 
costs. For, as one land agent explained, "the increased 
rent would depend on how the farm had been let before not 
on the amount expended on improvements." And an inspector 
for the Inclosure Commissioners made very much the same 
kind of point in explaining that some landowners would have 
found it difficult to increase their rents "where improve­
ments amounted to nothing more than urgently required 
maintenance on run-down estates." ^^7) However, on 
Lancashire estates it was usual to pass on a 3% charge for 
drainage work and, therefore, it is reasonable to suppose 
that investment in this area was likely to show a profit, 
though only in the long-term and always provided that it 
had been undertaken early enough. But the same could not 
be said for expenditure on farm buildings and cottages. In 
fact, in some cases, tenants were not charged any additional 
rent for building work/1ZfS^ For, as one agent pointed out, 
the tenant could not be expected to pay "for restoring what 
he could not do without. Indeed the Cliftons them­
selves spent over £236,000 on farm buildings and cottages 
between 1838 and 1894, virtually 73% of their total expend­
iture on improvements, and yet no percentage charge was
(1 50)made on the tenant farmers.v '
The inescapable conclusion is that many of 
the improving estates in Lancashire were overcapitalised in 
the sense that most landowners undertook their heaviest 
investment from mid-century onwards and cons*equently had 
little hope of securing a return before agricultural prices
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started to fall and rents to stagnate by the early 1880sP^^ 
Nor did it always follow that the improvement pioneers of 
the earlier decades should have benefited substantially 
more from their foresight than those who embarked on their 
improvement schemes after 1850, Some were unable to raise 
their rents, others had to put right defects in what had 
been largely experimental drainage systems and, in any case, 
most waited until the 1860s and 70s before committing them­
selves to their heaviest spending. Furthermore, it is 
worth bearing in mind that the costs of improving agricult­
ural land were increasing at the time when many Lancashire 
landowners were at their most active and, therefore, this 
was bound to diminish the prospects of an adequate return 
in the foreseeable future. In 1874 it was claimed that "in 
the last few years” drainage costs had risen from £5-10-0 
to between £6-10-0 and £7-0-0 an acre and this excluded an 
additional £4-£5 per acre on fertilizers which was thought 
essential if Considerable increases in rent (were to) be 
asked for." Worse still, by then, a high annual rate of 
inflation was said to be pushing up the costs of building 
materials still further. (^2)
In summary, everything pointed to a disapp­
ointing return on investment. Even landowners who commenced 
their improvement work in the early decades of the century 
were rewarded by little more than 4# at best, when interest 
rates ranged between 3% and 4# and when commercial invest­
ment was expected to show a profit of 8 to And for
(15 5^)those who started later the return was very much worse.v 
Indeed some would have been fortunate to break even. The
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Cliftons,for instance, had been generous investors by any 
standards, having laid out about £22 per acre on improve­
ments between 1832 and 1880, Yet, taking this period as 
a whole, the return on ,their investment could not have 
been more than 1 And the limited evidence that is 
available tends to suggest that landowners elsewhere in 
the county fared little better. The investment in farms 
and land undertaken by the Standish family in mid-century 
showed a profit of 14-2%. On the Devonshire estate in 
Furness individual farms produced a return of between 1% and 
34% depending on the kind of improvement work which had been 
carried out. By comparison, Garnett of Quernmore enjoyed 
slightly greater success. His investment in the purchase 
and improvement of the Quernmore and Bleasedale estates 
returned 2.8% in the mid-1850s rising to 3.8% by the early 
1870s.
In general, even by their own unambitious 
standards, landowners did not reap anything like a satis­
factory financial reward from their frantic investment 
during the middle decades of the century. Furthermore, a 
substantial part of the improvement work which took place 
could only have been financed by borrowing in many cases. 
Still, as long as rents actually held up and, more 
especially, as long as land values were maintained, the 
position of most landowners would not have been unduly 
threatened. The agricultural depression in the last quarter 
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It is now part of historical orthodoxy 
that the wgreat agricultural depression1 was not quite as 
drastic nor as universal in its effect as was once assumed. 
Briefly, the prices of agricultural produce, farm rents 
and land values fell much more sharply in the southern 
counties than in the north. Lancashire, being predomin­
antly a livestock district, did not suffer to the same 
extent as the arable south and east because dairy produce 
did not experience the same long-term, calamitous drop in 
price as cereals. The easily accessible, expanding markets 
of the industrial towns, a sustained improvement in the 
real wages of labouring people and a consumer preference 
for local dairy produce ensured that Lancashire farmers 
continued to enjoy respectably high prices for their 
products. Milk, for instance, which accounted for three- 
quarters of dairy output, maintained a constant price 
level throughout the years of the depression. Pig and 
poultry farmers, together with market gardeners, also
reaped the benefit both of growing demand and relatively
(1)stable prices. 7
Generally rent levels tend to act as a 
mirror of farming prosperity and, clearly, Lancashire land­
owners did not suffer the same drop in income as their 
southern counterparts. For some it might have been 
reassuring to know that rentals in Oxfordshire, Berkshire 
and Somerset were said to have dropped by 27% between 1875 
and 1892. In parts of Essex, Hertfordshire and Lincolnshire
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the picture was even worse with reports of a 50% reduct- 
(2)
ion. By contrast, so the argument goes, sharp movements 
in rents did not take place in Lancashire. Fairly frequent 
abatements in rent were made on a number of estates but 
permanent reductions were few and far between. Indeed it 
is claimed that Lord Derby*s rents on his Fylde and Bowland 
estates acutally increased by 25% between 1884 and 1904 
and the same was also true of the Trappes-Lomax estate in 
east Lancashire. Moreover, rarely did landowners find 
themselves with large amounts of land on their hands, rents 
continued to be well paid and it is evident that a high 
level of investment in repairs and improvements was 
sustained.
At first sight it would appear that 
Lancashire was an oasis of reassuring stability for land­
owners and farmers alike. But if this was really the case, 
then why was so much land sold off over the three decades 
following the onset of the depression in 1879? Why were 
large ancestral estates such as the Heskeths* broken up 
completely and others, like the Cliftons', reduced to 
shadows of their former selves? Why Thomas Fair's despond­
ent remark in 1889 that "land will no longer provide as it 
has in the past?"^
In part the movement in land speaks for 
itself. The closing two decades of the 19th century and 
the opening years of the 20th witnessed a reduction in the 
size of numerous Lancashire estates, and total dismember­
ment in some cases. Of course, a certain amount of land
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came on to the market for much the same reasons as it had 
done in the past# The lack of a direct heir brought about 
the sale of the Townley estate, near Burnley, thq ancestral 
seat of one of Lancashire!s oldest landed dynasties#
Equally, the introduction of death duties no doubt compounded 
the problem of settlements and gave a further boost to the 
land market after 1914 and in the immediate post-war years# 
So, 3,000 acres belonging to Captain Charles Gerard, who 
owned land in Wrightington and in adjacent parishes to the 
west of Wigan, had to be sold off in 1919/20 in order to 
meet succession duties and clear considerable family 
settlements.^
Nevertheless, it is clear that a large
amount of land was coming on to the market after 1880
because landowners were being forced to contract. Even
then, disposing of property was never easy. The newspaper
coverage of auctions strongly suggests that landowners
experienced considerable difficulties in finding an
immediate buyer prepared to pay a reasonable price. For
instance, part of the De Tabley estate near Ribchester came
on to the market in 1894 and, interestingly, it was put up
for auction on the instructions of mortgagees. But only
601 out of an advertised 2,658 acres of farmland were
actually sold and then at the low proce of c.£36 per acre.
Similarly, the Samesbury Hall estate belonging to James
Harrison, purchased from the Braddyll family in 1862, was
auctioned in 1883 but bids did not reach the reserve price
(7)apart from one farm of 33 acres*
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Yet, irrespective of whether they were 
successful or not, it is apparent that an increasing 
number of landowners sought a reduction in their holdings.
In particular, those landowners who had scrambled to invest 
in land in the second and third quarters of the 19th century, 
and who therefore had invariably bought at high prices, were 
the ones who were most impatient to part with it in the 
last quarter. The Jacsons* Barton Hall estate on the east 
side of the Fylde was acquired in 1834 and put back on the 
market in 1899. Between 1854 and 1866 the Starkie family 
purchased the Ashton Hall estate, formerly the residence of 
the Dukes of Hamilton, only to put it up for auction in 
1884. Lord Cardwell bought the Ellerbeck estate, situated 
between Wigan and Chorley, in 1860 but disposed of it 
thirty six years later. The Alison family of Park Hall, 
near Chorley, made considerable additions to their estate 
in the 1870s yet had parted with the same property in 1909 
and, in fact, all of their land by 1919.^^ After a 
period of expansion and consolidation in the 1870s, the 
process of breaking up the large Hesketh estate commenced 
in the early 1880s with the sale of land in Tarleton and 
was virtually complete by 1915. The ancestral seat at 
Rufford came under the auctioneer’s hammer in 1906 and it 
is an interesting reflection on the times that the property 
was advertised, not as a financially rewarding investment, 
but principally as a "sporting estate". There could be no 
mistaking the market at which the auction was aimed: "The 
estate....possess an exceptional value to any gentleman who, 
whilst engaged in commercial pursuits, is nevertheless
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desirable of acquiring a place of residence surrounded by- 
scenery of a rural and delightfully picturesque character 
and the possession of which must necessarily carry consid­
erable influence in the neighbourhood."^^
Several factors prompted Lancashire land­
owners to carry out a reduction in the size of their 
estates: a growing awareness that the recession in agric­
ulture was not a temporary phenomenon, driven home by the 
impact of stagnating rentals and falling land values 
particularly on those who were already heavily in debt.
Lord Derby went to the heart of the problem in a speech he 
delivered to the Lancashire Agricultural Society in 1883.
He ascribed the marked increase in land sales in the county 
not only to the deepening recession, but also to the need 
felt by many landowners to reduce the "encumbrances on 
their property#" Contributory factors he pointed out, may 
also have been fears about future land legislation, 
combined with changes in the laws of settlement and entail 
which made it easier to dispose of settled estates.
Initially, however, many landowners 
responded to the depression in much the same was as they 
had responded to recessions of the past. Their confidence 
in the ultimate prosperity of agriculture remained basic­
ally undiminished and it was assumed that recovery could
(11)be purchased through further injections of capital.v ' 
Consequently, on top of the debt accumulating improvements 
of the 1860s and 70s, landowners launched themselves into 
still more expensive, debt-financed undertakings in the
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1880s with the object of combatting falling cereal prices
and the exceptionally wet conditions of 1879-81. True,
Lancashire farmers were fortunate enough in having access
to large urban markets where a growing demand for dairy
products - milk in particular and, to a lesser extent, for
lamb, poultry and eggs - had the effect of stabilising
(12)
prices. ' Nevertheless, farmers had to be equipped to 
meet changing market conditions, and this called for 
increased capital outlays on the part of landowners.
Landowners' investment in Lancashire was 
closely in line with the high levels of spending on drain­
age, land-use conversion and buildings evident in other
(13)
livestock areas during the 1880s and early 90s.N In their 
common efforts to keep tenants on the land and at least 
maintain existing rents landowners in the county demon­
strated a remarkably consistent level of response to the 
depression,in spite of the inevitable variations from one 
landowner to the next arising from different personal 
priorities, resources and the condition of the land itself. 
At one end of the spectrum the Earl of Sefton, who drew an 
income of £43,000 from his agricultural property alone in
1876, could presumably well afford to spend the equivalent
(14)
of £10.50 per acre between 1879 and 1892.v ' At the 
other, Charles Cavendish's outlay of c.£1 per acre reflected 
the fact that his tenants had long enjoyed well-drained, 
highly productive grassland and arable and had been able to 
capitalise on the swelling market demands of neighbouring 
Barrow. But the great majority of landowners can be
- 214 -
found midway between the two extremes. It would also appear 
that the smaller landowners were not necessarily more 
cautious in their spending when compared with the greater 
gentry of the region. In terms of expenditure per acre 
their respective outlays were very similar. For their part 
the Cliftons expended roughly £7 per acre between 1879 and
1892. Lawrence Rawstome spent approximately £6/£7 per 
acre over the same period on his 3-4,000 acre estate at 
Hutton outside Preston. A similar amount was invested by 
Fitzherbert-Brockholes in his 3,800 acres surrounding 
Claughton Hall on the Fylde. Expenditure on the Scarisbrick 
estate was of the same order whilst at Gawthorpe Hall, 
Burnley, the Kay-Shuttleworth family spent Just over £6 
per acre on their modest 300 acre property.v '
Much of this spending was concentrated in 
the early 1880s. These years, for example, represented the 
high point of investment on the Clifton estate and focused 
on an expansion in dairy farming. During the 1870s grass­
land in the county had been gradually increasing, partly 
through a long-standing process of reclaiming and enclosing 
wasteland.But, by the 1880s, the increase in meadow- 
land, necessary to support more stock, was taking place on 
the basis of a much more radical shift in existing land-use 
arrangements* In the townships making up the Clifton estate 
permanent meadow increased by between 21 and 56% from 1874/6 
to 1894/6 at the expense of the arable used for crop rotat­
ions. On the arable which remained wheat gave way to such 
fodder and cash crops as barley, and vegetables. And these 
changes were by no means untypical of the pattern across
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the whole Fylde. If, as Fletcher has claimed, Lord Derby 
was fortunate enough to enjoy a marked improvement in 
rentals on his Weeton property then this could only have 
been made possible by an expensive programme of laying a 
considerable acreage down to permanent grass. (see 
Appendix V).
Evidence from the Clifton account books 
suggests that the intensive efforts to expand and improve 
dairy farming throughout the estate were far from cheap.
From 1878 to 1894 annual sums, as high as £527 in 1884, 
were being spent on grass seeds and fertilizers which were 
made available to individual tenants on demand. The drain­
age bill averaged £330 per annum throughout the 1860s and 
had risen to an average of £915 per annum during the 1870s. 
But a loan from the Lands Improvement Company, specially 
advanced for drainage purposes, drove average annual spend­
ing in this area up to £1,228 between 1879 and 1886. 
Similarly, expenditure on farm buildings moved sharply ahead 
in the same period. An average of £3>900 p.a. was being 
spent on repairs and new constructions between 1872 and 
1881. From 1882 to 1887 an additional £2,000 p.a. was laid
South of the Ribble, Hesketh reorganised 
farm units and accelerated his own investment in new farm 
buildings. Close by, the trustees of the Scarisbrick 
estate embarked on what amounted to a rescue operation 
during the early 1880s. Their problem, however, was partly 
of their own making. The agricultural property to North
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Meols had been largely neglected during the 1860s and 70s 
on the strength of the fact that farm rentals had held 
steady. In any case, the estate was cushioned by the flow 
of ground rents stemming from Southport*s development.
Yearly expenditure on repairs, improvements and drainage 
amounted to an average of only £4-500 p.a. between 1861 and 
1869, which represented a small fraction of the total 
Scarisbrick income. However, the changing tide in agric­
ulture brought a sharp reminder that, despite their urban 
connections, the Scarisbricks were still dependent on farm 
rents as the mainstay of their income. Only the prompt 
injection of large capital sums prevented substantial parts 
of the estate falling on to the hands of the trustees. So, 
in just over four years after 1879, £59,000 was spent on a 
comprehensive range of much needed improvements.
The hoped-for recovery did not materialise. 
Admittedly, rents on Lancashire estates did not go into 
rapid decline as clearly was the case elsewhere. There were 
few permanent reductions in rent. Nevertheless, recurrent 
abatements and mounting arrears amounted to substantial 
shortfalls in income, which many landowners could ill-afford. 
For instance, the Hesketh rent-roll fell from £20,223 in 
1880 to £17,*981 by 1896. It was an alarming drop in view 
of the expensive reclamation schemes carried out on the 
Hesketh-with-Becconsall estate during the 1870s which it 
was expected would boost gross annual rentals by £3,000.
Land in Tarleton was sold during the early 1880s but this 
does not fully explain the shortfall. The fact was that
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arrears of 20-25% were commonplace by 1 8 9 6 . The 
pattern of persistent arrears and annual abatements was 
repeated elsewhere and together they amounted to virtually 
permanent reductions in rent. Lord Lilford’s rental from 
his Bank Hall estate at Bretherton ostensibly grew from 
£8,743 to £10,580 between 1880 and 1885, yet this increase 
was due almost entirely to the purchase of Hesketh’s 
adjacent property in 1883. In fact income from farm rents 
was down by £1,000 per year by the end of the 1880s and 
only returned to the level of 1880 in 1892/3.^22  ^ The 
position on William Garnett*s Quemmore estate was very 
similar in that rents dropped by almost 20% between 1879 
and 1899.^2^  The rise in agricultural rents on the Clifton 
estate began to tail off from 1877 onwards and only a slow 
maturing of ground rents in Lytham and St. Annes prevented 
a still more serious deterioration in the estate’s financial 
health. Even so, using 1882 as a base, gross rentals were 
down by an average of £1,500 p.a. over the following twelve 
years and did not fully recover until 1898 when urban rents 
assumed a heal their growth rate.^2^  With the exception of 
1890 and 1891, 10% abatements in rent were made even on 
the Devonshires* Furness estate every year from 1886 to
1893. On the Earl of Bective’s Baraacre estate there was 
a consistent rise in rent abatements starting at 34% in 
1882 and reaching 214% by 1893. Tenants on the Fylde 
estate belonging to Lord Winmarleigh received periodic 
abatements of 10% prior to a permanent reduction of the 
same proportion in 1893. (see Appendix VI).
Moreover, it appears that the losses were
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most severe on those farms where most money had been spent. 
In an effort to persuade tenants to remain on the land and 
hopefully maintain their rent payments, capital outlays 
tended to be concentrated on the larger units. It was a 
gamble which failed on both counts. The Hesketh estate is 
a case in point. On their Hesketh-with-Becconsall property, 
farms had been doubled and trebled in size and additional 
farms created out of the marsh reclamation scheme under­
taken during the 1870s and early 80s. Significantly, it 
was these very large holdings which carried the highest 
arrears - as high as 33% - and in which the greatest invest­
ment had been made.^2^  The situation deterioriated still 
further in the first half of the 1890s - by far the worst 
phase of the depression in Lancashire agriculture. Wheat 
prices reached a record low in 1894, store cattle and wool
prices fell and a series of droughts compounded the problems
(27)facing the grazier and dairy farmer.v ' By then, the
Hesketh estate had neither the will nor the resources to
face inevitable demands for further rent reductions,
abatements and improvements. True, Sir Thomas Fermor-
Hesketh undertook the construction of new farm buildings at
his own expense but the ambitious drainage schemes of
former years never reached completion. Neither landlord
nor tenantry were in a position to find another £2,000
( 28}needed for the Hesketh-with-Becconsall drainage work.v '
In the closing years of the century the 
Cliftons found themselves faced with the same difficulties 
as the Heskeths. It was said of Fylde landowners in 1882 
that "the effects of the depression (had) not reached
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landlords1 pockets Solely in terms of the impact
on nominal rents, this may have been the case; but that 
does not take account of the financial realities confront­
ing many landowners, which called for a steady if not 
increasing income to meet rising expenditure. The 
Cliftons were forced to borrow still further and invest 
capital in their agricultural estate which they could 
ill-afford, and on which there was no prospect, as events 
turned out, of any return. Again, the heaviest losses 
were tied to the larger farms in which their investment 
had been greatest not only in the 1860s and 70s but 
during the depression years as well. It was, therefore, 
a matter of small consolation that there was no diffic­
ulty in letting the smaller farms. They had not consumed 
most of the estate’s capital spending. Hence the twist 
of despairing irony to Thomas Fair’s reflection in 1894 
that he "would split up farms now if it was not for the 
expense of making buildings.1 As it was, money was
borrowed from the Lands Improvement Company to extend 
grass acreages, improve under-drainage and remedy 
deficiencies in building accommodation on existing farms. 
So, during the course of the 1890s, drainage work was 
carried out and new buildings erected (appropriately 
shippons, dairies and pig-styes) on all the twenty-five 
farms making up the Ciifton-with-Salwick estate. The 
ten largest units absorbed a high proportion of the total 
expenditure. Yet, virtually in every case, not even the 
pre-1894 rent levels could be maintained and reductions 
of between 20 and 25% were allowed on most. By the time 
the estate was sold in 1916 none had recovered their
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former rentals. Worse still, despite all the landowner’s 
efforts, larger farms did fall on to the estate’s hands 
at a cost of almost £20,000 in lost income between 1894 
and 1904, Thereafter the Cliftons continued to plough 
what money they could afford into the green acres of 
Clifton-with-Salwick; but this was essentially for the 
purpose of dressing it up for the property auctions,
By itself the downward movement in net farm 
rentals was hardly a development of dramatic proportions. 
Nevertheless, the stagnation in agricultural incomes dealt 
a serious financial and psychological blow to those land­
owners already overburdened by debt. For the numerous 
landowners who were not in the fortunate position of the 
Derbys, Seftons and Devonshires in having large assets 
and diverse sources of non-agricultural income, the 
financial problems generated by the depression threatened 
to assume critical proportions. In their case even a 
marginal drop in agricultural rentals could have serious 
implications in that it threatened an already precarious 
balance between income and expenditure. And, as has been 
indicated, Lancashire landowners so far studied were 
inclined in varying degrees to high levels of debt accum­
ulating expenditure throughout the 19th century. The 
persistent and unavoidable costs of family settlements, 
the heavy outlays of land purchases, estate improvements, 
housebuilding and, in some cases, the expense of an 
extravagant life-style, all contributed to a mounting 
burden of debt on top of which was piled the capital 
borrowed to counter the effects of the depression.
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Consequently, a major item of fixed expenditure was the 
servicing of interest charges.
Such borrowing habits had been reinforced 
by the over-confident assumption of the 1860s and 70s 
that rents would continue to rise, however modestly. If 
a landowner had further resources with which to meet debt 
repayments so much the better. Yet, when the depression 
came, few landowners below the level of the great magnates 
had the means to shield themselves fully against its 
worst effects. With net incomes beginning to stagnate 
from the 1880s onwards many like the Cliftons, Garnetts, 
Heskeths and the host of lesser landowners, with incomes 
of a few thousand pounds which were almost totally 
dependent on farm rents, must have found themselves facing 
grave problems. At best, the view that rents in 
Lancashire in the 1890s, even when allowance has been made 
for reductions and remissions, may have fallen no lower 
than the levels of 1867-71 was hardly a cause for cele­
bration. If the Scarisbrick trustees were given an 
uncomfortable shock by the recession of the 1880s, what 
of the prospects for the smaller landowner with a modest 
income, limited assets and the problem of meeting interest 
charges on his property? Fletcher’s conclusions that "an 
impoverished landowner was unlikely to be found in 
Lancashire... .largely through a diversity of economic 
activity" will not do.^2  ^ It is inconsistent with the 
harsher reality facing many landowners. For them it was 
not enough that rents in Lancashire did not collapse as 
dramatically as elsewhere. It has been imperative that
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they continued to rise.
Nowhere was this more apparent than on 
the Clifton estate. With current income being squeezed 
from all directions an indebted estate like the Cliftons1 
found that additional debts, however small, could assume 
ominous proportions. Thomas Henry Clifton’s death in 
1880, with the consequent settlement charges on the 
estate was a twist of fate which stretched current income 
to its limits. In fact the estate had to recourse to the 
desperate strategy of trimming various accounts to 
persuade the probate court of its sound financial health 
and to justify the size of the allowance settled on 
Clifton’s widow, M ad e l ei n e. Y et  no amount of manip­
ulating the figures could alter the fact that land, 
burdened down with mortgages and producing a shrinking 
income, was becoming more of a liability than an asset.
In the optimistic projections of 1866 it was confidently 
assumed that Madeleine Clifton would be comfortably 
provided for in the event of her husband’s death. Her 
marriage settlement secured a jointure of £1,000, her 
childrens’ portions amounted to £1,600 p.a. and the 
interest on the value of furniture and plate was estimated 
to be worth a further £340 p.a. In addition it was 
intended that her income would be supplemented by the 
rents from the Layton Hall estate, disentailed in 1866 
and transferred to Thomas Henry in fee, and from the 
Warton and Bryning properties purchased during the life­
time of John Talbot Clifton. In 1882, the'rents from 
these estates amount to £1,862 but maintenance costs and,
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more especially, interest payments on mortgages absorbed 
all but £252.^  ^ Layton Hall itself was by far the 
most heavily encumbered property. It was gradually sold 
off during the 1890s, enabling the mortgages to be 
cleared and leaving a capital profit of £16,000.
Property in Warton presented much the same kind of intract­
able problem. The net income it generated was small yet 
it was difficult to sell off. Some was in fact sold 
between 1887 and 1890 but the greater part remained on 
the estate’s hands at the end of the century. And the 
prospects of an adequate return from the land were as dim 
as ever. It was valued at almost £13,500, which if 
invested at the current commercial rate of 3i% would have 
realised c.£430 p.a. Instead, when allowance was made 
for management and maintenance costs, Mrs. Clifton’s 
income from her Warton property averaged out at £390 p.a. 
between 1899 and 1901 and that excluded interest payments 
on mortgages of £3,500. There was little hope that this 
poor return would be improved on in the future. On the 
contrary, it was felt that rents were already too high
in Warton and could not have been held at their existing
(36)level in the event of farms being relet.v:? '
The unsatisfactory nature of the return on 
Mrs. Clifton’s land was not exceptional. By the mid-1880s 
the profitability of the whole Clifton estate was coming 
under much closer scrutiny. The confidence of earlier 
decades had all but evaporated. Income was virtually 
static. The prospect of reaping a bonus from building 
development in Lytham and St. Annes was at best long-term.
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Meanwhile, interest payments were absorbing 41% of the
gross rental by 1886* Current income was also under the
additional pressure of financing the costs of maintenance
and improvement work on the agricultural estate which,
far from being cut back, significantly increased during
the early 1880s, In fact, by 1886, estate expenditure
accounted for a further 47% of a slightly reduced gross
(37)rental.v 7 It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the
agent and the family solicitors should have begun to
seriously consider selling off part of the estate. Their
choice immediately fell on Great Marton, It was heavily
mortgaged, there were no strong family ties with the
district and it could be safely detached from the main
body of the estate. As soon as Thomas Henry1 s son, John
Talbot, attained his majority in 1889 the way would be
( 38)open to putting the property on the market.w
However, their decision to sell was 
influenced not just by the pressure on current income and 
the problem of servicing crushing interest charges. The 
depression had the equally serious effect of actually
( 39)undermining the basis of a landowner's capacity to borrow;^7 
Just as it had been assumed during the halcyon days of 
the 1860s 'and 70s that rents would continue to rise, it 
was similarly felt that land values would appreciate at 
the same rate. In turn, climbing rents and land values 
clearly offered the kind of security which potential 
investors found attractive. On this basis the Cliftons, 
along with innumerable other landed families, had 
experienced little difficulty in raising all the money they
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needed in the years before 1879.
This situation, however, had changed
dramatically by the mid-1880s. If anything, land values
fell more spectacularly than rents and the depression
effectively wiped out the gains that had been made during
the third-quarter of the century. in this respect
parts of the north-west did not fare much better than
elsewhere. A drop of 30% in land values was apparently
fairly u n i v e r s a l. F o r instance Lord Lilford was
buying up rich agricultural land around Bretherton and
Much Hoole in the 1860s and 70s for as much as £105 and
never less than £78 per acre. By 1883 he was able to buy
Sir Thomas Fermor-Hesketh’s 167 acres in Bretherton for
an average price of £66 per acre. And the downward spiral
continued. In 1904 land in Tarleton, Bretherton and Much
Hoole, at the heart of Lancashire’s fertile coastal plain,
ranged in value from £81 at the top end to £59 per acre
at the lowest. And, as was evident on the Clifton
estate, the fall on the heavier clays which typified soil
(43)types away from the coastal belt was in excess of that.
The financial repercussions were serious 
and fairly, immediate. At a time when any reduction in 
fixed outgoing would have come as a blessing to an indebted 
estate like the Cliftons*, the chances of finding more 
favourable terms in the money market were virtually neglig­
ible. Nevertheless, desperate attempts were made to 
reduce interest costs. In 1886 Clifton’s s^olicitors 
pursued the possibility of transferring loans and paying
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off debts totalling £174,000 on which interest rates of 
4—4j-% were being charged. By obtaining a lower rate of 
3i%, which was currently operating in the market, here 
was an opportunity for making a considerable saving. The 
problem, however, was that agricultural land was no 
longer considered to be the "first class security" which 
any shrewd investor would want. Not only were new mort­
gages harder to come by but Thomas Fair was less than 
confident that mortgagees would be entirely sympathetic 
towards the estate’s existing arrangements. As he pointed 
out to the estate’s solicitors: "The Royal will have to 
be carefully approached, for although the present is a 
favourable time as regards the value of money, they are 
fully alive to the drop in the value of agricultural 
e s t a t e s . T h e y  were indeed and, with £125,000 
invested in the Clifton estate, the Royal Insurance 
Company was none too happy about the current agreement, 
let alone prepared to extend reduced terms. Before long 
the Company realised Fair’s worst fears by reviewing 
outstanding loans. In the autumn of 1886, as a test of 
the estate’s solvency, the Royal demanded an immediate 
repayment of £5,000 out of the £65,000 loan secured by 
the rents from Clifton-with-Salwick. The Royal felt it 
was "being moderate (in) asking no more" but to the 
estate it came as a serious blow. The episode clearly 
demonstrated how a drop in rentals and, more especially, 
a concomitant decline in land values could expose the 
vulnerability of a heavily indebted landowner. "Of course," 
Wilson and Deacon instructed Fair, "you will send them a 
cheque by the first post....on no account let it be
-  ZZ7 -
supposed that the Cliftons cannot pay £5,000 at a 
moment's notice. If you do you will find it utterly 
impossible to borrow money on favourable terms.n^)
That might have been the case but there was no hope of 
paying the £5,000 out of the rents nor of increasing the 
security on existing loans to pacify the estate's 
creditors. Ultimately the family solicitors saved the 
day and came up with the £5,000 themselves.
Stagnating rentals, falling land values 
and the decision to sell off land were not the only 
effects of the depression. Just as important was the 
fact that the depression brought into sharper focus 
strategic alternatives for the future development of the 
estate. Agriculture was no longer the solidly dependable 
bed-rock it has once seemed. In truth, the estate's 
financial salvation lay with bricks and mortar not green 
pastures. Even so, it took some time to convince Thomas 
Pair that the cross-roads had finally been reached. The 
Duke of Bedford later reflected that it was "strange that 
a catastrophe which was no longer impending but had 
actually taken place should have been regarded by those 
best able to judge as a passing c l o u d . Y e t  Bedford 
was speaking with the benefit of hindsight. At the time 
Fair, like so many others, viewed the onset of the 
depression as a temporary phenomenon, the result of 
freakish climatic conditions. Landed sentiment may also 
have played a part in obscuring an objective assessment 
of the situation. Indeed Lord Derby's impassioned 
comments of 1883 reflected a desperate attempt to cling
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on to the past and shore up confidence among the 
county’s landowners* A decline of 15—20% in national 
land values, he argued, should not detract from the 
fact "that land was still a good investment returning 
2^ % to the shrewd investor. It is not quite certain," 
he went on, "that the funds will give him more. New 
wealth should be poured on to the land rather than it 
should be squandered upon a needy and greedy foreign 
state or invested in speculative undertakings of which 
perhaps half are swindles.
Lord Derby could well afford to preach 
what amounted to a conventional gospel. But, as the 
depression deepened, his words came to have a hollow ring. 
Many Lancashire landowners with more limited means were 
in no position to take him seriously. In fact, by 1886, 
Thomas Fair himself had fully jettisoned the idea that 
an agricultural recovery was just round the corner. Of 
course he continued to argue to the contrary with the 
Royal Insurance but, there again, he really had little 
alternative. As for the Royal it was far from being
impressed with Mr. Fair’s "sanguine view that the
depression in agriculture is only temporary." However, 
Fair and the Royal Insurance were much closer in their 
thinking than their formal correspondence actually 
suggests. Fair’s true feelings were reflected in a letter 
he wrote to Wilson and Deacon about the same time in which 
he referred to "gloomy days ahead in agriculture." There 
were few quibbles about lending money on town property, 
he pointed out, and added that "were it in my power I
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would have Lytham stretch to Blackpool.1 The
numerous surveys and valuations undertaken from 1887 
onwards pointed to the estate’s much more earnest deter­
mination to expand building development on the property. 
There were projections of the future rents which new 
building land was likely to produce. Potentially, vacant 
land in Lytham and St. Annes would bring in another 
£22,000 per year, a 60% improvement on existing rentals. 
Indeed the freehold interest in the 1,200 acres lying 
along the coast between Lytham and Blackpool was thought 
to be worth £600,000 in 1896.^*^ But clearly the 
Cliftons were one amongst many landed families who saw
the advantages of transferring their money and attention
(51)to the lucrative pastures of business and industry.w  '
The agricultural depression, then, put the 
Clifton estate under financial pressures of threatening 
proportions, but there were reassuring indications that 
a solution could be found by selling off land, reducing 
the level of mortgage indebtedness and, above all, devel­
oping more lucrative sources of income. Unfortunately 
the salvage operation suffered a devastating set-back.
Once more the incidence of personality disrupted well-laid 
plans* Having come of age in 1889, John Talbot Clifton, 
like his grandfather before him, wasted no time in using 
his inheritance to pursue a taste for expensive adventure. 
Action, exploration, big-game hunting were his enduring 
passions in life. In a seemingly endless series of 
expeditions he charted new routes in Africa and South 
America, he made several excursions to the Arctic, and
- 230 -
made claim to being the first Englishman to trek to the 
Lana River in Siberia. He bought shooting lodges in 
Scotland and the tranquil retreat of Kildalton Castle 
with its 1,000 acres on the Isle of Islay. (52) scaqe
of his travels was matched only by the scale of the 
expenses he inflicted on the estate. Indeed the first 
ten years of the yuung Cliftonfs tenancy were nothing 
short of a disaster in that, between 1889 and 1898, family 
and estate expenditure exceeded income by £230,000 and, 
as has already been made clear, Cliftonfs spending over 
and above his personal allowance accounted for at least 
£150,000 of that figure. So, instead of the £54,000, 
which was realised by the sale of Great Marton property 
and land to the railway companies being used to reduce 
the mortgage burden, it only acted as a slight brake on 
an accelerating rate of indebtedness through the 1890s.
In May 1891 Fair and his legal associates 
came forward with a scheme to rescue the situation. For 
the next twenty-one years the estate would be managed by 
a body of trustees who would take responsibility for 
paying all outgoings, but with a special brief to bring 
down annual costs and interest payments. They had full 
authority ,to grant leases, spend money on improvements, 
rearrange mortgages and raise additional sums as they 
saw fit. Above all, they had the power to sell as much 
land as was necessary to reduce the mortgage burden. "We 
think 1,500 to 2,000 acres must go to do any good," came 
the solicitors’ advice, "but even this may.very well be 
done without breaking into really old family properties.
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Selling land was the only effective remedy for the
estate’s financial ills, but it was a course of action
which both Fair and Lady Clifton emotionally rejected and
an alternative they therefore tended to shy away from.
"I think it would be a bad plan to sell much land at once,"
Lady Clifton told her agent. "It would be better to keep
rather a tight hand on the present owner. "(55) jn effec-t
this meant that no positive steps were taken to deal with
the debt problem. Once again landed sentiment got the
better of more rational considerations. Consequently
the estate struggled on from one year to the next. Net
income from the farms fell to its lowest level in the
early 1890s. Deficits accumulated in the current account
and were obligingly supported by the local banks until
mortgages could eventually be arranged. As a result, the
estate office was having to pay out an extra £5,000 per
year in interest charges alone by 1893. Moreover, there
were no compensatory cut-backs in estate spending.
Improvements alone took an average of 30% of the gross
rental and additional sums were needed to set out building
/ \
land in Lytham and St. Annes.
Inevitably the day of reckoning had to 
come. Management, solicitors and accountants made another 
thorough review of the estate’s finances in 1900. By then 
the need to trim the family’s agricultural property was 
even more imperative. Little Marton, Westby-with-Plumpton 
and Clifton-with-Salwick together produced a rental of 
£18,828. After interest had been paid on the mortgages 
with which these properties were charged, all that was
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left was £6,404; and repairs and maintenance would 
comfortably have swallowed up the greater part of this 
residual amount. By contrast, Lytham and St. Annes 
(including the agricultural districts within their bound­
aries) carried more than half of the estate’s total debts 
of £590,000 yet still showed a net income of £15,000.^^
The Clifton settlement of 1906 finally 
recognised that a considerable part of the estate would 
have to be sold in order to reduce the debt burden by any 
significant amount. The settled estates of Lytham, Warton, 
Westby and a part of Little Marton which protected out­
lets to the main water-courses would form a compact 
property. Clifton-with-Salwick, most of Little Marton 
and what was left of Great Marton were to be sold off.^®^ 
Nevertheless, it was no easy matter marketing such large 
properties and so, for the next ten years, the Cliftons 
continued to shoulder what was an increasingly embarr­
assing liability, with no significant improvement in farm 
rents, and the added pressure of mortgages demanding still 
further security for their loans.
In 1913 the family solicitors put the 
diminished attractions of an agricultural estate into 
concise perceptive. "A very important question," they 
wrote, "is whether a purchaser of land today would be sat­
isfied with the same income return from it as he would 
have been formerly. If you compare the market price of 
Consols and other gilt edged securities of 1894 with the
price of the same securities today you will find the
question sufficiently answered. On top of this you have
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the unfavourable effect of recent and possible future
(59)legislation.” However, the war and the improvement
in farm rents gave a boost to the land market and eased 
the sale of Clifton-with-Salwick. "Enquiries from 
wealthy and commercial men in the county looking for a 
residential and sporting estate" were made especially 
welcome by the estate office as no doubt had been the 
case at Rufford Hall ten year earlier. Commercial
wealth was no longer regarded with the same contempt shown 
by previous generations of Cliftons. Industrial fortunes 
now held the key to a landowner’s financial salvation.
One prospective buyer was informed that the estate was 
being sold because of "the heavy increased burdens due to 
the war. The real reason why Clifton-with-Salwick
was being sold in 1916 was because the land market had 
picked up, and because creditors were calling in their 
loans from most parts of the agricultural estate. The 
break-up of one of Lancashire’s largest and oldest 
estates had begun in earnest.v
The effects of the "great depression" on 
landed society in Lancashire were real enough and drawing 
comparison with their southern counterparts does not 
adequately express how individual- landowners took stock 
of their own situation. If they drew any comparisons at 
all it was with their own immediate past. In this respect, 
a sense of tradition and obligation may have persuaded 
some to postpone the clearly painful decision to sell off 
ancestral property. In the past the ownership of land 
seemed to justify itself. It underpinned the social and
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political as well as the financial pre-eminence of the 
county’s landed elite. It had made them socially secure 
and reasonably affluent. Similarly, the ownership of 
land had given landowers the assurance and the means to 
borrow money in order to increase the visible trapping 
of status.
However, the lengthening depression 
gradually sapped away the confidence of earlier years.
Many landowners, particularly those who were heavily 
dependent on their agricultural estates and who were faced 
with the problem of servicing heavy debts, could not have 
seen any significant improvement in their net incomes.
Some actually saw their income shrink. All must have been 
aware of the fact that land could no longer support their 
traditionally dominant social and economic role vis-a-vis 
other and wealthier groups in society. Accordingly, not 
a few must have been sorely tempted to sell up in the 
years before and after the Great War. On balance, the 
depression in British agriculture did not occasion a 
dramatic collapse in landed fortunes in Lancashire nor 
a sudden decimation of the established landed ranks. But 
it did lead to a more thorough reappraisal of the financial 
and social advantages which were once thought to stem from 
the ownership of broad acres. The depression exercised a 
formative influence in reshaping attitudes towards 
business, investment and social relationships - aspects 
which the final chapters take up in more detail.
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CHAPTER VI
THE LANDOWNER AS URBAN DEVELOPER
For much of the period encompassed by
this study the Cliftons, as owners primarily of a
large prestigious agricultural estate, reflected in their
behaviour all the assumptions of the narrow landed elite
to which they belonged. Land generated the greater part
of their wealth and it confirmed their social and
(1)political status. ' Yet, towards the end of the 19th
century, the estate’s growing commitment towards further­
ing urban development along the Fylde coast became more 
pronounced. This shift in emphasis - from country to 
town - is significant for several reasons. Above all, 
their far more vigorous attention to urban development, 
strongly evident in the last quarter of the century, 
reflected a significant change in managerial priorities. 
Whereas ground and property rents had formerly been 
looked upon as an additional and potentially very useful 
income, by the 1890s, they were essentially regarded as 
a financial life-line.
However, the hope that residential build­
ing would improve current income had a paradoxical twist 
to it. A growing urban community on the estate involved 
the landowner in social relationships which challenged 
the once easy assumption of authority and control. In 
short, what he stood to gain on the financial roundabout 
he threatened to lose on the social swings.
Thirdly, the Cliftons1 urban connection is
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of more general historiographical interest. In recent 
years the links between landed estates and urban devel­
opment have been the focus of detailed and long-overdue 
attention* Conventional wisdom was assumed that high 
standards of planning, evident in many 19th century 
"new towns", flowed naturally from the presence of one 
or two locally dominant landowners and, therefore, from 
the strict controls which they were likely to impose. 
Moreover, it is also accepted that this relationship was 
particularly pronounced in the spas and "watering places" 
of 18th and 19th century England. The ordered spacious­
ness of such resorts as Eastbourne, Skegness and Bexhill 
dominated respectively by the Dukes of Devonshire, the
(2 )Earls of Scarbrough and the De La Warrs spring to mind.v '
More recent research, however, has 
questioned the easy conclusion that a town’s social and 
physical character was moulded in automatic response to 
a landowner’s territorial prominence. In fact, to return 
to a theme which runs through this particular study, the 
extent of a landowner's involvement and the impression 
he made on his local community depended primarily on his 
own motives and purpose. Some, no doubt, had purely 
entrepreneurial ambitions being intent only on squeezing 
the maximum return from their urban estate at minimal 
personal expense. The ordered ground plan of Southport, 
for example, the scale of its public amenities and the 
presence of two dominant landowning families should not 
be allowed to obscure the fact that the toto's imposing 
facade probably owed more to the initiative of the
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resort*s leading citizenry than it did to any inspired 
leadership on the part of the major landowners.^ But, 
for others, reasons of a social and aesthetic nature 
pressed as heavily as financial considerations. Where 
it was thought important to shape developments which 
were fully in keeping with a landowner*s own aspirations 
and interests there was no alternative to his active 
participation. In this sense Eastbourne, under the close 
control of the Devonshires, is the archetypal aristo­
cratic creation.
Furthermore, it is worth bearing in mind 
that a landowner*s motives could change over time. We 
are not dealing with a static situation. Many of the 
landed families connected with urban development were 
also the owners of expansive estates. Therefore, a land­
owner *s policy towards the urban domain could and did 
change in relation to an unfolding strategy for his 
estate as a whole. It is no accident, for instance, that 
the Earl of Scarbrough injected a greater urgency into 
the promotion of Scarborough in the early 1880s when the 
cold winds of recession started blowing across his agric­
ultural property. Similarly, the role of the Cliftons 
as urban developers is of interest not only in the sense 
that their territorial power had an obvious physical 
impact on the towns with which they were associated. Their 
experience casts an important light on the way in which a 
landownerfs attitude, policy and function could vary quite 
sharply in space and time.
- 242 -
I
The Cliftons were the major landed 
participants in resort development along the Fylde coast 
They were closely involved in the early stages of 
Blackpool’s expansion into a bustling sea-side resort 
and they maintained a territorial connection with the 
town until 1920. They were the moving force behind the 
entirely new creation of St. Anne’s whose foundation 
stone was laid in 1875# Finally, over the course of the 
19th century, a relatively small but socially exclusive 
resort gradually took shape around their ancestral home, 
Lytham Hall. Yet their role in each of these resorts was 
markedly different.
It was in fact Blackpool rather than 
Lytham which staged the Cliftons1 first real foray into 
urban development. They already had a substantial landed 
stake in the locality, owning a 480 acre estate around 
Layton Hall situated about half a mile inland from the 
coast. Moreover, Blackpool had other attractions to a 
landowner seriously interested in promoting select 
residential building. In contrast to its later reputat­
ion. the Blackpool of 1835 was described as "a favourite, 
salubrious and fashionable resort for respectable famil­
ies", and hy the time the Cliftons started taking a 
keen interest in the resort the basis already existed on 
which to launch their own socially selective building 
operations. The estate’s plans for central Blackpool have
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been chronicled elsewhere.Bub, "to summarise, the 
Cliftons began pursuing the idea of expanding their 
Layton Hall estate into the town from the mid-l830s on­
wards. An abortive attempt was made to purchase certain 
centrally located properties in 1837 and 1838; but it was 
not until 1843 that the Cliftons finally secured title 
to land which included part of the sea-front at Talbot 
Square and a corridor extending inland from the promenade
along what eventually became Talbot Road, connecting up
(7)with the northern extremity of the Layton Hall estate.' J
At this stage it is clear that long term 
plans to create a residential area with a high-class 
social tone took precedence over thoughts of making an 
immediate profit. ^  The capital laid out on prelimin­
ary work speaks for itself. As has already been pointed 
out, almost £3,000 was spent between 1843 and 1847 on
building plans, the re-arrangement of properties, new
(a)
roads and modernising the Clifton Anns Hotel.v ' Charles 
Reed, a Liverpool architect, who had in fact carried out 
work at Lytham Hall, was called in to produce ground plans 
for building development on land adjacent to Talbot Square. 
He put forward two schemes, the first of which was grand­
iose indeed, envisaging a crescent of double villas which 
would express "style and ornament" and have an open aspect 
towards the sea. Even so, warnings were being sounded at 
an early stage. Inferior building on neighbouring prop­
erties crowded in one an area of intended high-class 
housing to threaten the viability of the whole exercise.
So, by 1846, grand schemes had given way to more modest
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proposals and, by 1847, the venture had been abandoned 
altogether. No doubt other factors lay beind the
decision to withdraw from direct investment in Blackpool* 
It was generally felt that land values had reached a 
peak by 1847 following the railway boom. It may also be 
the case that, not having the same landed stake in Black­
pool as they had in Lytham, the Cliftons did not have the
til)same personal identification with the town* J But,
not least among their c onsiderations, was the fact that
the sale of property in Blackpool would realise capital
urgently needed to ease the financial problems with which
(12)they were faced in 1847. ' That, indeed, determined
the tone of the Cliftons1 policy for their Blackpool and 
Layton properties thereafter. In effect they exchanged 
the role of urban planners for that of land speculators.
At first every effort was made to dispose of all the 
Blackpool and Layton property in one fell swoop. The land 
was put up for auction in 1848, 1850, 1852 and again in 
1856 but only small parcels in Talbot Square and along 
the south side of Talbot Road as far as the railway 
station were sold off.^^ Nevertheless, that left a 
substantial amount of land, particularly along Talbot Road 
which was strategically well-situated for future devel­
opment.
With the return of economic confidence in 
the 1850s the estate no longer felt the same urgency to 
dispose of land in Layton wholesale. In 1854 John Talbot 
Clifton took the view himself that the "Blackpool property 
has had its day", but it was a somewhat hasty judgement.
Instead, under the agent*s control, the whole tenor of 
the estate’s policy towards the Blackpool and Layton 
property became more calculating in design and more ruth­
lessly business-like in execution. In fact, in many 
respects the Cliftons were hardly distinguishable from 
the town’s innumerable small landowners whose paramount 
objective was to extract the maximum profit from their 
holdings. Consequently, any consideration of an ordered 
plan of development or acceptable standards of building 
construction and sanitation was relegated to secondary 
importance. In short the estate no longer had any direct 
interest in influencing the pace or quality of develop­
ment in Blackpool. It could have offered land at a more 
attractive marketable price in order to induce building 
expansion or it could have invested in housing itself, if 
even on a limited basis, to encourage builders to take up 
land. But it pursued neither of these options. Clifton 
land in Blackpool was basically left to lie dormant in 
the anticipation that later year would bring a higher 
profit as surrounding development pushed up the value of 
property. Interestingly, the Lytham Charities, whose 
board of trustees included both Clifton and his agent, 
demonstrated how quickly land could be developed. Their 
Lark Hill estate, one of a number of plots they owned 
along Talbot Road and adjacent to Clifton’s holdings, took 
shape in the 1850s and became entirely built up during 
the course of the 1860s. In fact, by 1876, very little 
of their property in the town was left unoccupied. At 
2d. per square yard the Charities’ land was attractive
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enough to small builders interested in constructing the 
type of low status "cottage" accommodation which typified 
the area around the railway station and sidings. And 
not even their efforts to enforce minimum house values, 
standards of construction and usage deterred prospective 
developers in a town where a flagrant disregard for 
building regulations was commonplace.^*^
By contrast the Clifton estate preferred to
engage in longer term speculation. Very little of its
remaining Blackpool property was sold in the 1860s and
70s, and not because there was an absence of potential
buyers. Thomas Fair’s passive approach to the Blackpool
property reflected his confidence in the future of what
was still largely an agricultural estate, and his
consequent assumption that the Cliftons could afford to
wait and reap a richer harvest at some later date. As he
explained to his employer, Blackpool land sold very well
and at high prices "if offered in small lots of an acre
or two" and if "others on adjoining properties are put to
(16 )the task of carrying out the expense of building."v '
So he felt able to turn down the offer of £240 per acre 
made by the new Winter Gardens Company for a twenty-four
(17)
acre site north of the railway station.v Again, 2d. 
per square yard offered by a Blackpool estate agent in 
1876 for a large plot in one of the town’s less fashion­
able districts, suffering from "bad approaches" and in 
need of "laying out and all the streets making" was not, 
on the face of it, unreasonable. Yet Fair-would not go 
any lower than 3id. per square yard and the plot remained
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undeveloped until 1886. Admittedly, it is plausible
to suppose that an estate like the Cliftons* would be 
basically uninterested in taking a financial stake in 
artisan housing. Even so, when the opportunity presented 
itself to initiate equally lucrative but more socially 
select housing, the estate was seemingly no more 
enthusiastic. Such might have been the prospects for land 
around Layton Hall which, in the late 1870s, lay at the 
eastern extremity of a steadily expanding town. In 1878 
there were moves in the Corporation to promote an improve­
ment bill for the purpose of building new roads and 
opening up building land. Included in the scheme were 
plans to widen Whitegate Lane which in fact defined the 
seaward boundary to Layton Hall farm. However, the 
proposal was defeated by the town’s ratepayers. The 
Clifton estate could have stepped into the breach. It 
could have initiated improvements and developments had
it been willing. Instead there was no significant build-
(19)ing in the area for another twenty years. y
Thomas Fair was more inclined to take a 
long-term view and cultivate an appreciating asset by less 
direct methods. No opportunity was missed in tightening 
up the ring-fence of estate properties around the town.
This involved a process of buying up rights of way or small 
plots strategically located along the main thoroughfare 
into the resort. At the same time the estate office
organised exchanges of property and occasionally sold off 
rights of way with the intention of encouraging neigh­
bouring proprietors to assume the initial costs of opening
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up land for building purposes. For example, in 1876
adjustments were made to the western boundaries of Layton
Hall farm on the condition that the Cliftons were given
rights of way over intended new streets on the adjoining 
(21)property. Similarly another builder spent £100 on
the right of way along a track giving access to a rail­
way crossing and into land suitable for development 
purposes on the north side of Talbot Road. Further he 
was also bound to pave the road and grant the Cliftons
the facility to connect with a proposed street system from
(2 2)their adjacent plot. J Others were prepared to pay a 
still higher price for rights across the Clifton ring- 
fence. In 1878 the estate was offered land valued at 
£500 in the more outlying areas of Layton or Marton in 
exchange for rights of way over Clifton property.'
The estate office looked upon the policy 
of attaching building conditions to land transactions in 
the same speculative manner. Controls were never applied 
with the same consistency as was evident on the Cliftons* 
other urban estates at Lytham and St. Anne’s. In 
Blackpool such a policy was determined by the commercial 
requirements of the particular locality. In 1859, for 
instance, the estate sold one of its last remaining plots 
on Clifton Street. Since it no longer had any vital 
interest in this central area freehold possession was made 
immediately available and no conditions were imposed on 
the purchaser other than he observed a building line 
consistent with neighbouring property/24  ^ Elsewhere
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controls were applied where the estate had interests to
protect on adjoining land. When the Banks Street site,
again situated close to the railway station, was sold in
1878 the estate insisted that houses fronting the street
should compare in quality with those on neighbouring
plots and therefore have an annual value of not less than
£20. But the value of back property was "of little
consequence" to Thomas Fair.^2^  Conditions of a similar
kind applied when the land bordering Exchange Street was
finally sold in 1886. Admittedly, it is possible to
identify areas in Blackpool where the estate influenced
the emergence of better quality artisan housing than
might otherwise have been the case in a town dominated by
small landowners and developers who had a generally low
( 27)regard for regulations.' ' At the same time it must be 
said that the exercise of controls by the Clifton estate 
did not stem primarily from any consistent, high-minded 
pursuit of quality. Controls were selectively applied 
and governed by the overriding need to secure the maximum 
return from residual property.
In its thinly disguised, parasitic attitude 
towards property in Blackpool the estate could hardly have 
endeared itself to the town’s civic leadership. There is 
no direct evidence of open and prolonged animosity between 
the two. Yet that was hardly likely given the fact that 
the estate’s territorial stake in the town was limited 
and largely confined to the outer perimeters of the resort. 
Moreover, the Cliftons had no proprietory claims to such 
vital areas as the foreshore which tended to focus much
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more intensive rivalries elsewhere*Nevertheless, 
several factors converged to trigger feelings of ill-will 
and suspicion. By the 1890s the inexorable expansion of 
the resort brought its boundaries up against the Clifton 
ring-rence* Equally, land on the outskirts of the town 
attracted the municipal interest of a Corporation deter­
mined on imposing its own management over the physical 
dimensions of the borough and on making a wider provision 
of public amenities. 1 At the same time, a sharp 
deterioration in its financial position inclined the 
estate towards a policy of disposing of its Blackpool land 
as quickly as possible and at the highest possible price. 
Hence a situation which brought together a town council 
which was ambitious to acquire land at the lowest possible 
cost to its ratepayers and an estate bent solely on 
profit-taking was bound to place a certain strain on 
relationships. What ensued was a battle of wits; and 
nowhere was this more apparent than in the lengthy and 
sometimes devious efforts of the Corporation to purchase 
land from the estate in 1890 for the site of a new 
slaughter house next to the railway sidings along Talbot 
Road. Thomas Fair»s asking price of £400 per acre was 
met by a firm refusal from the Sanitary Committee who put 
a valuation of no more than £300 per acre on the land.
The impasse was broken by a private buyer, also a town 
councillor, who purchased a much larger plot at a prop­
ortionately lower price per acre and proceeded to resell 
a part to the Corporation. The town had reason to 
celebrate. It had done more than save a considerable sum
f
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in the transaction. What was just as important in some 
quarters was that l!a radical triumph” had been scored 
against the local landowner. Yet, interestingly, such 
feelings of triumph were not universally shared. The image 
of the landowner as benevolent benefactor still lived on 
and there was the fear that to offend carried the risk 
of repercussions, ”The representatives of the Cliftons 
will....probably be found to be less amenable to the 
Blackpool Corporation... .remembering that only a few months 
ago Mr. Fair offered the Borough of Blackpool about 50 
acres of land as a free gift for the purpose of a park.1
This image, however, had little foundation 
in reality. The offer of free land had not been the 
result of a sudden burst of generosity as might have been 
imagined by some. The idea of creating a public park on 
Clifton land off Whitegate Lane certainly did interest 
the Corporation. And their interest could not have come 
at a more opportune time for the estate. In 1888 and 1889 
the Layton Hall property had already been up for auction.
On the first occasion the land had been advertised in 
small parcels in the by now well-established pattern. In 
all 49 plots were offered, each "excellently situated for 
the erection of villas and other residences." But there 
was one significant departure from the norm. The estate 
proposed to build a road connecting Layton Hall with 
Marton village in the hope of encouraging immediate build­
ing on the back plots. Its readiness to invest capital 
itself relfected the estate1 s mounting des'peration to 
accelerate the disposal of its Blackpool property. The
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response, however, was disappointing. The auction held 
in the following year suggested a return to the even more 
desperate strategy of the late 1840s. This time the
property was put on the market in just twelve large plots, 
with no projected street plans, no attached building 
covenants and, also, with no more success. As one pros­
pective builder pointed out to Thomas Fair, "with houses 
standing empty in almost every street in the town not 
even excepting such streets as Clifton Street, Queen
Street, also the promenade... .the prospects for building
( ^2)operations are the reverse of brilliant. It is not
surprising, then, that Fair nursed the Corporation’s 
interest in the land. A public park was precisely the 
kind of amenity most likely to attract developers and 
enhance the value of surrounding property. Working along 
these lines Fair inquired into the conditions which 
Charles Hesketh had imposed when making his own "present- 
ation of land" for park to Southport Corporation in 1865. '
He then adopted a strikingly similar strategy in his 
dealings with Blackpool’s Council. And there was nothing 
benevolent or altruistic in his motives. Fair’s initial 
demand was £200 per acre for a fifty acre site. It was a 
ludicrously high price and one which he clearly intended 
should be rejected. It made his second proposal appear 
all the more attractive and reasonable in that he offered 
thirty acres at just £66 per acre. But he attached some 
very important conditions. The park had to be laid out in 
three years and the Corporation was bound to construct 
and sewer a road sixty feet wide and running around the 
perimeter of the park. The most important stipulation of
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all was that the estate would have the right to connect 
with the new road and sewerage system from its adjoining 
land. Perhaps Fair played his hand too quickly.
Certainly the Corporation moved much more cautiously. It 
made its own careful enquiries into how public parks had 
been planned in other towns and it refused to be rail­
roaded into a premature and hasty agreement by Fair’s 
threat that he had another application for the land.^^
In fact the Borough’s interest in the site began to cool 
rapidly and it was at this stage that the estate offered 
the land as a "free gift" to the Corporation in the hope 
of keeping negotiations alive. But to no avail. No doubt 
the whole episode taught some useful lessons. Not unreas­
onably the Corporation approached its future dealings 
with the estate with a due sense of caution. The estate, 
no longer being in a position to leave its Blackpool 
assets to appreciate in value, set about selling up at 
any price it could get. In fact buyers were found for 
the Layton Hall and Blackpool properties by 1892. All 
told, the sale of 296 acres realised over £25,100 which 
made it possible to clear the heavy charges on that part 
of the estate. Even so, the final outcome must have been 
a source of considerable disappointment. This figure fell 
well short of the £43,000 which Fair had hitherto anticip­
ated on the basis that land could be disposed of gradually




By contrast Lytham was, in certain crucial 
respects, a world apart from Blackpool. Lytham was 
essentially the Squire’s town; and, though the estate was 
obviously interested in securing an improving income from 
its urban property, wherever it was situated, other 
considerations coloured the landowner’s attitude towards 
the resort taking shape around the ancestral family seat. 
He was concerned to maintain controls over the town’s 
size, its aesthetic and physical qualities and its social 
and political character almost to the extent, it could be 
argued, of actually stifling growth.
For Lytham it is possible to delineate 
quite clearly distinct phases of development. The first 
phase, roughly from the mid-1840s to the 1880s coincided 
with the emergence of other planned resorts - notably 
Torquay, Eastbourne, Bournemouth among others. And, as 
was the case in all these places, this period in Lytham*s 
history was characterised by the unchallenged supremacy 
of the controlling landed family and the mainly docile 
subservience of the urban community. This was followed 
by a second phase, broadly the 1890s and the first decade 
of the new century, in which feelings of mutual dependency 
gave way to a separation of interest and, at times, open 
confrontation between the estate and the town’s leaders. 
Again parallels can be drawn with the pattern of events 
in other resorts although the timing of developments was 
not simultaneous. In Southport, for instance, the 
Scarisbrick estate and the town’s Corporation were locked
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in battle in the 1880s whereas it was not until the 1890s 
that Eastbourne attempted, to throw off the aristocratic 
shackles of the Dukes of Devonshire.(36)
The Clifton estate reigned supreme in 
Lytham long after its modest beginnings as a select, 
middle-class resort in the late 1830s for principally two 
reasons. The landowner and agent were resolved to retain 
firm powers of control; and there was no effective 
alternative to their leadership. After all, in a place 
as small as Lytham, dominated as it was by a single land­
owner, there was no-one else capable of taking an initiat­
ive in defining and financing initial developments. 
However, until the late 1840s, the focus for investment 
was still decidely blurred. Indeed, as has been seen, it 
was Blackpool rather than Lytham which first attracted 
the estate’s serious intentions to promote select resid­
ential building. By contrast, Lytham had certain disad­
vantages. Not least among these was the fact that its 
character and appearance were hardly conducive to 
encouraging middle-class families to invest in property 
and take up residence. In 1835 Lytham consisted largely 
of one street running east to west, lined by low thatched 
cottages and with a population chiefly engaged in fishing, 
various craft trades and agriculture. Any claim it might 
have had to being a resort rested on its popularity with 
the day-tripper. In this respect it probably attracted 
more visitors than neighbouring Blackpool since, in the 
pre-railway age, it was more accessible especially from 
Preston either by barge up the Ribble estuary or by the
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new toll road across Freckleton marsh. However, soon
after James Fair’s appointment to the estate office, 
limited efforts had been made to improve the town’s image. 
Some of the older property was demolished, new houses put 
up, part of the beach was levelled and a start made in 
constructing a promenade; and, in 1840, the new Clifton 
Anns Hotel was opened providing "the most perfect accomm­
odation for families of the highest distinction,"(38)
Once plans for Blackpool had finally been 
abandoned and a railway link made with the Preston and 
Wyre line, the estate embarked on a more energetic scheme 
to carry out improvements to Lytham. Across the Ribble 
estuary Southport was also staking its own claim to 
social exclusivity. It was dominated by two landed famil­
ies but its early success as a resort can be explained in 
terms other than the financial spur provided by the local 
landowners. The town already had a well-established 
reputation as a popular "watering-place"; it had closer 
access to Liverpool and Manchester and enjoyed more 
favourable railway links. Above all, the readiness of 
wealthy middle-class residents to invest not only in 
houses but roads, drainage and other social amenities for 
themselves compensated for the obvious reluctance by the
major landowners to supply the financial impetus. But
(39)Southport seems to have been exceptional.Elsewhere 
a landowner’s more positive role of leadership, sometimes 
over an extended period, was crucial, At Eastbourne, for 
instance, the Duke of Devonshire advanced local builders 
over £34,000 between 1834 and 1857. He also spent £7,500
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on houses on his own behalf and almost £9,200 on laying 
out building land as well as investing £700 in the 
town’s gas and water companies. In 1840 the Tapps-
Gervis-Meyrick family contributed £5,000 to furthering 
Bournemouth's expansion. Later in the century the
Earl of Scarbrough raised a consolidating mortgage of 
£120,000 of which £80,000 was ear—marked for the purpose 
of developing the new resort of Skegness from the mid- 
1870s onwards. in the same way Lytham was just as
dependent on its local squire. Of course other factors 
enhanced the resort’s attraction. The locality’s natural 
attributes undoubtedly helped. Even more important was 
the influence of the railways in that they made possible 
cheap and rapid transport for both the occasional visitor 
and the residential commuter. Moreover, railways could 
be made to channel specific groups of people in the 
direction of a specific locality and clearly, without them, 
resorts such as Lytham could not have prospered. But 
perhaps there is a danger of over-emphasising the impact 
of the railways on resort development* As regards the 
emergence of the north-west’s sea—side towns it has been 
argued that railways "were a convenience rather than a 
cause of subsequent growth. what probably mattered
more, at least in the embryonic stages of urban expansion, 
^23 firstly the demand among middle-class families seeking 
a socially exclusive residential retreat, and secondly 
the willingness and ability of landowners and developers 
to respond to and cater for this demand. The success or 
failure of a new town might indeed rest on the particular 
terms of the landowner's leasing policy, his readiness to
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stimulate building operations and the provision of 
essential social amenities. This emphasis on the land— 
ownerfs role ties in with the view that, given the some­
what insensitive nature of the 19th century building 
industry, it was possible for a sufficiently determined 
and resourceful developer to induce a building boom on 
his own property in a way which does not necessarily 
synchronise with such factors as population mobility.
Certainly there can be no doubt that the 
moving force behind Lytham’s face-lift was the Clifton 
estate. It was the Cliftons who determined the ground 
plan for the resort, defined the type of house-building 
that was to take place and put up the capital for the 
initial improvements. As has already been indicated in 
an earlier chapter, the accumulation of debts which began 
to pile up during Thomas Clifton’s life-tenancy can be 
partly explained by the money borrowed to finance con­
struction work in Lytham during the 1840s, beginning with 
the reconstruction of the main thoroughfare, Clifton 
Street. (**5) Qld thatched cottages were town down and 
replaced by thirty new shops and "ornamental cottages” 
to produce a long street ”with pretty dwellings shaded 
by trees...fronted with grass plots and (forming) a 
beautiful verdant vista." Beach Terrace was also improved 
by the erection of houses in "the old English style." In 
total about a hundred properties were built between 1846 
and 1848 of which a substantial number were commissioned 
and financed by the estate itself in order to encourage 
private building development in specified localities.
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But the greater part of the £37,000 which was invested 
in Lytham during the 1840s and 50s went into laying out 
the promenade and constructing the show-piece residences 
along the sea-front and adjacent terraces. Five houses 
were built along Dicconson Terrace, another five in Bath 
Street and at least a further eleven on East and West Beach 
Parades. It was the last which were by far the most 
imposing and intended to set the high-class tone for 
future development along the promenade and in the direct­
ion of the west end of the town. They were designed as 
semi or detached marine villas for private occupation "by 
respectable tenants" or as lodging houses for those intend­
ing to spend the summer season in the resort. Even the 
smallest consisted of three reception rooms, six bedrooms, 
"good cellaring" and fruit and flower gardens and were 
valued at £1,000-£1,200 each in the late 19th century.
Following Thomas Clifton’s death in 1851 his 
son and agent produced a comprehensive ground-plan for 
Lytham’s future expansion. It envisaged a district of 
exclusive residential building extending from the central 
and promenade areas of the town westwards over the sand­
hills in the general direction of Blackpool. The back 
plots inland from Clifton Street were intended for lower 
status cottages and lodging houses, whilst the labouring 
population was to be residentially segregated in the east 
end in the vicinity of the old harbour. Again the estate 
led the way in stimulating building. Between 1857 and 
1865 £5,200 was spent levelling the sandhills to the west 
of the town, extending the beach, laying out building plots
A?* *'n'o *#.*£«
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and forming a carriage drive. Individual family
members also made their separate contributions towards
furthering the townfs growth. Charles Clifton, for
example, invested part of his portion in the building of
Hastings Place at the entrance to Lytham Hall part and
hence opened up an area between Church Street and the
railway line for building purposes. Equally, when
the area behind Clifton Street towards the east end was
being developed for lower-status accommodation and
"company" or lodging houses during the late 1860s and
early 70s the pace was once more set by the estate, which
had blocks of cottages built along Westby Street, East
and West Cliffe and Freckleton Street.Furthermore,
one of the problems of Lytham fs development was the fact
that the modern resort was largely built alongside the
dilapidations of the old village. And, since many of
the middle-class residents had moved to this sea-side
haven presumably an anticipation of avoiding residential
contagion with those they regarded as their social
inferiors, it was the estate which, in the interests of
selectness, assumed the responsibility for clearing away
some of the old, squalid properties scattered throughout
(51 )the back streets of the central and west end districts.w  7
However, the estate*s investment in the
resort*s early growth did not stop at funding building
work and road construction. Given the discriminating
residential tastes of middle-class families, "it paid
those who catered for them to satisfy their requirements
(52)beyond the provision of elegant and spacious housing.
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Attention to such environmental considerations as land­
scaping and parks, the provision of certain amenities 
such as churches and assembly rooms, and the mainten­
ance of acceptable sanitary standards, all were essential 
prerequisites in the created of middle-class suburbia; 
and, in the case of Lytham, they were met by the land­
owning family. Over the third quarter of the century 
they provided the site and endowed the new church of 
St, Johnfs appropriately located among the marine villas 
springing up along East Beach. They were the financial 
mainstay beind the town’s gas company established in 
1847. The initiative for a water-works company also 
emanated from the estate office in 1853 and when it was 
finally established in 1861 Clifton’s 1130 shares, worth 
£5,630, made him by far the largest single investor. The 
shares in fact returned a loss but profit was a second­
ary motive. The main aim was to bring pure water to 
Lytham’s middle-class residents. When public subscript­
ion failed to produce the sum needed to build public 
baths in the town in the late 1860s Clifton money, this 
time £6,650, again saved the scheme. They were the 
major financial force behind the Pier Company, formed in 
1865; they bailed out the Masonic Hall in 1870 and, in 
the following year, contributed £600 towards the cost of 
urgent repairs to the fabric of the parish church. But 
the family’s patronage was crowned by Lowther Gardens, a 
park of thirteen acres created by the estate at the west 
end of the town during the early 1870s at a cost of 
£12,000. No doubt it was an aesthetically pleasing feat­
ure, but it was also intended to cultivate greater
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interest among prospective builders in sites as yet 
undeveloped along the western carriageway.
Yet the Cliftons were faced with conflict­
ing emotions. Opening up building land and inviting 
middle-class families to settle in the resort was one 
thing. But retaining control over the town’s physical 
and social character was another. Power, in effect, 
belonged to those who owned the land and who spent the 
most money. And the Cliftons jealously guarded their 
privileged position. It could be argued, in fact, that 
this lay at the root of Lytham’s unspectacular expansion 
between the 1840s and 1880s when landed influence over 
the town’s affairs was at its height. At times it 
appeared that the compelling concern to preserve tone, 
selectness and, above all else, habits of social and 
political deference towards the landowner transcended 
purely financial considerations.
Indeed Thomas Clifton was not too sure
about what he was paying for. He hardly greeted the
costly improvements going on in the town during the 1840s
with unreserved enthusiasm. His own undisguised social
and political prejudices warned against inviting "hordes
(54)of Manchester men” to . descend on the place.w  ' And he 
had similar fears about Lytham’s physical transformation. 
He in fact objected to Fair’s proposals to extend build­
ing operations to the west end of the town because views 
from the Hall might be obstructed. He recognised the 
importance of inducing people to build but he did "not
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feel justified in sanctioning anything which might be 
deemed a nuisance to those who might hereafter possess 
the property and might wish to inhabit the Hall."^55^
And this is why an extended scheme for Lytham’s develop­
ment did not materialise until after Clifton’s death in 
1851.
Clearly the estate office and Clifton’s 
successor were more ambitious in their efforts to estab­
lish Lytham’s reputation as a residential resort. Yet 
this did not imply a diminished concern for exercising 
strict control. Their omnipotence was secured by 
several related devices. Firstly, by virtue of a territ­
orial dominance and a carefully contrived leasehold 
policy, the estate was able to be very selective in how 
by whom land was to be utilised. Until the late 
1870s land was never leased to large-scale developers.
Only one area in the town - West Beach - was dominated by 
one individual and even he spread his building operations 
over a twenty-five year period. Instead, the much
more typical leaseholder was the widower, the spinster, 
the retired businessman, clergyman or solicitor, along 
with individuals already known to the estate - local 
tradesmen ‘and some of the larger, prosperous tenant 
farmers. They invariably took small plots for the purpose 
of having their own houses built as well as perhaps one 
or two other properties which were basically intended to 
provide a small income for the future. Indeed the 
majority of those who, in the census enumerator’s returns 
described themselves as "annuitants” and "proprietors of
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housesn fall into this category of locally based property 
investors.(57)
Moreover, ground rents were comparatively
high, covenants incorporated into leases were strict and
the estate was uncompromisingly severe in its term and
conditions when it might have paid to have been more
flexible. Ground rents, for instance, were set at a
deliberately high level. Normally, the best plots along
the central promenade, adjoining terraces and in the west
end district were valued at 2d. per square yard. On back
plots 1^ -d. was usual and nowhere was land leased for less
than 1d. per square yard.^®^ By contrast Southport
landowners followed a policy of leasing building land
at a fraction of a penny per square yard in the interests
of encouraging speculation and persuading wealthy new-
( 59)comers to finance improvements themselves.w /
By 1850 building leases had been completely 
revised. Gone were many of the obsolete clauses which 
in the past had acted as a virtual barrier to investment. 
The term over which leases were granted was extended from 
forty to sixty and then ninety-nine years and the condit­
ion which .prevented lessees from selling or even sub­
letting their property without the prior consent of the 
landowner was removed. Yet, if leases had been
updated, they were still nevertheless restrictive. The 
estate office placed minimum values on proposed buildings 
and they laid down a strict timetable for .construction.
In particular the function of buildings was carefully
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guarded: premises were not to be used was a factory, 
soapery, smithy, brew-house or alehouse, or for any other 
purpose whatsoever which shall, in the landowner’s 
opinion, be considered offensive or disagreeable to any 
adjoining premises or likely to deteriorate or diminish 
the value thereof,n The location of all shops was 
determined by the estate. Public houses were actively 
discouraged. Measures had also been taken to protect the 
future in that plans for additional building or alter­
ations on sites already leased had to be submitted to the 
estate office for approval. In addition, a detailed set 
of building regulations had appeared by 1850 which were 
subsequently enlarged and amended in the mid-1860s. They 
dealt with building lines, heights of chimneys, thickness 
of cavities, damp coursing, room sizes, gardens, walling,
sewering, the strength of joists, lintels, roof principles
(61)and every conceivable aspect of construction.v J
Beyond question, the estate used every means 
in its power to ensure that these covenants were adhered 
to. Solicitors were employed to uncover and correct 
ambiguities in standard leases, powers of inspection were 
regularly used and lessees were harrassed over any infring­
ement of their lease t e r m s . S u c h  stringent conditions 
and vigilance were no doubt essential in preserving 
residential selectness but, at the same time, an over- 
zealous attitude, when taken to extreme lengths and when 
coupled with high ground rents, could have the effect of 
driving potential developers away. Nevertheless, the 
estate steadfastly refused to modify its terms under any
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circumstances. But its inflexibility deterred much-needed 
investment. In 1865, for instance, one builder returned 
unsigned a contract for a valuable plot on Lowther 
Terrace and not solely because of the high ground rent 
that was being asked. His principal objection was to the 
many restrictions inserted in the agreement, particularly 
the redrafted building regulations and the landowner’s 
powers of re-entry, which he considered "objectionable and 
unusual. Similarly, in 1873, a Preston solicitor
offered 1^ d. per square yard for a large site behind Church 
Street. Moreover, the fact that he had a colleague also 
interested in building land, argued in favour of a 
sympathetic response to his offer. Instead Fair declined 
to lower the ground rent. "A transaction of this sort 
ought to be quite mutual", came the reply, "some prospect 
or otherwise should be held out to purchasers who, at any 
rate, have all the risk and are tied to build under 
conditions sufficiently s t r i n g e n t . A t  least in the 
early years of Lytham’s development the estate did not 
always practice business expediency.
The estate was just as demonstrative in 
exerting its will over the town’s social and political 
affairs. No public event took place without the family’s 
influence making itself felt. Though her husband and son 
displayed a waning interest in the estate, very little 
escaped Lady Clifton’s attention. She ensured that the 
family headed subscriptions to every local charity and 
organisation - the Lytham Life-boat Society, Ship-wrecked 
Mariners, the Pier, the Promenade Band, the Recreation
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Fund and so on.^^ She insisted that poor relief, the 
central core of landed benevolence, remained the exclus­
ive preserve of the Squire rather than a responsibility 
for the local churches and their parishioners. As she 
explained to Thomas Fair: ,fI think now that it is a 
fashion for them to like to manage the poor themselves 
with no interference from the owner of the estate, except 
as regards subscriptions for beautifying the churches - 
this is in my opinion a mistake, particularly on an 
estate like the Colonelfs at L y t h a m . A g a i n ,  when a 
convalescent hospital was being talked about in 1876 the 
dominant concern was that "proper procedure" should be 
followed and deference paid to the wishes of the estate. 
For, "if once it is permitted that residents are to have 
a voice in the matter of buildings...great difficulties 
would ensue. Thomas Henry Clifton went so far as
to censure Fair for even consulting Lythamfs citizens 
on the matter. (68)
Political controls went hand-in-hand with 
social controls. The promotion of Lytham as a residential 
resort was financially attractive, but it was a consider­
ation which had to be weighed against the danger of 
inviting the incursion of political and religious sub­
versives. After all, the Cliftons took their political 
responsibilities seriously. Thomas Clifton devoted much 
of his time and energy to the Conservative cause in the 
North Lancashire constituency and no-one preached the 
doctrine of high Toryism louder than he. His son won the 
North Lancashire by-election of 1844 as a Protectionist
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and he was himself the passionately committed chairman 
of the local Agricultural Protectionist Association.
Cliftonfs defence of the Established Church was no less 
fervent. His son’s growing Peelite sympathies were 
undoubtedly a source of some embarrassment, but John 
Talbot’s support for the Maynooth Grant came as a bitter, 
personal blow. This would certainly explain his behaviour 
towards Catholic and non-Conformist groups in Lytham in 
the closing years of his life. Traditionally the land­
owner made token contributions to all denominational 
churches in the town. There was therefore more than a 
strong suspicion of victimization when the estate suddenly 
withheld the salary which it had formerly paid the 
minister of the Catholic Chapel whilst, at the same time, 
funding the appointment of an additional Anglican minister 
and extra places in Anglican schools. Clifton’s aim was 
clear enough. He wanted to "combat the spreading 
influence of dissenting opinion and Romanism in the 
parish.
The family’s political role showed no signs 
of diminishing following Thomas Clifton’s death. His 
son’s mild flirtation with moderate reform in the late 
1840s reflected his impulsive nature rather than a fund­
amental departure from his family’s Tory allegiance. In 
his later years he campaigned as vigorously against the 
Liberals as his father had done against the Whigs. Indeed, 
the greater part of his correspondence to his agent was 
concerned with local political issues. Lytham, in fact, 
saw more of its squire in the run-up to a general election
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than at any other time. As landowner and agent seemed 
to have been acutely aware, an expanding town always 
courted the danger of attracting elements who were not 
sympathetically disposed towards either the landowner or 
his politics. Election time invariably saw determined 
efforts to counter the opposition as it surfaced; and a 
contested parliamentary election could certainly be relied 
upon to inject more than the usual vigour into the 
estate’s political attentions to the town. In the elect­
ions of 1868, for instance, every effort was made to 
protect Lytham’s political impregnability. Thomas Fair 
was instructed to draw up a blacklist of persons, partic­
ularly tradesmen and retailers suspected of even harbour­
ing Liberal sympathies. He further promised to "root 
out” political offenders who actively solicited support 
in Lytham. Indeed the accusations made by the Preston
Guardian that the estate office used "unfair practices"
(71)may not have been entirely without foundation.v '
At the local level there was very little
danger that Lytham would go the way of Southport and
(72)become a spawning ground for radical opinion. The
agent was far too attentive to allow that to happen. He 
was the leading figure on every local body, including the 
town’s Board of Improvement Commissioners, and he rarely 
missed an opportunity to impress on Lytham’s citizenry 
the benefits which had flowed from the landowner’s 
patronage • Dissenting voices were regarded as a personal 
attack and seen as an act of betrayal against the land­
owner himself. "As Lytham increases so much", Lady Clifton
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complained., "and so much is done for the Independent yet 
they will form themselves into a strong class against 
the proprietor of the estate.Furthermore, the 
estate’s preoccupation with political controls made 
itself felt outside the confines of Lytham. It extended 
as far as Blackpool where Fair worked enthusiastically 
on behalf of "good conservatives", in elections to the 
Local Board, especially if they happened to be tenants 
of the e s t a t e . B u t ,  for Lady Clifton, non-conformity 
was the major threat. It was radicalism in a religious 
guise. She welcomed the idea of a Local Board being set
up in the new resort of St. Anne’s so long as it was "not
composed of radical elements". And the danger could be 
averted if "Church people could be encouraged to come
(75)to St. Anne’s as there was already so many dissenters."w 7
In the same vein her wish to see St. Anne’s provided
with two new schools was not totally inspired by philan­
thropic motives. "It will be advisable to push on the 
matter as fast as you can", she told Fair, "for I feel 
convinced that this is the time for us to make all the 
efforts we can at St. Anne’s - or the Dissenters will 
swamp us•"K
For a long time, Lytham’s middle-class 
rgsidents acquiesced in a situation in which the controls 
exercised by the estate remained the dominant influence 
shaping the resort’s early character. This, in effect, 
reinforced the landowner’s hegemony over the town’s 
affairs. The fact of the matter was that the residents 
needed the landowner. They were dependent on his
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patronage and his regulatory powers to give their town
the kind of physical and social climate which was as
much in keeping with their own interests as it was the
landowner’s. Firstly, Lytham’s Board of Improvement
Commissioners, set up by the Improvement Act of 1847, did
not have the will or the financial resources to steer an
independent course in shaping the town’s development.
It was initially empowered to borrow £10,000 on the
strength of the rates for the purpose of building a market
hall, paving, lighting, sewering, beach improvements and
the construction of a gas w o r k s . B y  1850 the Board’s
borrowing powers were virtually exhausted and, to the
consternation of its members, the unexpected expense of
the gas works scheme had absorbed by far the lion’s
(78)share of the original loan.v 7 Nevertheless, the money 
had been borrowed, it had now been spent and there was 
a general resistance to borrowing more. At least this 
was the prevailing view among the commissioners who saw 
it as their brief to campaign for "economy1* and, as far 
as possible, minimise the burden on the ratepayers. The 
Board itself was a self-perpetuating oligarchy but, at 
the same time, it was broadly representative of the 
social type whom the estate had actively encouraged to 
take up building land in the town - retired "gentlemen", 
widows, spinsters, mostly small property owners, conserv­
ative in every sense and sharing a vested interest in 
keeping the rates down. There was certainly no shortage 
of commissioners who saw it as their compelling duty to 
stringently monitor public spending. Typical was Thomas 
Cross, a long-established resident of Lytham,a member of
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the Board of Commissioners from 1852 until an elected
Local Board came into being in 1879 and an individual who
acted on the simple principle of opposing "anything that
had a tendency to increase the rates.1 In any event,
given the low level of the rates and the town’s lethatgic
growth, the Board could not have generated sufficient
income to assume any initiative of its own. Even by 1879
the rates brought in less than £3,000 a year and more
than half went towards interest payments and the reserve
fund leaving barely £1,300 for general and administrative 
(80)purposes. 7
Secondly, the town’s financial position
lent weight to a strongly held view that improvements
were basically a matter of landed obligation. It was not
a question even of shared responsibility. Rather it was
clearly anticipated that the estate would provide. Indeed,
whenever there was any danger that the Board might become
involved with the estate in any expensive improvement
scheme involving increases in the rates, commissioners
(and ratepayers) quickly retreated behind the argument
that not everything undertaken by the landowner was
( 81 )necessarily to the advantage of the town.' 7 Examples
are too numerous to mention. But typical, for example,
was the protracted dispute over responsibility for the
western promenade which dragged tortuously on for some
( 82}twenty-five years after its completion in 1851.' ' Again,
Thomas Fair’s efforts to persuade the Board to connect 
the western promenade with the newly constructed Clifton 
Drive, the coastal road to Blackpool, focused by now
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familiar arguments. It was largely in the estate’s 
interests that the promenade and carriageway had been 
built in the first place - namely to encourage building 
and swell the landowner*s ground rents.^85  ^ In 1871 the 
estate proposed that further loans should be raised to 
extend the town*s sewerage scheme and build a treatment 
plant. The immediate reaction of the commissioners was 
that not only was the scheme premature and too expensive, 
but it was essentially for the landowner’s benefit and 
primarily his responsibility.^8^
A word of caution is needed here. It must 
be stressed that these disputes never became politicized. 
Points of conflict between town and estate never gave 
way to open confrontation. In fact, on the occasions when 
the estate stood its ground firmly enough, the opposition 
invariably relented. For instance, having finally 
decided to settle the niggling problem of road adoption, 
Fair "pressured1* enough members of the Board into attend­
ing specially convened meetings at which his proposals
( oc\
were simply railroaded through. y And, in 1874, the 
Board also gave way over the matter of raising an
(86}additional loan for gas and drainage improvements.v J 
But it coiild not have escaped anyone’s attention that, in 
its early years of development, Lytham needed the land­
owner’s patronage and therefore it did not pay to offend 
unduly. So, a proposal made in 1860 that building plans 
should be deposited with a "requisite authority" as well 
as with the estate office was publicly denounced by Fair 
as "a great piece of impertinence" and subsequently
- 274 -
(87)dropped* When challenged on its rights of ownership
to Lowther Gardens in 1878 the estate, at considerable 
expense to itself and in the full glare of local 
publicity, successfully hauled the case through Liverpool 
Crown Court. I!A lesson in gratitude for the residents 
of Lytham,,, was how Thomas Fair described the incident.
Yet these were isolated occurrences. More usual were the 
displays of gratitude and deference which greeted the 
landowner’s gifts of land and money. It was no less than 
the squire and his agent felt entitled to expect, Clifton 
had provided virtually all the town’s social amenities, 
its park, its churches, its promenade; his stature and 
landowning influence were essential in preserving Lytham’s 
social tone and residential selectness. In return for 
services rendered it was indeed assumed that the town 
would defer to the landowner’s proprietory rights and 
privileges - to order the resort’s physical appearance, 
to determine uses and access to the foreshore and to 
guide the religious, cultural and political life of the 
community.
Ill
The mid-1870s marked something of a water­
shed in the estate’s financial position. This in turn 
brought changes in the estate’s attitude towards its urban 
property and in its relations with the urban communities. 
By then, the quiet confidence of the 1850s and 60s had 
begun to give way to a troubled uneasiness. Current 








driven relentlessly upwards by mounting debts. Farm 
rents had virtually levelled out and the deepening 
agricultural depression wiped out any prospect of an 
immediate improvement.But injecting a greater 
impetus in-to building development without, at the same 
time, incurring heavy capital costs, seemed to offer a 
way out of the problem.
This was clearly what was in mind when the 
scheme for a new resort at St. Anne’s was launched in 
1875. Situated halfway between Blackpool and Lytham,
St. Anne’s promised to open up building land along the 
coastline between the two established resorts. It aimed 
at the same clientele as Lytham as its promoters announced 
in their prospectus: n0f late years Blackpool has become 
so much the resort of the excursionist that a decided 
want is felt for a watering place which, while possessing 
the same bracing atmosphere and commanding position on 
the coast as Blackpool, shall secure a more select and 
better class of visitors.1 In its physical lay-out
St. Anne’s was designed to attract the middle-class 
resident in search of a socially exclusive, residential 
haven. In contrast to the "dreary wilderness of bricks 
and mortar of the modern type which stamps most of our 
modern streets", architectural plans for St. Anne’s 
envisaged pseudo-gothic villas neatly arranged in pictur­
esque groups, along spacious drives and separated from 
blocks of "artisans' cottages" to be built on the out­
skirts of the district. But a claim to having advantages 
over all other resorts was based on the assertion that"being
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all new and built in these days of sanitary reform, the 
greatest facilities (were) afforded for making it the 
first sanitary town in the Kingdom, n(91)
Yet, so far as the estate was concerned, 
there were crucial differences between the development 
of Lytham and their promotion of St. Annefs. Firstly, 
the landowner did not take responsibility for the major 
items of expenditure involved in the creation of St.Anne*s 
as was the case at Lytham. Secondly, the actual day-to- 
day development of the town was left in the hands of a 
large building company. As a matter of increasing 
urgency the estate wanted to see building taking place as 
rapidly as possible. Yet, at the same time, it also 
wanted to maintain a level of control sufficient to 
protect its interests outside the area actually leased by 
the building company; but without any financial risk to 
itself. In other words the estate now wanted the best 
of all possible worlds and, in the medium term at least, 
it got neither. The estate would not, could not assist 
with making financial provision essential to the resortfs 
successful take-off. But, in abandoning its former role 
of direct participation, it consequently sacrificed the 
kinds of controls which it had formerly and uncompromis­
ingly imposed on Lytham.
No doubt plans to open up building land 
were being toyed with as soon as the Blackpool—Lytham 
railway line had been built in 1863. In fact, it has 
been suggested that the estate's initial intention was to
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gradually lease small plots and this would have been in 
keeping with normal estate policy. ^ 2) Yet it is also 
clear that, by the 1870s, this approach had been dropped 
in favour of a more ambitious undertaking. In 1873 ideas 
for an entirely new town were being drawn up. But why 
the delay between the opening of the railway and the 
actual start of building operations? Again, taking 
management policy for the estate as a whole, it is plaus­
ible that agricultural investment as well as making 
provision for Lytham absorbed both the agent's attention 
and available resources during the 1850s and 60s. More 
important, as the estate looked more and more towards the 
urban sector for its financial salvation, Fair's primary 
objective was to find developers prepared to shoulder 
the capital costs of financing building expansion. 
Interestingly, Fair had already been approached by a 
company in 1873 with a proposal for leasing two and a 
half miles of coastline. Yet they expected the land­
owner to share the risks by demanding no more than a 
"peppercorn" rent for the first fifteen years, spending 
£20,000 on new roads and contributing to the costs of any 
further road construction. That was not the kind of
arrangement Thomas Fair has in mind.
The agreement he finally negotiated with 
the St. Anne's Building Company between 1874 and 1876 
virtually removed the risk factor as far as the estate was 
concerned. The building company, a consortium of East 
Lancashire businessmen, initially agreed to take up a 
lease on eighty acres with a reserved option on further
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plots. They were no doubt highly confident about the 
success of their venture for, by 1876, they had taken up 
leases on a total of 318 acres with the intention of 
eventually developing one square mile. The estate could 
not have secured better terms. It was guaranteed a 
steadily increasing income projected over a twenty year 
period, and the building company was legally bound to 
provide most of the capital involved. Conditions 
governed minimum property values along Clifton Drive,
St. Anne’s Road and, proportionately, within the adjoin­
ing plots. The main arterial roads were to be constructed 
by the company, but reserved the landowner’s right to tie 
into the road and sewerage system. No apportionment of 
rent would take place "until buildings of at least three 
times the annual value of the rent to be apportioned" in 
respect of each plot had been built and surveyed. Above 
all, the company was covenanted to spend at least £70,000 
on roads, houses and hotels as well as a public market, 
town hall, baths, wash-houses and pier. Further, the 
agreement also contained the provision that £50,000 of 
the capital should be laid out during the first four 
years. Against this level of spending the estate’s
contribution in making Clifton Drive and St. Anne’s Road
(94)pales into insignificance.
St. Anne’s, however, was beset by problems 
from the very outset. But it is the way in which the 
problems emerged and the failure to deal with them which 
is of particular interest here, in that the resort’s 
troubled beginnings play a light on the estate’s changing
- 279 -
attitude towards its urban property. Admittedly there 
were difficulties which could not be entirely anticipated. 
The site itself presented natural problems which had to 
be overcome, not least among these being the effect of 
blown sand drifting to depths of five feet in places and 
estimated to have caused £200 of damage by March 1876.^^ 
But much more serious was the fact that potential invest­
ors did not share the same confidence as the company’s 
directors in the resort’s future prospects. Few were 
willing to take the first plunge. Typical, for instance, 
was the Bolton contractor who hoped to take ten to twelve 
acres depending on whether he could interest one or two 
associates in forming a company. Yet they were unwilling 
to invest their money until they saw the St. Anne’s 
Company in active operation. The warning bells were
in fact being sounded as early as 1874 when a Blackpool 
developer found that three building societies would not
support his plans to build in St. Anne’s ”as the place is 
(97)not f o u n d e d . I n d e e d  he advised Thomas Fair that 
builders would need convincing that "St. Anne’s would be 
developed and shown to (their) entire satisfaction that 
the development would be certain and sure."^^ Unfort­
unately, the mortgage companies proved to be no more 
enthusiastic when construction hesitantly got under way 
after 1876.
Nevertheless, at the root of the many 
problems which plagued the new resort during the remain­
ing years of the century was the inability of the major 
vested groups - the Land and Building Company, the Local
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Board and the landowner - to accommodate their own 
objectives with the greater good of the town. Indeed, 
the early history of St. Anne’s is a sorry saga of charge 
and counter-charge, claim and counter-claim by the parties 
concerned. Firstly, the matter of lease-hold controls 
soured relations between the building company and the 
estate from the very beginning. Thomas Fair did not want 
to see development unduly impeded. At the same time he 
was customarily anxious that high standards of construct­
ion and planning should be observed, In their ebullient 
mood of 1874 the directors of the building company were 
probably easy to bring to terms. But, given the grim 
reality of actually having to persuade builders to invest 
in the town, their emphasis shifted noticeably towards 
reducing constraints to a minimum. The first angry 
exchange between the two centred on Fair’s insistence 
in 1876 that not only were all plans and specifications 
to be submitted to the estate office for approval but also 
that covenants incorporating the estate’s building rules 
should be included in all sub-leases. ' The quality of 
construction in St. Anne’s had not come up to Fair’s 
expectations. His surveyors reported that "commonly 
accepted standards regarding thickness of walls (and) 
strength of timbers" had not been complied with and that 
"the workmanship in many points (was) most unsatisfact- 
ory."^^^ More than a year later matters were appar­
ently no better. "Numerous properties....are very badly 
built in almost every respect", Fair was informed, and 
"considering the building at St. Anne’s generally, we 
cannot say there is much improvement from our former
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survey...The majority of them, even when they do not 
greatly transgress the building rules, are so defective 
in quality of materials and putting together that any 
benefit the observance of the rules might insure is lost". 
And, in November 1877, the same surveyors reported find­
ing "such buildings.. .that walls could be pushed down 
with one hand." What was even more galling to Fair was 
that he had actually asked the surveyors not to be too 
strict in interpreting the regulations "in comparatively 
unimportant p o i n t s . H o w e v e r ,  the estate’s demand 
that building rules should be inserted in leases came up 
against stern resistance. The building company protested 
on the grounds that other landowners among the county’s 
resorts - notably the Heskeths, Scarisbricks and Weld- 
Blundells in Southport and Birkdale - did not impose the 
same conditions on their lessees. But equality of treat­
ment was not their main concern. They could not afford 
"to impoverish and harrass" the few lessees they had
(102)managed to acquire. In a sense their hands were tied. '
Despite these initial differences of 
opinion, in due course, the estate and the building 
company came to occupy roughly the same ground on the 
matter of building controls. The truth was that the land­
owner could no more afford to parade stringent standards 
than the building company could. High ideals had to bow 
to financial exigencies. In the end the estate office did 
not force the issue and accepted the argument that it was 
far more expedient to let the company reguiate its own 
affairs. Indeed it later went on to make significant
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c o n c e s s i o n s . j n 1373 some 0f -the stricter clauses 
were removed from the building regulations. And, in 1880, 
certain plots were subdivided and street plans and build­
ing lines modified to enable such as the Oldham Land and 
Building Company to attract investors and raise mort­
gages.^0^
However, financial problems proved much 
more significant than the difficulties which stemmed from 
lease conditions. Indeed the early years of St.Anne’s 
development were littered with casualties. Between 1875 
and 1889 no less than forty-five investors filed bank­
ruptcy petitions.^^5) in hindsight it seems nothing 
short of a miracle that the St. Anne’s Building Company 
did not figure in the list. By 1879 it was itself in 
serious financial trouble. The euphoria of 1874 had given 
way to an acute sense of desperation* Houses stood 
empty, prospective builders had taken flight, income was 
falling sharply away and debts had started to pile up.
In 1877 virtually all the eighty-six cottages along 
Church Road and Nelson Street were tenanted. By 1881 
fifty-one were empty. Their evacuation reflected the 
fact that building had almost ground to a halt. With 
sixty-three houses and villas standing unoccupied and 
property values stagnating it is not surprising that most 
of the company’s leased plots remained undeveloped. But 
that was by no means the sum total of the resort’s 
problems. Other associated companies, formed to manage 
the town’s amenities - the Hotel, Pier, Gas and Public 
Gardens Companies - inevitably ran into the same
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difficulties. One by one they had to be rescued from 
imminent bankruptcy by the parent company. It was only 
the determination and commitment of individual directors, 
backed by substantial amounts of their own capital, that 
enabled St. Anne’s to survive these years. By 1890 
almost £74,400 had been sunk into construction work which 
included c.£8,000 for roads and the promenade, c.£6,000 
invested in St. George’s Gardens and £17,800 put into 
the Pier Company. In addition, another £25,000 was found 
to keep the Gas, Hotel and Brick companies afloat.
But what of the role of the landowner? In 
short, he came out of these events with a tarnished 
reputation, at least in the eyes of the building company 
and St. Anne’s residents. Indeed it is difficult to 
avoid the conclusion that, left to the devices of the 
estate, the resort would almost certainly have crumbled 
back into the sandhills from which it had struggled to 
emerge. From the outset the approach of the estate office 
was deliberately exploitative. It was both unwilling and, 
to a lesser extent, unable to come to the building 
company’s assistance. On the contrary, it preferred to 
distance itself from the company’s financial problems.
Moreover, at one stage, it appeared that 
the estate had itself been instrumental in compounding 
the building company’s basic problem of persuading 
builders to take up land. In 1877 Thomas Fair entered 
into a private agreement with another company (which 
incidentally included two directors of the St. Anne’s
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Building Company) to lease an initial twenty-one acres 
along the shore. This new consortium was offered land 
at a ground rent of £17-10-0 per acre which was substant­
ially lower than the terms on which St, Anne’s Building 
Company leased their own adjoining plots.(^7) more
to the point, this arrangement directly contravened 
St, Anne’s Building Company’s original agreement with the 
estate according to which land within one and a half 
miles of the resort was not to be leased at rents lower 
than they themselves were paying. (^8) This new devel­
opment provoked angry scenes of recrimination among the 
board of directors. An emergency meeting of share­
holders was called by James Maxwell, architect, director 
and major contractor to the company, at which he launched 
into a fierce attack on the purely speculative practices 
of some of his fellow directors and the estate - men 
f,who breached covenants and (who) had no intentipn of 
developing the property but to sell at a later date, when
small developers elsewhere in the town had through their
(109)efforts attracted other investors into the town.’1'
In the event he was proved right. No building took place
and, when eventually faced with the prospect of having
to lay out money on streets and a promenade, the estate’s
(110)new lessees surrended their deeds. 7 But by then the
damage had been done. Open conflict among the directors
could not have happened at a worse time. It prejudiced
the image of the building company and the town and scared
(1 1 1)away potential investors.'
Furthermore, the estate was hardly more
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supportive as St, Anne’s struggled through the 18Q0s.
It did virtually nothing to cushion the building company 
against a situation in which income declined and 
expenditure increased. With yearly losses running as 
high as £700 the building company pursued means of 
cutting its costs. At the same time it was also anxious 
to cultivate an impression of continuing activity in the 
resort. So in 1887, for instance, eight "first class 
houses” were started in St. Anne’s Road. The estate was 
asked to supply shingle and marl for the foundations of 
these houses since the company took the not unreasonable 
view that a total halt to construction work would damage 
the estate’s interests as much as anyone else’s. Thomas 
Fair, however, would not make a free gift of any 
materials • ^  ^
Yet reducing permanent overheads was the 
company’s main objective and, from 1879 onwards, the 
estate office came under unrelenting pressure to rearrange 
the terms by which ground rents were to be paid. The 
company was understandably anxious to alter the existing 
system whereby the payment of rents was based on a pre­
determined time-scale. Instead they proposed that the 
rental on undeveloped plots should be left in abeyance.
The estate did in fact concede an aggregate lower rental 
on these plots but would not surrender the condition that 
the ground rents on all seven leases taken out by the 
company should come into operation within the specified 
time p e r i o d . a n n u a l  losses mounting through 
the 1880s and no prospect of a dividend being paid,
- 286 -
shareholders petitioned the estate to make a permanent
reduction in ground rents. They achieved a 10% abatement
in 1884 but for a limited period of five years only and
with the provision that part of the saving would be
(114)
expended on improving the streets in the town. J 
Finally, as building prospects began to show signs of 
improvement in 1890, the company proposed developing the 
remaining two hundred acres of their large fourth lease. 
They therefore asked for £500 to be cut from the maximum 
rental and a nominal ground rent to apply, with arrears 
and interest to be paid off at a later date. But, once 
more, the estate refused to depart from what was described 
as its "hard and fast line."^^
In summary, the idea of a new resort at 
St. Anne’s was kept financially alive, not by the estate, 
but by a small and determined body of men who were not 
prepared to let it die; men like Joseph Whitehead, the 
first chairman of the board, who tore up his personal 
guarantee for £10,000 when the company started running 
into difficulties in 1878; above all, William J. Porritt, 
the owner of some of the largest quarries and cotton 
mills in east Lancashire, who contributed more than any­
one to the resort’s survival. He is said to have ploughed 
more than £i million of his own money into house construct­
ion in the town. He was a long-serving member of the 
Local Board, Chairman of the Land and Gas companies, an 
ardent Liberal and the benefactor of the Congregational 
Church; and his last act was to purchase St. George’s
f r \
Gardens for the building company.
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Finance - or lack of it - underpinned the
third major barrier to the progress of St. Anne’s; the
need for good roads and adequate sewerage arrangements.
It was, after all, on the strength of its claim to a
healthy environment that the resort was first launched.
No-one was more aware of this prerequisite than the
directors of the building company, but they did not see
themselves as being responsible either for maintaining
the roads or for financing a modern sewerage system. In
fact, in their negotiations with the landowner in 1875,
a clause requiring them to build a sewage farm and build
(117)a drainage system was deleted from their agreement. 7
Both the estate and the company arrived at the easy
assumption that, once a Local Board had been established
in the town, the rates would gradually take care of
(118)improvements of this kind as the need arose. 7 So, a 
Local Board was hastily established in 1878. Yet its 
sttitude was markedly different to the one anticipated 
by the estate and the building company. This became 
immediately clear as soon as a deputation from the company 
held a first meeting with the Board to discuss plans for 
sewering the town. Most of the Board’s members had no 
intention of authorising expensive improvements and they 
therefore rejected the proposal that a permanent joint 
committee should be set up to investigate possible sewer­
age s c h e m e s . Tlie root 0f the problem, from the 
point of view of the building company, was that the 
cumulative voting procedure, based as it was on property 
qualifications, had returned a Board comprised largely
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of farmers from the outlying districts. They had no stake 
in the town themselves and therefore were primarily con­
cerned about keeping the rates down to a bare minimum. ^ ^0) 
In any case, with only two hundred ratepayers, an average 
levy of fifteen shillings on each and the expenses of
salaried officials to the Board amounting to £150 p.a.
(121 )in 1878, there was not much scope for action, '
Continuing efforts were made to produce a more amenable
Local Board but came to little. Property owners in the
town petitioned the Local Government Board to reduce the
geographical extent of the St. Anne’s district on the basis
that a small body of ratepayers could not support the cost
of maintaining over twenty miles of roads in the outlying
areas as well as undertaking urgently needed sewerage
works. But there was clearly an ulterior motive, and that
was to undermine the farmers’ representation on the Local
Board. The petition failed. It came up against an earlier
agreement between St. Anne’s, Lytham and Blackpool that
their respective boundaries should be co-extensive.
Furthermore Thomas Fair had not been prepared to throw
the landowner’s unreserved support behind the petition.
Eager as he was to have a more energetic Board in St.Anne’s
he was also under an obligation to protect the interests
(122)of the estate’s tenant farmers.'1
Fair’s equivocation over the matter of 
Sto Anne’s boundary limits also reflected his own stubborn 
refusal to depart from the view that financial respons­
ibility for major improvement works in the town lay prim­
arily with the Land and Building Company. For their part
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the company wanted to see a Local Board elected which was 
sympathetic to rate-supported intervention and prepared 
to shoulder part of the expense of sewering and road 
construction. At the same time, securing a co-operative 
Local Board had to he balanced against a real danger that 
high rates could scare off potential investors. Conseq­
uently, the company’s directors were inclined to pass 
responsibility back to the estate as far as the most 
expensive undertakings were concerned. As for the Local 
Board, its dominant voice remained that of the farming 
community rather than the town’s residents. In short they 
did not mind who paid, so long as it was not them.
For the most part this state of affairs
continued throughout the 1880s. Meanwhile the resort
suffered. With the estate, Land and Building Company and
Local Board locked in battle and each refusing to give
ground, nothing was effectively done to tackle the urgent
problems of road repairs, lighting and sanitation. Until
the 1890s St. Anne’s had no road system worthy of the
namp, 0^3) newiy elected Local Board quickly defined
strict limits to their own liability by declaring in 1878
that they were not responsible for the repair of any road
other than the old Lytham-Blackpool highway which passed
(124)through the St. Anne’s district.x 7 Road maintenance 
was basically left to the voluntary efforts of individ­
uals though they were unlikely to agree an apportionment 
of the costs. Even where roads were put in order by 
frontagers, they had no assurance that the Local Board 
would adopt them.^"^ This impasse between the Board and *
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the property owners effectively neutralised any attempts 
to improve the major thoroughfare of the town. Even the 
condition of the promenade and coastal road, an amenity 
essential to the attractiveness of any resort, went sadly 
neglected as estate, Local Board and building company 
each denied responsibility. Only after repeated petition­
ing by residents did the Board finally relent and agree 
to adoption in 1887.^2^
However, the woeful condition of the town’s 
roads was not entirely due to the miserly attitude of 
Local Board members or the building company’s lack of 
resources. The Board’s stubborn policy on road adoption 
was strongly influenced by its lengthy battle with the 
estate office over rights to take shingle from the fore­
shore for the purpose of road repair. Access to cheap 
and plentiful materials might have made the Board more 
accommodating in the matter of road adoption. However 
the estate was unflinching in its refusal to grant the 
Board unlimited access. And more was at stake than Fair’s 
claim that the removal of shingle threatened the sea 
defences. His uncompromising stand was part of the 
estate’s long-running campaign to assert full proprietory 
rights to the foreshore along its coastal boundaries. In 
this case the rights of landownership took precedence over 
the immediate needs of a struggling resort, to the extent 
of dragging an impoverished Local Board into expensive 
litigation in 1882. ^127'
But the sanitary condition of the town was
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by far the most pressing problem. In 1889 St. Anne’s
sewerage system had barely improved on the primitive
arrangements which had existed at the resort’s inception
in 1875. Its claim to a healthy environment amounted to
nothing more than a surface drain which carried waste from
the township south of the railway into the sea, and an
open ditch which drained the northern part into Lytham’s
surrounding watercourses, eventually discharging into the
Ribble estuary. (^8) jn a £rain first constructed
by the Clifton estate in 1871-2 and running the length of
St. Anne’s Road constituted the resort’s sewerage system.
Individual residents were required to make their own ad hoc
arrangements for removing "nuisances”. In fact it was not
until 1884 that the Local Board engaged a contractor to
clear the town’s privies and ashpits; and even he was
(129)driven to resign within six months. '
Thomas Fair was very much aware that a lack 
of adequate sewerage facilities was the major barrier in 
the way of the resort’s expansion. He was impatient for 
progress but just as determined that the Local Board and 
especially the Land and Building Company should shoulder 
the costs of improvement work. He demanded that the Local 
Government Board set up an inquiry into the failure of 
St. Anne’s authorities to implement a drainage scheme.t1 0^) 
But the pressures he put on the building company were of 
a more subtle kind. When William Porritt advised Fair to 
get himself elected to the Local Board in 1879 he supposed 
that Fair would act in the common interests of both the 
company and the estate by neutralising the obstructive
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measures of the farmers1 representatives,^^^ Porritt’s 
assumptions were wrong. Instead Fair placed the problem 
of St. Anne’s stagnation fairly and squarely at the 
company’s door and specifically blamed their lack of 
investment in a sewerage system. He was prepared to use 
his influence with the farmers only when the building 
company gave a positive undertaking to give financial 
endorsement to a sewerage scheme,(^ 32) However, the town’s 
principal developers were no less adamant that the initiat­
ive should come from the estate. As James Maxwell,builder 
and one-time director of the Land and Building Company, 
explained; there was no private capital available and the 
Local Board was totally unresponsive to the idea of 
improvement work. ”1 have been struggling for months", 
he went on, "to get a sewerage scheme but I am simply 
single-handed against not only the Board but the whole 
community of farmers and nothing but a generous proposal 
from the estate can help much." Furthermore, revitaliz­
ing building development in the resort depended on expand­
ing drainage facilities well beyond the existing limits 
of habitation, which the Local Board would never contem­
plate doing. ^ 33)
With the building company and estate each 
expecting the other to lead the way the Local Board was 
able to procrastinate throughout the 1880s. Two sewerage 
schemes, in 1881 and 1883, were rejected and, by 1887, 
the Board had not even committed itself to the principle 
that improvement work was necessary• ^  The real 
casualties in this tripartite struggle were St. Anne’s
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residents themselves - small builders, property owners, 
shopkeepers, individuals who had invested their all in 
the resort and who felt cheated by the ineptitude and 
apathy of the Local Board, dominated by a coterie of 
farmers, and the obduracy of the building company and 
estate. From 1878 onwards an increasingly vitriolic Rate­
payers Association railed against the deceit of the Local 
Board, the narrow concerns of the building company 
directors and what appeared to be the lethargy of the 
landowner, all of whom seemed intent on letting the resort 
die. With roads made inaccessible by drifting sand, 
maintenance left to the haphazard efforts of individuals, 
virtually non-existent lighting and no sewerage system to 
speak of, property owners could hardly complain of high 
rate demands but neither were they getting any rents. 
"Improvements" rather than "economy" became the battle- 
cry of the besieged citizenry of St. Anne’s. Comparisons 
were drawn with the spending habits of other resorts.
St. Anne’s had not taken out a single loan whereas by 
1880 Blackpool had borrowed some £130,000 which worked out 
at £13 per head. Given this rate it was assumed that even 
the small St. Anne’s community could afford at least 
£13,000 of debt capital.^^ In short, there was a 
growing ground swell of opinion that the residents by them­
selves could resolve the town’s major problems through 
rateable intervention.
In the early 1890s they got their chance.
As a result of a marked improvement in the* building trade 
generally, rising demand inland and the spirited efforts
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of individual residents who had kept the resort alive 
out of their own pockets, St. Anne’s experienced a sharp 
up-tum in fortune.^136  ^ In 1892 the town was at last 
attracting a level of investment which promised to secure 
its future. "Each week”, it was reported, flsees new 
houses roofed in and others commenced in this growing sea­
side resort. New streets are being laid out and houses 
are being erected with the utmost possible speed, the 
demand being great.1 A sudden surge in development
was reflected in an increase in the town’s rateable value 
from £8,409 in 1878 to £13,368 in 1890 and then a dramatic
leap to £21,000 by 1893*^^^ Even the St. Anne’s Land
(139)and Building Company was showing a profit by 1896.v
Importantly, expansion brought changes in 
the composition of the Local Board. The farmers’ monopoly 
was gradually whittled away so that by 1894 their repres­
entation had been reduced to one member. Control passed 
into the hands of property owners, retailers and contract­
ors. Moreover the town found that it could now
generate the financial means of independently determining 
its own future. It no longer needed to pull on the tight 
purse strings of either the building company or the 
estate. Indeed the Board began to assert its independent 
spirit and its independent means. In 1893 the wheels 
were set in motion to submit a parliamentary improvement 
bill "to improve the health and good government of the 
district.1 Several public works were contemplated but 
priority was given to taking over the promenade and imple­
menting a comprehensive sewerage scheme. £10,000 was
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allocated for the purpose of providing a main sewer for 
each of the three drainage districts into which the town 
was divided. A further £7,000 was ear-marked for taking 
over the south promenade from the Land and Building 
Company, laying out pleasure gardens and widening the 
resort’s principal thoroughfare, St. Anne’s Road. Moreover, 
despite stem opposition from the estate, the new Urban 
District Council as it became in 1894 equipped itself with 
the powers to regulate building development in the town 
including control over street plans, elevations, building 
lines, conversions, fencing and so on.^^^ Indeed,within 
the space of a few years, virtually every amenity in the 
resort had fallen under the control of a Council which 
clearly had a bold vision of its municipal role. In 1895 
the Council combined with other coastal authorities in 
the joint purchase of the Fylde Waterworks Company. The 
following year it entered negotiations to purchase the 
local gas company. In 1897 an application for loan capital 
was made under the Electric Lighting Act. However, the 
Council’s major preoccupation remained the public owner­
ship of the foreshore, The Duchy of Lancaster was 
persuaded to part with further land along the shore which= 
enabled the Council to press forward with plans to improve 
the promenade. Indeed in its impatience to see the work 
completed the Council took out a £2,500 loan with the 
Lancashire and Yorkshire Bank in 1898 because of the admin­
istrative delays involved in applying to the Public Works 
Loans Commissioners. But this sum was only a small part
of the £40,000 which the Council had endorsed for its
(143)total improvement programme.v
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The energetic spending of the District 
Council clearly contrasts with the parsimonious attitudes 
of the Local Board of the 1880s. Nevertheless, Council 
members were far from being carefree with the ratepayers 
money. Enterprising as St, Anne’s Council was, its belief 
in the value of municipal intervention was kept firmly in 
check by "the perennial Victorian impulse to economy,,. In 
the case of St. Anne’s ratepayers this impulse seems to 
have been at its strongest when the interests of the town 
and those of the estate overlapped. ^  In view of the 
way in which the estate had distanced itself from the 
problems which had plagued the resort in its early years, 
it is not altogether surprising that subsequent relation­
ships operated on a largely cold and formal level. What 
is strongly evident is the obvious reluctant to spend 
public money which would be in any way advantageous to the 
estate. For instance, an acrimonious dispute blew up over 
the Council’s decision to reduce the geographical reach 
of its sewerage scheme in 1900. It was originally envis­
aged that the system would be extended into the north­
western area of the township but that also promised to 
open up building land on Clifton property. Since the 
enlarged spheme placed "an unfair burden on the ratepayers" 
the Council opted for a more limited undertaking and
successfully defended their decision in a court action
(145)brought by the estate.
Again in 1902 the Council did not regard 
the landowner’s "gift" of thirteen acres for a public park 
as the benevolent gesture it might have appeared. The
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Council rejected the offer because of the attached 
condition that it would not only have to finance the laying 
out of the park, to which it had no objection, but the 
provision of a surrounding road and sewerage system into 
which any further housing would be allowed to connect. 
Equally, while it remained the Council’s paramount object­
ive to secure possession of the whole promenade running 
throughout its district, it was only prepared to do so if 
guaranteed absolute powers of control. Consequently, it 
refused to take over the northern portinn of the foreshore
from the estate because "the Lord of the Manor wished to
(147)impose such onerous conditions.f,v J In the past the 
estate had always vigorously guarded its right to deter­
mine the uses to which the promenade was put. "Joy wheels, 
Aunt Sallys, cheap Jacks, stalls and pleasure fairs" had 
always been strictly prohibited on the grounds that such 
unseemly activities would deter building development on 
adjoining land. By contrast the Council took a less 
puritanical view. Not only was the principal of municipal 
self-determination at stake here but envious glances were 
being cast in the direction of Southport where promenade 
amusements had made a significant contribution to the 
municipal coffers. Ultimately their improvement bill of 
1914 equipped the Council with the means for removing the 
last vestiges of estate control over the town’s affairs.
In face of the landowner’s petition against the bill the 
Council secured powers of compulsory purchase; and it 
then went ahead with plans for not only ornamental gardens 
and marine lakes but "pavillions, booths, stands and 
s t a l l s . T h i s  episode was in effect a final snub to
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an estate whose attitude towards St. Anne’s had been one 
of remorseless profit-taking - "privilege without respon­
sibility" as one St. Annefs resident acidly remarked. ^
In the end St. AnneTs survived and prospered and its 
survival served to rescue the landowner*s ailing financ­
ial fortune. Yet a price of a different kind had to be 
paid, and that was a shattered public image.
IV
In terms of the relationship between town 
and estate there are interesting similarities between 
Lytham and St. Anne*s in the last quarter of the century. 
In Lytham the relationship again turned on a shift in 
emphasis in the way in which the estate managed its urban 
property. The benevolent paternalism of earlier years, 
the accent on social controls as much as one financial 
return, gave way to much more basic considerations. If 
the town could be encouraged to expand, the prospect of 
steadily increasing ground rents offered a possibility of 
shoring up the estate’s crumbling solvency. In effect 
the estate concentrated on a policy of maximising the 
return from its urban property at minimum cost to itself. 
At the same time, such a policy eventually placed the 
family in an altogether new light in their relations with 
the town. Increasingly Lytham*s leading citizenry were 
prompted into asking the basic question whether the 




However, injecting new vigour into the 
resort would not be easy. Lythamfs development from the 
1840s had been far from impressive. With a population 
of about 3,200 in 1871, the town was still little more 
than a large village.(^ 50) eg^a^e -fcackied the problem 
of stagnation in several ways, all of which pointed 
towards a relaxation of direct controls. The first large- 
scale developers were invited on to the estate, in a 
departure from the customary practice of leasing small 
building plots to private individuals. In 1879 a consort­
ium of East Lancashire businessmen formed the Lytham Land 
and Building Company and took out an initial lease on 
thirty acres in the Ansdell district lying between St.Anne’s 
and Lytham. They were joined in 1892 by a Fleetwood
based company who took out a lease on 260 acres again in 
the district to the west of the town and began work on 
what became the exclusive residential suburb of Fairhaven. 
Their plans envisaged building a string of villas which 
would eventually link St. Anne’s and Lytham. By 1896 they 
had successfully developed twenty-one acres, investing 
over £12,500 in carriage drives, a promenade, marine lake 
and golf course. It also followed that some revision
to Lytham*s leases was needed to bring them into line with 
those operating in St. Anne’s. In 1886 the Trustees to 
the Clifton estate granted Lytham’s first 999 year lease 
and, from 1890 onwards, expired leases were renewed for
(i 5:5 \
the longer term but at considerably higher ground rents.v 
Yet, as was the case at St. Anne’s, any prospects for 
future growth in Lytham rested largely on providing a 
standard of amenity and quality of environment likely to
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attract new investors and residents. For the estate, 
the cheapest solution lay in reorganising the town’s 
local government and bringing to the fore men who were 
sympathetic to the notion of municipally financed improve­
ments. Moreover, by the late 1870s, there was a rising 
ground swell of opinion in Lytham which was highly 
critical of the town’s shortcomings as a residential 
resort, which not even the most ’economy minded” citizen 
could afford to ignore.
Typically, the focus of attention was the 
town’s ’sanitary condition”. Behind an imposing facade 
of villa residences, promenade, hotels and assembly rooms 
lay an uninviting world of filth and squalor, a throw back 
to Lytham*s agricultural past. In 1866 it was reported 
that ”in nearly every cottage back-yard along Clifton 
Street may be found ashpits full, pigs kept, dung heaps” 
and a virtual absence of any kind of drainage. Similarly, 
in 1868, the nuisance inspector received complaints from 
the respectable inhabitants of Clifton Street and Market 
Square about the odour emanating from the yards in Henry 
Street, where large numbers of pigs were kept and ’manure 
allowed to remain until thirty to forty tons had accumul­
ated giving way to a stench that could be felt sixty or 
a hundred yards away.” 1^^  The medical officer’s report 
of 1874 indicated that no improvements had taken place.
The primitive sewerage system was faulty, the beach was 
contaminated by animal and vegetable waste, filth continued 
to accumulate in the back streets and the sanitary 
inspection was still inadequate. ’The cleaner the town
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is kept”, he continued, ”the healthier it will become and 
the more resorted to”, but the remedy lay with the 
residents. ^
Lytham*s sanitary record was not the only 
deficiency under attack. Residents contributed seemingly 
endless items to a catalogue of shortcomings compiled by 
the local press from the mid-l870s onwards. Railway 
links were inadequate with no direct service from Preston. 
Mud and haphazard maintenance left the major thoroughfares 
of the town impassable in winter, and the streets were in 
such poor condition because no-one would accept respons­
ibility for them. The oligarchic body of Improvement 
Commissioners imposed stringent conditions on road adopt­
ion and the landownerfs building regulations insisted 
that houses had first to be built before the work and 
costs of properly forming the roads and footpaths could 
be apportioned. It was also felt that "hundreds of 
people were prepared to take houses at £20-£50 p.a. rent” 
but accommodation in the town was too limited. Yet who 
was prepared to take on building plots along unformed 
roads with no access to adequate drainage? Why was the 
town so poorly advertised? Would it help to provide more 
amenities for winter amusements? Could a packet-boat 
service to Southport boost the town’s fortunes? And the 
most burning question of all - who was to pay?^156^
Rate-supported municipal enterprise was 
the solution advanced by recent newcomers to the town, 
especially those whose vested interests were most affected
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by the resort*s lethargic growth - the more extensive 
property owners, lodging house keepers and the building 
trade. They inevitably drew comparisons between the 
energetic efforts of other seaside authorities and the 
"penny-pinching” attitude of their own. Lytham Trades­
men* s Association paraded the example of Southport whose 
transformation into a bustling resort was put down ”to 
the united effort of its inhabitants....in laying out a 
Winter Gardens, Aquarium and Cambridge Hall”. Another 
critic scathingly commented that £10,000 had been spent 
on one promenade alone at Llandudno and added that it 
was "enough to drive some folk mad to see what can be done 
at other places and what stagnation there is at Lytham". 
£60,000 was reputed to have been spent on public amenit­
ies in Rhyl, a resort no larger than Lytham. But the most 
telling contrast was made with neighbouring Blackpool:
"In one thing Blackpool and Lytham are exactly alike; they 
wish to get as much as they can of the money made in the 
manufacturing districts, but there is a very great 
difference in the way they respectively adopt to attain 
their end. They long for the same cake, but whilst 
Blackpool is willing to pay and does pay pretty dearly for 
its bite, Lytham neither does nor will pay anything worth 
talking about.....Blackpool lavishes thousands of pounds 
to catch the public; Lytham haggles over sixpence.
By 1878 there were mounting pressures to 
replace the Improvement Commissioners by an elected Local 
Board drawn from "men of enterprise, of enlarged views 
and aims (and) who will fearlessly adopt measures for the
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further development of this town of which it is capable 
to a much greater extent than hitherto. This was
precisely the kind of positive action which Thomas Fair 
did everything to encourage. Changes to the town’s local 
government formed a crucial part of the agent’s plans as 
the urban property began to assume a greater importance 
in his financial arrangements for the estate. Attracting 
potential builders depended largely on providing amenit­
ies which the estate could ill-afford to finance intself. 
It was estimated, for instance, that extending a sewerage 
system westwards to connect with the building operations 
underway at Fairhaven would cost £3,000. And Fair 
anticipated that a more enterprising Local Board would
be more likely to lend financial support than the
(1 59)obstructive body of Commissioners. y '
However, not everyone shared Fair’s views 
that changing the structure of local government would be 
a change for the better. In the opinion of the heir to 
the estate it meant a dangerous political departure.
"It is a great thing to steer clear of elections", Clifton 
advised Fair. "It has a tendency to engender parties 
which is not very desirable. ^  Clifton’s warning 
proved to have some foundation to it. The more "progress­
ive" of the town’s citizenry were not suddenly swept into 
power in the elections of 1378. Instead the new Local 
Board was made up of improvers and the old guard, divided
/ Jk C A  \
into almost equal factions. Consequently, the
impulse towards economy still had to be reckoned with.
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In the Board elections of 1880 the call for improvements 
was countered by equally vocal complainants who argued 
that the Board was acting under pressure and ratepayers 
"saddled with an outlay which ought to fall on the owner 
of the land." In 1882 a decision to appropriate half 
the profits from the gas works to reduce the rates was
clearly popular with a section of Lytham residents.
Furthermore, the adoption of several major roads, includ­
ing Clifton Drive, was successfully resisted, as were 
Fair’s persistent demands that the Lytham Land and Build­
ing company should be allowed to connect their residential
estate with the main sewers, There was, however,
some progress. In 1882 work started on a £5,800 project 
to build new sewerage and gas works,(^3) a priva-te 
Act of 1888 provided the Board with £10,000 for extensions 
to the gasworks, £500 for modest street improvements and 
powers to introduce new by-laws governing the beach and 
promenade. ^ ^
This tug-of-war between the two factions 
characterised Lytham1s local government into the 1890s.
The "progressives’*,as they were known locally, scored a 
number of small victories under Thomas Fair’s and his 
son’s leadership; notably the Board’s final adoption of 
the western promenade. from Fairhaven to Ansdell in 1889, 
and modest increases in the rates to cover the adoption 
of some of the town’s notoriously squalid back-streets and 
r o a d s . H o w e v e r ,  several factors conspired to build 
up resistance to Fair’s plans to drive more impressive 
improvement schemes through the Local Board. Groups tended
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to realign over every issue of public spending, and any
project which threatened to have a dramatic effect on the
rates was likely to drive wavering supporters into the
ranks of the opposition. Secondly, the suggestion that
the landowner was taking advantage of the ratepayers had
much the same effect. In mid-century few would have
wished and even fewer would have dared to cast aspersions
on the estate’s motives. By contrast, there was much
more public debate in the 1890s about the estate’s role
in the town, and a greater readiness to criticise and
censure. Where public comment on the estate’s affairs
and the behaviour of the landowner and agent had, in the
past, been discreet and usually deferential, a growing
body of residents and Board members were now unashamedly
unrestrained in their reference to the estate. Moreover,
a further element had crept into the picture. Some of
Fair’s most vociferous critics had a political axe to
grind, confirming the Cliftons’ long-standing fear that
a more open system of government would provide a stage
for the politically antipathetic elements in the town.
’Some”, Fair remarked, "are more inclined to put their
party scruples before the good of L y t h a m . I n d e e d ,  
it was no coincidence that the hard core of Board members
who doggedly resisted Fair’s comprehensive improvement
schemes were also the leading figures in Lytham’s infant
Liberal Association. (^7) Their favourite line of attack
was to impugn the integrity of the estate in an effort to
drive a wedge between the landowner and the town. Typical
were their highly personalised accusations’ that the estate
had broken previous "understandings" and "agreements" and
was ducking its responsibilities. Their opposition, they 
declared, was based on the view that "Mr. Clifton was
trying to force expensive schemes on to the Board."
By 1894, the estate’s political critics had become more 
daringly outspoken. The town’s tradesmen, it was claimed, 
were unable to voice an opinion because of fears of 
reprisals. The Board, they continued, was Tory dominated 
and manipulated in the interests of the landowner. "In 
Lytham they had not grown out of the old order of things. 
In the old days every cottage was owned by the estate and 
they thought by that means to control all of a labouring 
character and that the whole place would be exceedingly 
respectable." True, the argument ran, the town needed 
more enterprising and energetic government but provided 
"it was free and divorced from the interests of the 
estate.
Nevertheless, as events turned out, Fair’s 
"progressives" swept to victory in the local elections 
of 1894. Their success was due to a combination of 
circumstances. Measures to improve Lytham’s poor image 
were more urgently needed than ever. It was a matter of 
some alarm that, by comparison, St. Anne’s was attracting 
more building activity. Whereas Lytham’s population had 
crept up to almost 5,300 by 1896 St. Anne’s was not far 
behind, having increased from 2,588 in 1891 to 4,250 five 
years later. (^9) formation of an Urban District
Council and the division of the town into electoral wards 
tipped the balance of power in favour of the manufacturing 
and professional families based in the west end district,
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who were largely sympathetic to the principle of rateable
intervention. At the same time, the political influence
of the estate office played its part. Never before had
it made such efforts to canvass support and to cultivate
an acceptable impression of the landowner’s role in the
(17)affairs of the town.' 1 Fair made an impassioned
defence of the landowner’s position. Since building
operations had started south of Clifton Drive the Local
Board had taken over £5,000 in rates he argued. The
landowner had "left open" more than a third of the land
for "recreational purposes" and he had made "gifts of
land" whose value was estimated to be £31,000. But now
there was an urgent need to encourage more builders into
the town, and that depended on "a yearly programme of
improvements with particular regard to sewerage and road
repair. Fair got the Council he wanted. It confirmed
its sense of enhanced status and purpose by raising £5,500
for new council offices and it endorsed Fair’s plans for
(172)the town's new sewerage system. 7
Outwardly it appeared that the ties between ' 
estate and town had been mutually reinforced. In fact, 
the alliance between the town’s "progressive" leaders and 
the estate was based on temporary convenience. For the 
moment differences were buried out of a recognition of the 
fact that the resort’s needs were more immediate and only 
public self-help cuuld bring about any speedy improvement. 
But the honeymoon was brief. In committing the town to 
more expensive public works programmes the "progressive" 
group became more critical of the landowner’s contributory
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role rather than less so. In a sense Fair made a rod 
for his own back. He helped to bring to the fore men who 
were prepared to carry out the kind of improvements which 
the estate itself could ill-afford but he had also brought 
about a situation in which the town’s civic leaders and 
most ratepayers would not be satisfied with less than 
full control over their own affairs. On this basis they 
drew a clear distinction between the town's interests and 
those of the estate.
So, the concerted action of 1894 soon gave 
way to a more searching analysis of the landowner's 
contribution to the town's welfare. Pressing to consol­
idate their control over the Council in the elections of 
1896 on the promise of still further improvements, 
"progressives1* portrayed the landowner not as the benev­
olent force of the past but as the beneficiary of their 
own success and that of the town. They attacked the 
squire's continued absences. They complained about the 
poor condition of the unadopted roads and they accused 
the estate office of deliberately abandoning the building 
standards of the past in favour of speculative profit- 
making. Referring to the recently built "company houses" 
in the east end of the town one councillor remarked that 
"there was no seaside town where there was more jerry- 
building than at Lytham." Another made no bones about 
that he saw as a separation of interests and, on that basis, 
challenged the agent’s ability to carry out his duties as 
a town councillor or in an impartial manner.
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Of course contested elections have the 
effect of heightening emotions and giving rise to some­
what exaggerated claims. Nevertheless, it is apparent 
that Councillors expressed a strong current of popular 
feeling. Criticism stemming from various interest groups 
in the town was no less unrestrained. The Lytham Trades­
men's Association in 1904 no longer felt the same common 
cause with the estate as had been the case ten years 
previous. Their resentment was unmistakeable. The land­
owner became their scapegoat for the town's unspectacular 
progress: "Perhaps if the Squire were to settle here and
reside at Lytham Hall it would give impetus to trade. It 
was the duty of the Squire to come and help the town.....
It was as little as Mr. Clifton could do to come and spend 
some of his money here.1* The Ratepayers* Association 
voiced similar complaints, and public comment at a meeting 
called to discuss relief measures for the poor and 
unemployed of the town went further. The landowner's past 
record of benevolence came under scathing attack. Nothing 
could be asked or expected of a landowner, the platform 
asserted, whose previous acts of generosity had been 
inspired by ulterior motives. "He gave a park to St.Anne's 
which they did not want and made over Lowther Gardens to 
avoid the expense of maintenance." A reduction in the 
estate's income from the town seemed to be the panacea for 
all social ills. If ground rent values were appropriately 
rated then the burden on the town as a whole could be 
reduced, and more cottages would be built and leased at 
lower r e n t s N o t  surprisingly, the tarnished reput­
ation of the local landowner was seized upon by Liberals
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in search of political capital* The parliamentary 
elections of 1910 fuelled further accusations against 
the estate1s leasing policy. Old scars were reopened as 
the local press enjoyed a field-day investigating "Mr. 
Clifton’s alleged misdeed in respect of the renewal of 
expiring leases." In particular it was claimed that the 
estate office had trapped the District Council into paying 
an unjustifiably high price for a new lease on its offices 
and for the purchase of the public baths and assembly 
rooms. Similarly the landowner, in his capacity as one 
of the trustees, was accused of pressing otherwise useless 
land on to the Lytham Charities Trust at an exorbitant 
price when a site was being chosen for the town’s new 
grammar school.^^5) whether there was any basis to these 
claims really did not matter. These issues became a 
matter of public concern and added to growing suspicions 
of the estate’s motives.
By the turn of the century the town council 
had virtually severed the estate’s controls over what it 
considered to be the most important areas of municipal 
responsibility. In this respect, no single issue gener­
ated more public controversy than the question of who 
controlled the town’s schools. For the previous two 
hundred years education in the parish had come under the 
aegis of a combination of trusts collectively known as the 
Lytham Charities. Ostensibly, the purpose of the Charit­
ies was to provide a basic education for the children of 
poor families in the parish on a non-denominational basis. 
However, a number of vacancies on the Board of Trustees in
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1845 brought about significant changes in the Charities’ 
management and policy. Thomas Clifton had served as a 
trustee for two of the four charitable bodies involved but, 
in 1846, the number of trustees was increased to thirteen 
and came to include not only Clifton but his agent, 
solicitor, five of the major tenants on his estate as well 
as several rectors and patrons of local Anglican churches* 
In effect the Lytham Charities and their schools came to 
be dominated by an oligarchy of estate and establishment 
which was to last until 1903. For the landowning
family the Charities provided a valuable instrument of 
social control - a means of keeping the influence of non­
conformist and Catholic groups in check. It proved to 
be a highly effective weapon. With some justification 
local Catholics complained about the denominational 
prejudices of the trustees and the "bitter persecution” 
which had forced Catholic children out of the parish 
school. ^ 77) Backed by a steadily mounting income from 
their small but highly lucrative plots of land in central
Blackpool the Charities maintained a dominant influence
(178)over primary education in Lytham.v
The educational provision of the Lytham 
Charities was no less discriminatory in the 1880s. By 
then the trustees maintained two schools - one in St.Anne’s 
and a second, St. Cuthbert’s, in Lytham. In 1880 they 
had been approached to lend support to St. John’s National 
Schools, which had been established in the growing east 
end of the town. At first there was a marked reluctance 
to dilute the Charities* spending by taking on additional
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obligations. However, a sharp reversal in attitude had 
taken place in 1883* St. John’s did not have the 
resources to cater for a rising school population but far 
more persuasive in forcing the trustees hand to come to 
the schools* assistance was the fact that a newly opened 
Wesleyan school had drawn twenty-four pupils away from 
the Charities* own establishments.
Against this background the 1880s witnessed
growing demands for the complete reorganisation of the
town’s education system. The trustees found themselves
coming under pressure from a number of directions. The
non-conformist and Catholic groups were incensed by the
Charities’ denominational bias, and claimed entitlement
to a share of the trust fund under the terms of the
original foundation. The Catholic Church, it was claimed,
catered equally for the poor of the east end in much the
same manner as the Anglican establishment, yet their
appeals for financial assistance from the Trust had been
(1 r)repeatedly rejected. J By 1896 a third interest group 
was pressing its own claim. Under the Local Government 
Act, Lytham U.D.C. asserted its right to appoint to the 
board of trustees and in fact proposed nominating a number 
equal to the existing membership. Their immediate concern 
was to implement the recommendation of the Charity Comm­
issioners that the Lytham Charities should set aside a
(181 )specific sum of money for higher education in the town.v '
In face of pressure from all sides the 
trustees made minor concessions. In 1891 they made the
- 313 -
meagre grant of £75 to the Catholic and Wesleyan element­
ary schools and £200 p.a. was allocated to secondary 
education in Lytham, whilst St. John’s received a £500 
grant to build a new school. But any moves to break their 
control over the Charities* funds were strongly resisted. 
Scheme after scheme foundered on the trustees’ stubborn 
refusal to relinquish power so that, in 1898, the Charity 
Commissioners set up a public enquiry into Lytham*s 
educational provision. The Commissioners in effect acted 
as arbitrators between the two main factions - the exist­
ing trustees and a loose alliance of town councillors and 
non-Anglicans determined on breaking what they saw as a 
remaining vestige of estate/establishment control over 
an important area of the town’s life; and that could only 
be achieved, as one Baptist councillor put it, by termin­
ating the "perpetual succession of Fairs." In fact their 
regime was brought to an end in 1903 by the Board of 
Education which enforced a sweeping revision of Lytham’s 
school system. From a bottrd of fourteen the number of 
existing life-trustees was reduced to just two and controls 
over the Trust’s funds became firmly vested in represent­
atives from the local authorities. The sectarian 
character of the Charities’ work was finally erased and
much of its money used for the purpose of establishing
(182)
two grammar schools in the town.
The Lytham Improvement Bill of 1904 
occasioned the final confrontation between town and estate. 
With an average of 115 houses per year being built between 
1890 and 1905 and the rateable value climbing to almost
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£64,000, the Council had sufficient independent means 
to sever all remaining ties. The most important aspect 
of the Bill was not the Council’s new borrowing powers 
but its claim, embodied in a comprehensive list of by-lav/s, 
to proprietory rights over the streets, parks, beach and 
promenade. In face of loud protestations from the estate 
the Act overturned an arrangement whereby by-laws had 
formerly been subject to the landowner’s consent. The 
point had been reached when municipal pride could no longer 
be satisfied with a situation in which any future plans 
for the town would depend on the approval or otherwise 
of the e s t a t e . l a n d o w n e r ’s control over the 
affairs of the community had been finally broken. The 
Cliftons still liad a role to play but it was little more 
than that of property developers. Their former role - 
as the politicial and social overlords of the town - had 
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THE OLD ORDER IN RETREAT
19th Century Lancashire was a county of 
sharp contrasts. In the main it has conjured up images 
of industrial and urban sprawl. Yet it is sometimes 
forgotten that, even towards the end of the century, 
Lancashire was one of Englandfs most important agricult­
ural counties, at least in terms of the geographical
(A }
extent of land under production and farming output. y 
Moreover this distinction has a spatial dimension to it. 
Whereas industry v/as heavily concentrated in the towns 
to the south and east of the county, the north and west 
for the most part retained a strongly agricultural 
character. Physically and economically distinctive these 
two regions also harboured two contrasting social worlds.
The industrial environment was the making 
of new men and new wealth and it also generated a power­
ful social rationale which, with its stress on individual 
achievement, challenged the assumption of inherited 
authority. ^  By contrast, the rural areas of the north 
and west of the county remained the bastion of an older 
landed order and it was from this position of territorial 
dominance that Lancashire's established families derived 
much of their wealth and the authority which they had 
traditionally commanded over the county's affairs. 
Lancashire had its great landowning figures like the 
Derbys, Seftons and Scarisbricks. In fact, in 1883, the 
great estates controlled 24% of the land. Yet, the number
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of these great estates, that is to say, in excess of
10.000 acres, came to just five and only two exceeded
20.000 acres. In this respect, Lancashire was not a 
county of aristocratic landowners; it was a county of 
squires. Again, on a statistical basis, 26% of all land 
was controlled by estates of between 1,000 and 10,000 
acres and a further 18% by smaller landowners of 100 to
1.000 acres. This picture, however, is slightly mis­
leading because the location of the larger estates was 
not evenly spread. In the main they were heavily concen­
trated in the agricultural heartland of the county, that 
is the coastal plain extending from Liverpool as far 
north as Morecambe Bay. For instance, a handful of 
families - Derby, Sefton, Lathom, Blundell, Dicconson, 
Scarisbrick, Hesketh and Lilford virtually had a landed 
monopoly over the south-west plain between Liverpool and 
Preston, But the "landed gentlemen", who collectively 
had the territorial advantage over the county's great 
magnates, were more numerous still in the Fylde and 
Lonsdale area of north Lancashire. w/
This landed order continued to exercise 
real power well into the 19th century. Their influence 
was obviously most keenly felt within their own localit­
ies but, at the broader regional level, they imposed an 
authority over political and administrative life which 
they only slowly relinquished. The first part of this 
closing chapter therefore looks at the substance and 
dimensions of landed power in more detail. We shall see 
how the diminishing relevance of the landowners' social
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and political role in the later part of the century 
coincided with the eclipse of their financial pre-eminence,
I
Outside the industrialised districts the 
oligarchy of established landowners was still remarkably 
intact in the early decades of the 19th century. At the 
same time they had never been a closed case. Through 
marriage or the investment of commercial wealth in land 
new families had always been able to establish themselves 
in the ranks of the landed order and win acceptance. Yet 
it was a gradual process of assimilation which ensured 
that the established elite was strengthened rather than 
swamped. Sir Lawrence Rawstorne and William Garnett 
followed a well-trodden path in their pursuit of the 
trappings and status of landed gentlemen.^ For example, 
they followed in the wake of Edward Wilbraham who in the 
late 18th century married into the titled Lathom family 
and later became a successful Tory M.P. Other earlier 
precursors also included James Pedder, a Preston-based 
linen merchant and founder of a banking fortune, Nicholas 
Ashton who purchased Woolton Hall in 1772 and another 
banker, Thomas Leyland of Liverpool, who bought the Walton 
Hall estate in 1802.^
An emphasis on their own social exclusive­
ness and on the claims of inherited authority is reflected 
in the way in which the established elite attempted to 
maintain their control over the administrative and political
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life in the county. Nowhere is this more apparent than 
in the conscious efforts of a governing clique of landed 
families to retain their grip overthat vital organ of 
regional and local administration, the magistracy, by 
obstructing the appointment of industrialists to the Bench. 
And in this they were largely successful, at least until 
1835, whereafter the pressures of an expanding urban 
population and the need to make political accommodation 
opened up increased magisterial recruitment from a wider 
social background. Nevertheless, even by 1851 the rural 
areas of the north and west were better provided for, in 
terms of resident J.P.s., than the urban districts. To 
some extent power had been transferred to men of success­
ful business backgrounds but this applied more to specific 
urban localities than it did at the broad county level 
where the traditional elite was still very much in command
and where a hard core of ancestral families continued to
(6)supply most of the recruits to the Bench.v '
Similarly, party politics in north 
Lancashire, the geographical heartland of landed society, 
were shaped by the same determination of an established 
elite to maintain its power and influence. Again, the 
controlling hand of a few families is unmistakeable. 
Elections in the north Lancashire constituency went uncon­
tested until after 1865. Election committees, composed 
almost exclusively of the local squirearchy, smoothly 
engineered the return of a succession of landed notables. 
But what, above all, provides striking evidence of the 
power base of leading landed families is the way in which
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political figures could change their political stance 
without materially endangering their support. Lord 
Stanley, for instance, was able to move across an admitt­
edly narrow political spectrum from the Whig-Reformist 
position to the Toryism of his fellow constituency M.P. 
without disturbing the loyalty of his supporters.
Stanleyfs leadership was quietly transferred to John 
Talbot Clifton, who was returned unopposed tin the by- 
election of 1844. Elected as a protectionist, Clifton 
himself drifted towards the Peelites. Even so it is 
doubtful whether his support would have been undermined 
to the extent of endangering his re-election in 1847, had 
he been prepared to run to the expense of standing against 
the Manchester Liberal, James Heywood. In fact, Clifton’s 
Tory colleague and neighbouring landowner Wilson-Patten 
(later Lord Winmarleigh), himself a supporter of Corn 
Law repeal, was comfortably re-adopted by his own constit­
uents for the election of 1847. However, by 1859, the 
familiar pattern of a Tory landed gentleman partnered by
an aristocratic Whig, this time Lord Cavendish, had
(7)re-established itself.
Of course landed influence did not restrict 
itself to -filling high office in the political and admin­
istrative life of the county. It was most keenly felt 
at the local level. The social reach of the Cliftons, for 
example, gives a measure of their influence within their 
own territorial sphere of the Fylde, and it also gives an 
indication of their position within the ranks of the 
region’s landed order. Clearly, the Cliftons’ patronage
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was regarded as indispensable to success by wide sections 
of the community. Candidates seeking election to posts 
in the Fylde Poor Law Union in 1836 scrambled to secure 
Clifton’s support. Likewise, in 1842, the hopes and 
ambitions of two Colne men, whose names had been put for­
ward for appointment to the Magistrate’s Bench, rested
largely on winning the support of such a major landowning 
(8)figure. 7 Socially less well-placed families, wanting
cadetships and commissions for younger sons, also fjfound
the Cliftons’ military and political connections useful
as did individuals after appointments to customs posts or
(q)
positions in the Colonial Office. 7 A great landowner 
opened other doors as well. He provided access to the 
higher reaches of the landed order. The inhabitants of 
Weeton, part of Lord Derby’s Fylde estates, recognised 
that their chances of obtaining his Lordship’s financial 
support towards building a new village school would be 
immeasurably enhanced if Thomas Clifton first made 
approaches on their behalf. In much the same way local 
worthies pressed their qualifications on James Fair in 
the open knowledge that the Lytham estate office had been 
asked to find suitable men to fill positions on a board 
of trustees which was to take responsibility for managing 
Lord Derby’s Inskip-with-Sowerby property/10^
The prestige value of Clifton’s name was 
pursued at all levels. His support was invariably 
solicited by parties involved in local civil disputes; he 
could be asked to vouch for individuals waftting to take 
out a loan; the absence or presence of the family name
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at the top of a subscription list for a local charity 
meant all the different between success and failure. Even 
urban based organisations tended to look outside their 
own social hierarchies when recruiting decorative figure­
heads and instead looked towards members of notable landed 
families to lend social weight and status. Preston’s 
Literary and Philosophical Society, for instance, unani­
mously elected John Talbot Clifton their Patron in 
1845 following the retirement of Lord Stanley. These,
then, were just a few of a leading family’s channels of 
influence reaching up and down through the social tiers 
of a hierarchical society. Moreover, this web of patron­
age and influence was not unusual. Within their own 
domains other landowners were probably just as active.
This position of broad power, so clearly
enjoyed by landed society as a whole, stemmed from the
authority they collectively exercised over their own local
communities. There is no need here to reiterate the
exhaustingly detailed arguments which both historians and
sociologists have used to define what is meant by the
M2)term "the deferential society.,lV 7 But the concept of a 
vertical, dependent relationship connecting those in 
authority With those below, especially in communities 
which fell under the territorial influence of an estate, 
has a measure of validity to it. In short, it was this 
dependency on landed paternalism which determined landed 
power. However, a word of caution is needed here. The 
extent of a landowner’s control was shaped*by a number of 
variable conditions - for instance, how a landowner chose
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to interpret his own role and responsibilities which, in 
turn, were governed by his financial means, his resident­
ial habits and, indeed, his own readiness to provide 
leadership. Moreover, in the absence of legislative and 
governmental provision, the level of dependency rested 
on the extent to which intervention by the landowner 
continued to meet the actual needs of the local community. 
To a greater or lesser degree, these conditions deter­
mined social life in many parts of rural Lancashire and 
especially those areas, particularly in the northern 
parts of the county, which were remote from the large 
towns and which fell within the territorial compass of 
local landed families.
The Clifton estate, at least during the 
first decades of the 19th century, was an example of this 
kind of society. Here Thomas Clifton’s wealth and status 
and his central importance in providing for the material 
well-being of the community gave him an influence which 
extended beyond the immediate confines of his own estate. 
Like many of his peers in early Victorian England,
Clifton felt secure enough to cultivate what was an ideal­
ised paternalistic community, shielded against outside 
influences* and very much the landowner’s undisputed domain.
Certainly a tradition of inherited authority 
must have played its part in enforcing social subordin­
ation. Yet the stability of what was essentially an 
authoritarian social order rested on the mutual recognit­
ion of rights and responsibilities by ruler and ruled alike.
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In this respect the whole system of deferential relation­
ships depended on the squire fulfilling a variety of 
paternalistic duties as well as enjoying the obvious 
privileges of landownership. Landlord-tenant relation­
ships, for instance, were tempered as much by a sense of 
tradition and obligation as by purely business consider­
ations. Anxious as Thomas Clifton and his agent were to 
reorganise farming practices throughout the estate, changes 
were made without unduly disturbing existing tenurial 
arrangements. As has already been explained, new faces 
were introduced but usually on to newly created farms and,
at the same time, some of the most inept and stubbornly
(13)unresponsive tenants were persuaded to go. 7 Yet, all 
told, there was no wholesale displacement of sitting 
tenants. Indeed, continuity in farm occupancy from one 
generation to the next is the most striking feature of 
tenurial relationships on the Clifton estate.
Admittedly, practical considerations argued 
against any hasty dismissal of tenants, as landowners were 
only too well aware. Lord Lilford and his agent were in 
full agreement that dismissing a tenant, even where there 
was good cause, had to be avoided "unless absolutely 
necessary"'. The inconvenience of re-letting the farm, 
the costs of any possible litigation and the likely 
expense of carrying out immediate repairs and improve­
ments before another tenant could be appointed, were all 
important factors which had to be taken into account and 
usually outweighed any advantages in seekirig a change of 
tenancy. The same reservations could be heard at the
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end of the century, Thomas Fair had a dread of changes 
because they involved "a considerable outlay to put the 
farm in proper tenable order.*>^ 5)
However, a farmerfs ancestral connections 
with the estate and proven qualities of sobriety and 
industry were usually enough to almost guarantee him 
security of tenure, even in times of difficulty and 
financial embarrassment. Under these circumstances he 
could usually count on the landowner’s or agent’s leniency 
if not their positive assistance. For instance, James 
Scott’s dealings with the Clifton estate office were 
typical. His family had farmed land in Clifton-with- 
Salwick for generations when, in 1849, he fell on hard 
times. He was heavily in arrears and his capital was 
exhausted. Nevertheless, impressed by Scott’s personal 
qualities and by the family’s record of service to the 
estate, James Fair himself put up part of the security for 
a £600 loan which Scott obtained from Pedder’s Bank in 
Preston. Much the same criteria governed relation­
ships on the Sefton estate. Arrears of rent, however 
large, by themselves were never enough to warrant the
dismissal of those tenants who were regarded as upright
(17}and industrious characters.v yBy the same token, farmers 
who did not match up to expected standards of conduct were 
shown less sympathy. One farmer was given time to reduce 
his arrears of rent because of the cattle losses he had 
suffered in the winter of 1843/4. Yet, in this case, the 
agent’s tolerance was short-lived. Not many weeks later 
he was recommending his removal because "it is perfectly
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clear that he will always remain the same dirty, slovenly 
and disagreeable tenant.1
Dismissals of this kind were few and far
between. On the Clifton estate managerial considerations
combined with a sense of tradition and obligation to
give most tenants what amounted to fixity of tenure.
Relatives of a previous tenant were invariable given first
preference on the farm. Failing that it was customary
for it to be offered to a deserving tenant on a smaller
(19)holding.' Nor did the later trend towards annual 
agreements undermine the general feeling of security. 
Irrespective of the genuine trust in the landowner, the 
phasing out of the longer leases coincided with the 
halcyon period of agricultural prosperity in the third 
quarter of the century. In any case, tenant farmers on 
the larger estates in Lancashire did not have the same 
amount of capital at stake as their landlords.
It is not surprising then that, given the 
generally favourable farming conditions and the land­
owner’s benevolent support, changes to the Clifton ten­
antry were minimal. The average length of family occupancy 
among thirty five farmers interviewed in 1892 came to
forty one years. On the larger properties alone the
(21)average was very much higher. The families, for
example, who farmed the largest holdings in the 1871 census 
were usually the ones who can be traced back to the earl­
iest estate surveys of the century which were carried out 
between 1809 and 1816. Of the 18 families in Lytham
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occupying farms of over fifty acres in 1871 ten can be 
found in the Land Tax assessment of 1831. Similarly, in 
Clifton-with-Salwick, no fewer than six out of the seven 
families on farms of over fifty acres had survived from 
1831. And, in almost every case, it was their holdings 
which had been gradually built up over the years.
The ties which bound the estate and the 
lower orders of society together were equally evident. The 
paternalism of the landowner was not a last gesture to a 
hy-gone feudal age. It was arbitrary, even eccentric, but 
it fulfilled a positive social need. Thomas Clifton 
certainly took a serious view of his social responsibil­
ities. He saw himself as the guardian of the spiritual, 
moral and physical welfare of the labouring families in 
his charge. And he did not restrict himself to patron­
ising local schools, churches, village halls and hospit­
als. He contributed significantly to softening the 
vicissitudes of daily life endured by countless labouring 
families. Employment is a case in point. His philan­
thropic intervention helped to neutralise the worst effects’ 
of the sharp seasonal fluctuations in the demand for 
agricultural labour. Matching labout supply with demand
was as much a problem, particularly in the more remote
(23)parishes of north Lancashire, as it was elsewhere.'
Taking the Fylde villages as an example, most increased 
in population at least until the 1830s and, moreover, had 
a rate of natural increase which far outstripped the drift 
into the industrial towns. There therefore existed a 
reservoir of surplus labour in many villages which,
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incidentally, may go some way towards explaining why 
only a light sprinkling from the flood of Irish immigrants 
who descended on the region in the 1840s settled outside 
the urban areas.
There could not have been any significant 
expansion in labour demand until the period of extensive 
agricultural improvements after mid-century.^^ Never­
theless, there is no evidence that the winter months or 
spells of economic recession during the first half of 
the century resulted in large scale unemployment at least 
on the estates so far studied. Rather it seems to have 
been the deliberate policy of landowners to keep a solid 
core of labourers in regular employment as far as was 
possible.Thomas Clifton, for instance, wrote to his 
agent in the bleak months of 1848: "I feel extreme
satisfaction at finding the poor of the different town­
ships on the property well supplied with work during the 
w i n t e r . T h j _ s was not unusual. Labouring families
on the Rufford, Ince-Blundell and Trafford Park estates
(28)were kept in regular employment throughout the year.
Likewise, the Quernmore Labourers* account book of 1846
shows very little change in the monthly number of regular
workers on the Garnett estate and the evidence for Lord
(29)Lilford*s property tells a similar story.
Despite paternalistic efforts to maintain 
employment levels there were inevitably sections of the 
community who fell back on some form of charitable help - 
and not just the old, infirm, the sick and the orphaned.
- 340 -
It has been estimated that few actually realised the
potential earnings of a full year’s work. Even the
healthiest and most regular workers could expect to lose
a few days or weeks work through illness or temporary
underemployment in winter. ^  fortunate few might have
been able to afford subscriptions to a Friendly or other
(31)Benefit Society. Most fell back on the formal relief
measures of the Poor Law Union. However, private charity
had a vital role to play. It formed an integral part of
the relationship between the labourer and his social
superiors and was built not only on the landowner’s sense
of obligation but his understanding and intimate contact
(32)with the problems of his community.w  ' Charity was
distributed on a regular basis. The Clifton estate ran
a clothing scheme for the poor of Marton and, from 1832
onwards, £100 was allocated to a Christmas dole. Lady
Lilford made a Christmas distribution of clothing and
founded clothing clubs in the villages on the Bank Hall
estate.(33) Celebratory dates or the incidence of severe
recession also occasioned additional charitable gestures.
Sir Thomas Hesketh marked his son’s majority by distrib-
( 34)uting clothing among 549 poor men and women at Rufford.w  ' 
But, more importantly, the charity of the benevolent land­
owner provided a valuable safety net in times of acute 
hardship. Lord Lilford, for instance, funded relief 
organisations to distribute food and find work for the 
unemployed of Atherton in 1826, and the Clifton estate 
came to the assistance of fifty-three labouring families 
in Lytham after their potato crops had been ravaged by 
the blight in the spring of 1847.^5  ^However, deferential
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relationships were best cemented by a landowner’s atten­
tion to the predicament of individual families. Strictly 
speaking it was more of a matriarchal responsibility in 
that familiarity with individual needs usually fell within 
the province of the squire’s v/ife. It was these small 
gestures of benevolent concern which essentially created 
the ’sinews of attachment of a community to its lord” — 
the replacement of a labouring family’s cow, gifts of food 
to the sick, payment of medical bills, the grant of a 
pension for long service to the household or estate. It 
is surprising how long such traditions survived. Lady 
Clifton continued to make charitable bequests up to her 
death in 1892 although, by then, they had become substant­
ially reduced in scale.
The landowner’s material benevolence 
legitimised his right to exact subservience to his moral 
and political dictates at every social level. Standards 
of conduct were clear and, on the Clifton estate, enforced 
by both persuasive and coercive means. It is not difficult 
to imagine how the puritanical vigilance of the estate 
office gave way to feelings of social claustrophobia. 
Through the ballot box, at the work place, in the home or 
at leisure the community as a whole was expected to 
conform. The landowner himself may not always have been 
fully conversant with affairs on his estate but nothing 
seemed to escape the omniscience of his agent. James 
Fair, in particular, policed the Clifton estate with the 
same thoroughness with which he managed its business life. 
Whenever the position or expectations of the landowner
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came under threat the velvet glove quickly gave way to 
the iron hand. Innkeepers v/ho kept an unruly house came 
under censure, drink-associated pastimes such as cock- 
fighting were stamped out and labourers suspected of 
over-indulgence were threatened with the forfeiture of 
their wages unless they mended their ways,^^ But the 
full fury of the landowner’s punitive powers was reserved 
for those who offended against property rights. In their 
case appeals for clemency invariably fell on deaf ears 
and the full measure of the game laws was used against 
transgressors.
Rural philanthropy was at best an arbitrary 
and patchy affair, yet this was in part a result of the 
mechanism of social control. 7 Selectivity and dis­
criminatory practice were bound to follow. Two areas in 
which the landowner was heavily involved - education and 
housing - make this clear. The Cliftons1 charitable 
spending on schools, for instance, was totally in keeping 
with one of the strongest of Victorian obsessions, the 
belief that providing for the education of the poor was 
the panacea for all social ills.^^ This same theme 
pervaded farmers’ magazines and agricultural journals from 
the 1840s *to the 187Os. "Good" schools under socially 
reliable supervision,. so the argument went, would equip 
the poor with the moral strength to lift themselves out 
of their poverty. Furthermore, as that doyen of Victorian 
educationalists, Kay-Shuttleworth, never tired of saying, 
education taught the labourer "the nature of his domestic 
and social relations....his political position in society
and the moral and religious duties appropriate to it.,f^ ^  
Typically, by far the greater part of the Cliftons* 
charitable spending found its way into supporting not only 
schools on their own estate but Anglican establishments 
throughout the region. In 1871 gifts to numerous educ­
ational foundations absorbed c.75% of the Cliftons* total 
charitable donations. And they made every effort to see 
that their money did not go to waste by ensuring that the 
children of labouring families in Lytham attended school 
on a regular basis long before the introduction of compul­
sory schooling by law.^^^ This pattern of charitable 
priorities is repeated elsewhere. Schools in the Atherton 
and Warrington districts exhausted most of the funds in 
Lady Lilford1s charity. Similarly, provided a Sunday 
school in the village of Bretherton accounted for the 
lion’s share of Lilfordfs charitable spending on his Bank 
Hall estate. And, again, provision of this kind was 
symptomatic of social engineering. The established church 
needed the squire’s support "to withstand, if possible, 
those who have become dissenters who.....predominate in 
the parish.
Nothing on the Clifton estate evidenced the 
discriminatory nature of social controls more than the 
allocation of cottages. A limited housing stock together 
with the fact that the landowner owned all cottages on 
the estate conspired to give the squire a social lever he 
used to some effect. The supply of cottages always fell 
well short of demand particularly during the first three 
decades of the 19th century when the rural population
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. (44}
rose sharply. No doubt the operation of the Poor Law
was partly to blame. The fact that the landowners of the 
individual parish were held financially responsibility 
for their own poor until the Union Changeability Act of 
1867 must have actively discouraged cottage building. 
Admittedly, there is no substantive evidence of direct 
harrassment by Lancashire landowners to rid their estates 
of poor cottages in order to reduce their rates. Never­
theless, it is also clear that there was a positive 
reluctance to expand the housing provision on their prop­
erties. The '’open” village of Nateby, for instance, was 
said to have doubled its population "in face of demolit­
ions" in neighbouring townships. Hornby, by contrast, 
boasted cottages which were "large, substantial and in 
good repair" but were too few to accommodate the number 
of men and their families who worked on the estate. In 
1849 Thomas Cliftonfs agent evicted twenty-one families 
from their cottages in the Mythop and Commonside districts 
of Lytham. Perhaps the cottages were uninhabitable, or 
perhaps this was a deliberate attempt to reduce the poor 
rate. In either event very few of these families were 
immediately rehoused. Furthermore, the overcrowded, 
squalid conditions to be found in some of the "open" 
villages and market towns of the Fylde reflected the gross 
disparities in cottage accommodation which clearly existed 
between one township and the next. "Everywhere", a 
government report of 1865 concluded, "even here, is the 
same protestation that it is the want of cots that s«eds 
the hind to the abominable life of the towns. People do 
not desert the villages, villages nowadays desert the 
people.
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In time the gap between supply and demand 
narrowed but only very slowly. In part this came as a 
response to the mounting public concern about the 
inadequacy of rural housing as was evident in the reports 
of the Poor Law Commissioners and the agricultural organ­
isations of the day. In the interests of a healthier,
more upright and industrious working population, land­
owners were encouraged to make greater investment in 
labourers* cottages. Yet, apart from such philanthrop- 
ically inclined and well-endowed aristocratic figures as 
the Dukes of Bedford and Newcastle, landed families of 
more modest means could not afford to translate such high 
ideals into practice. Financially, cottages did not pay. 
They were comparatively expensive to build and there were 
narrow limits to the rent which a labouring family could 
be reasonably asked to pay. In the early Victorian years 
cottage rents ranged from between £2-10-0 and £3-15-0 in 
the northern parts of Lancashire to £5 p.a. in townships 
further south. By the 1870s rents had not changed
very much. On the Clifton estate in 1876 cottages fetched 
about £4 p.a. in the rural parishes and £5 in Lytham 
itself, which was in line with what was being generally
asked in most places on the Fylde and on Lord Lilford*s
(49)
estate in south Lancashire.
These rent levels represented a poor 
return on a landlord’s invrstment. It was estimated in 
1867 that a reasonable 6% return on an outlay of £125, 
the average price of one cottage, would have called for a 
rent of £7-10-0 p.a/50  ^ In fact, by the 1870s, the margin
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between building costs and current rent levels seems to
have been widening further. Cottages which met the
minimum standards of the Inclosure Commissioners were
said to cost £300 a pair. Other authorities put the cost
at nearer £400, and that was without any "ornamental 
(51)fancies". However, it was not unusual for the Vict­
orian pre-occupation with aesthetic frills to add
(52)additional costs.' * The price of each cottage incorp­
orating the ornate detail which Lady Clifton wanted ran
( 55)
out at over £360.' In view of the low rate of return
it is not altogether surprising that, by 1873, only about
2,500 cottages nationally had been built with loan capital
made available by the Inclosure Commissioners.New
cottages built on the Clifton estate showed a return of
little more than 1%, and not even that in the case of
Lady Clifton’s elaborate ventures. Moreover, cottage
building and renovation seldom took place at a pace which
was consistent with the needs of the labouring population.
For instance, applications for twenty new labourers*
cottages in Lytham were already oversubscribed before
building work even started in 1870. With cbbts piling up
year by year and investment in agricultural improvements
reaching new heights, cottage building was bound to figure
(5 5)
low down on the list of priorities. This stark real­
ity was confirmed in 1868 by the medical officer to the 
Fylde Sanitary Authority. He rarely closed a cottage even 
though it might have been unfit for habitation simply 
because "the chief landowners of the district are so back­
ward in provising new cottages when the old ones are 
demolished. "(56)
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The perennial shortage of adequate accomm­
odation strengthened the landowner*s powers of social 
control. To acquire a suitable cottage on the Clifton 
estate a labouring family had not only to be deserving, 
but also respectable. It was Lady Clifton who wielded 
control over the allocation of cottages. She made her own 
personal recommendations to the estate office and she set 
down precise conditions by which labourers were to be 
offered new cottages. They had to be in the employment of 
the estate or its tenant farmers. They had to give proof 
of need but, above all, they had to demonstrate that they 
"have lived and (were) living respectable lives."(57)
Deferential habits also shaped political 
allegiances in the rural communities. And, as long as 
their political role continued to matter to them, land­
owners were anxious to see that political loyalties were 
observed in their own localities. There is no evidence to 
suggest that political coercion was openly practiced, but 
no-one was left in any doubt as to how the landowner 
expected his local clientele to vote, and that in itself 
was pressure enough. Before 1832 it had virtually become 
a tradition that the Derby interest controlled one of 
Lancashire’s county seats. Even the suggestion that their 
seat might be challenged, as happened in 1818 and 1826, 
was met with both surprise and indignation.(58) The 
Reform Bill, however, increased the possibility of con­
tested elections and the possibility of serious political 
challenge. Yet the Act also persuaded political leaders 
like Lord Derby to look to reinforcing the deferential
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chains of allegiance. Closer attention was given to the
registration of votes and canvassing became more thoroughly
organised* Crucially the landed gentlemen were asked to
see that their influence was used to maximum effect within
their own localities.(59) Lord Lilford informed his
steward that he wanted to leave his tenants ’free as to
their votes.” At the same time, whenever his tenantry
were being canvassed - and this applied as much to railway
surveyors as it did to political candidates - they were
left in no doubt about the feelings of their landlord.
Surprisingly, Lord Sefton*s agent did not share his
employer^ politics yet this did not necessarily disqualify
him from carrying out his duties as the landownerfs
political agent. In the South Lancashire by-election of
1844 he faithfully promised ”not to intrude (his) opinion
on the tenants or express anything contrary to those well-
known to be entertained by (his) lordship." And when the
election was over he was able to report that every tenant
(61 )had voted according to Seftonfs wishes. ' Similarly, 
whilst the Cliftons continued to play an active role in 
Tory politics in their North Lancashire constituency they 
had no reservations about turning the powers of landed 
influence to their own political advantage. The name of 
every tenant eligible to vote found its way on to the 
Conservative voting lists. Those with suspect loyalties 
received the personal attention of the agent for good 
measure. Applicants for vacant farms had a positive advan­
tage if they had the right political credentials as well 
as farming ability. Moreover, James Fair was an import­
ant link in the chain of political command that reached
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dov/n from "the aristocratic leadership. He had no 
hesitation in reminding other landed notabled of their 
political obligations. For instance, in the contested 
election of 1868 he wrote to Lord Knowles stressing the 
need to take action against an industrialist from Calder 
Vale on the east Fylde who was suspected of "working to 
subvert the Barnacre tenantry" for the Liberal cause.
II
The landed order clung to its political privileges 
long after its pull on the social reins had begun to 
slacken. Deferential habits survived a good deal longer 
than has been suggested but, it is also apparent that 
changes in social attitudes were gradually taking place.
At the heart of this change lay the fact that, by the mid- 
Victorian period, the closely ordered dependent relation­
ship between landowner and local community was losing any 
relevance it might once have had. It was being eroded 
from a number of directions.
Firstly, it is clear that landed families 
were becoming less and less inclined to fill the role in 
rural society they had firmly occupied in the past. What 
Professor Perkin has referred to as an abdication of 
responsibility has a strong measure of turth in it. Filial 
obedience was insisted on whilst paternal protection was 
withdrawn. j^e many other labdowners John Talbot
Clifton and his successors were increasingly inclined to 
retire from the social as well as the business side of
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their a f f a i r s . T h e y  looked upon their estate as a 
convenience, a source of income rather than the corner­
stone of a particular social organism that was intrins­
ically worth preserving. In this respect they were the 
complete opposite of Thomas Clifton. He at least made 
the effort to live up to Broderick*s idealistic portrait 
of the hereditary landowner as one who, "thoroughly 
instructed in all the manifold duties of property.. .and 
conscious that a large body of tenants and dependents 
look to him for guidance and example, enters upon the 
management of his estate in a spirit altogether superior 
to commercial self-interest.gy contrast his heir 
came closer to the absentee landlords Cobbett described 
as "foreign in their manners, distant and haughty in their 
behaviour, looking to the soil only for its rents, view­
ing it as a mere object of speculation, unacquainted with 
its cultivators, despising them and their pursuits.
As soon as he inherited in 1851 John 
Talbot Clifton made it abundantly clear that he had little 
interest in the public duties that went with his new 
position. He immediately instructed his agent to scale 
down the costs of his own charitable subscriptions as far 
as was possible. It furthermore needed all the agent*s 
powers of persuasion to get Clifton to carry out the 
honorific functions that inevitable came the way of one 
of the county's major landowners. "As far as I am 
personally concerned", he told Fair in 1852, "I do not 
wish to be High Sheriff except I know it must come." He 
finally agreed on the condition that the expense would
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be kept down to £700 and "not one cent more".^®^ Apart 
from election times Cliftonfs visits to Lytham were rare* 
He became a stranger on his own estate, preferring to 
divide his time between a country retreat in Northamp­
tonshire, his London homes and the fashionable high-spots 
of the Mediterranean. But Clifton was not alone in 
wishing to distance himself from his ancestral base. The 
Heskeths, for instance, moved their family seat from 
Rufford Hall to Easton Neston in Northamptonshire. The 
same county was home for Lord Lilford as well. And the 
two branches of the Scarisbrick family resided on foreign 
soil in Spain and Germany respectively.^®®^
Clearly the landowner*s lack of personal 
contact with his estate was of some consequence. It was 
certainly a major source of concern to Clifton’s wife 
and agent who both took a sterner view of landed respons­
ibility. But there was little they could do to alter 
John Talbot’s ways. Instead they contrived to cultivate 
a totally erroneous impression of the landowner’s 
paternalistic involvement in the affairs of the community. 
For instance, they used the local press in an effort to 
correct rumour and gossip that the squire was putting an 
end to such traditions as the distribution of game during 
the shooting season. But John Talbot Clifton was a
lost cause and, therefore, more serious efforts went into 
grooming his heir, Thomas Henry, for his inheritance; 
but, with little more success. Thomas Henry took no more 
interest in the estate than his father. Nevertheless, 
his coming-of-age in 1866 signalled a campaign by Lady
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Clifton and Thomas Fair to school him in the obligations
of landownership. He needed to act and be seen to be
acting in a socially worthwhile capacity.^7°) Yet all to
no avail. He showed no enthusiasm over his election to
the Royal Agricultural Society. He declined to give more
than the bare minimum to local charities because, as he
told Fair, "I am so little at Lytham that I cannot feel
the same interest." Not even the management of shooting
arrangements on the estate held any appeal. Moreover, he
side-stepped public duties in the same deliberate manner
as his father and so his appointment to the magistracy
( 71)was as decorative as it was unwanted.v' 7 Wearily Lady 
Clifton struggled to repair the damage to the family’s 
public image. She tried to restrain the highly public­
ized extravagance of her husband and grandson and she 
tried to correct Thomas Henry’s myopic view of landed 
privilege. For she was clearly aware of the social 
implications. "I fear in these radical days", she 
lamented, "that from one thing to another matters will 
be arranged and the Squire and his son will be for­
gotten."^72  ^ Her warning proved correct. There was no 
shortage of middle-class philanthropists ready to step 
into the breach. "Considering the number of charitable 
people in Lytham", she wrote, "the poor are really looked 
after.»^73>
Irrespective of personal idiosyncrasies, 
the economic climate of the mid and late Victorian period 
was bound to undermine the level of dependence which had 
characterised social relationships in Thomas Clifton’s day.
- 353 -
Charitable intervention, so much the tangible part of 
a landowner’s relationship with the broad base of labour­
ing families, was no longer called for to the same extent 
as it once was* The decision on the Clifton estate to 
cut back on charitable spending seemed to be socially 
justifiable. For, as Lady Clifton pointed out in 1876 
when reductions were made in the clothing lists, "cert­
ainly times are very different to what they were when the 
first gifts were bestowed.
Comparatively speaking the labourer’s lot
improved substantially during the second half of the 19th
century. He was more fully employed, better paid, better
housed and better fed. In a large measure, the real
improvement in the living standards of the Lancashire
labourer can be linked to structural changes in the labour
market. In contrast to the first half of the century the
third quarter saw an expansion in the demand for agricult-
( 7*5}ural labour which outstripped supply. ' The steady 
outflow of migrants had the effect of draining off the 
labour surplus which had formerly existed. Given the 
accessibility of wider employment opportunities in the 
region’s industrial towns, the rural exodus in Lancashire 
was predictably more pSrnounced than in any other part of 
the country. Compared with a drop of about 1796 in the 
national agricultural labour force between 1861 and 1871, 
the number of farm workers in Lancashire declined by 
26^ 96 over the same period, and by a further 2896 between 
1871 and 1901. For those who remained* on the land
their position was strengthened by the fact that, as the
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"total agricultural labour force contracted, there was no 
proportional decrease in the demand for labour. In fact, 
just as the labour requirements in the industrial and 
manufacturing sectors continued to swell, agriculture 
was also generating a growing demand for labour. 
Agricultural improvements, which so strongly character- 
sed Lancashire farming after 1850, had little to do with 
mechanisation. In themselves such improvement schemes 
as drainage, building work, road making, hedging, seeding 
and manuring were labour intensive. Moreover, the shift 
towards a husbandry system which coupled increased dairy 
production with supportive fodder-crop cultivation 
intensified the demand for regular labour rather than 
reduced it. The labourer benefited in several ways.
Apart from the occasions when exceptionally bad weather 
or an outbreak of animal disease intervened, in general, 
he could look forward to full employment without the same 
marked seasonal trends.' ' Furthermore, he also enjoyed 
a significant improvement in earnings. Of course, agric­
ultural labourers in the northern counties had long earned 
considerably more than their counterparts in the isolated 
rural areas of the south and east. Industrial wage rates 
had the effect of pulling up agricultural earnings above 
the national average. Understandably, in Lancashire, the 
highest wages were to be found in the districts closest 
to the industrial cities. However, the influence of 
commerce and industry reached out into even the most remote 
rural areas, so that agricultural earnings were remarkably 
uniform throughout the county. Allowing for local grad­
uations 12/- to 15/- per week in the 1830s was as
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commonplace in the far reaches of north Lancashire as
it was in the industrial heartland of the south. But
it was not until the second half of the century that the
growing labour demands of both industry and agriculture
combined to push up wage rates sharply. Average wage
rates in Lancashire in 1850 were barely above the level
of 1800 - roughly 13/6 per week. By 1882, 18/- per week
was not an uncommon wage throughout the county. When
payments In kind and harvest work are taken into account,
average weekly earnings range between 19/- and 20/- per
week by the 1900s. And, judging from the complaints among
local firmers, the late 19th century depression had little
(81)effect on wage levels.' J
Furthermore, the labouring family was
better off in real as well as cash terms. Cottage rents
in the 1890s were scar/cely higher than they had been in
mid-century. Substantial three bedroomed cottages on
Lord Derby’s Inskip estate cost c.1/9d per week in 1894.
In Upper Rawcliffe, also on the Fylde, 1/1 Od per week was
the average rent. But these were at the top end of the
scale. Cottages were available on the Clifton, Hornby,
Winmarleigh, Lilford and Garnett estates from as little
as 1/1d. per week which compares favourably with a range
( 82}of 1/0d. to 1/6d. over the whole county in 1867.' ' In
addition, not only had the labourer’s diet substantially 
improved by the end of the century, but in Lancashire, 
food accounted for a smaller proportion of a worker’s 
earnings than anywhere else. Moreover, the price of most 
commodities - clothing, furniture, fuel as well as food -
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fell in real terms between 1850 and 1900.
Changes in the labour market and a real 
improvement in living standards made the agricultural 
labourer a more independent figure, but there is no hard 
evidence to suggest that a new found sense of status and 
independence gave way to feelings of class identity and 
i n t e r e s t . T h e  structure of agricultural employment, 
Lancashire’s comparative prosperity and the safety Valve 
of access to alternative sources of work are factors which 
largely explain why social change could take place without 
the trauma and antagonism which seems to have character­
ised relationships within rural communities elsewhere. 
Indeed, Wilson-Fox’s comparative study for the Royal 
Commission on Labour in 1894 drew a sharp distinction 
between the social climates of the north-western and East 
Anglian counties. In the latter he pointed to a hardened 
commercialism governing employer-employee relationships 
and noted how nthe familiar and quasi-patriarchial terms 
on which farmers used to live with their men are fast 
giving way to mere contractual r e l a t i o n s . A n d ,  
whereas early trades unionism took root among East Anglian 
workers, there is no evidence for similar labout organ­
isation in' Lancashire or other northern c o u nties.At 
a basic level Lancashire labourers had little need for 
unionism. Those hired on both a short and long-term basis 
enjoyed regular work and much improved rates of pay. 
Moreover, hiring arrangements militated against notions of 
separateness. Large farms employing a large outside 
labour force were rare. Instead, small farms operated
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chiefly by family labour and the occasional hired hand 
were more typical* And there was probably a good deal of 
truth in the assertion that a very narrow social distinct­
ion separated the small farmer from the man he hired. 
Moreover, the still deep-rooted tradition of Hin-service” 
employment whereby many unmarried labourers lived under 
the same roof as their employers made for closer working 
relationships and a blurring of distinctions.
But this is not to imply that no social
change at all was talking place. Labourers expressed their
sense of enhanced status and greater independence in a
variety of ways. Some did so in the manner they had
always done, namely through migration. Greater mobility
and a more certain knowledge of opportunities beyond the
confines of the parish continued to uproot the young and
the casual worker attracted by the prospect of higher
wages, by a ”more ambitious and sociable life in the
towns” and by ”more lesiure (time) in the mining districts,
(qq)
quarries and other works.Labourers did not even 
need to look as far as the industrial towns to find 
alternatives to agricultural employment. There were, 
firstly, short-term influences on the local labour market.
In mid-century railway construction on the Fylde created 
a severe shortage of labour, particularly at harvest time, 
which could only be filled by recruiting Irish immigrants'89  ^
Similarly, building the new town of Fleetwood drew heavily
( qq)on labour from adjacent rural parishes.Moreover, 
local employment opportunities tended to widen through­
out the century. For instance, manufacturing concerns in
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Garstang and in villages along "the east Fylde, the salt 
works at Preesall, the coastal resorts, various quarries 
and turf—cutting businesses and the Thirlmere water scheme, 
all competed for native rural labour by offering potent­
ially higher earnings.^"0
However, even the labourer who remained on
the land had greater control over his own future and that
of his family. His increased earnings made it possible 
for his wife and children to withdraw from field work. The
vast majority of married men by the 1890s now belonged to
a wide description of local benefit societies - Oddfellows, 
Foresters, Catholic Brethren and the like.(92) But, self- 
help extended further than subscribing to a benefit society. 
Improved earnings made nthree acres and cow” a more real­
istic proposition for the individual wanting to graduate 
into the swelling ranks of the small tenant farmer. There 
were many examples of drainers and day-labourers invest­
ing part of their weekly earnings in a lease on a few 
acres on which to keep their own cattle. Landowners and 
agents themselves favoured a system of promotion into 
farm vacancies from among this group, and the sheer number 
of small f.arms made it possible for the frugal, hard­
working labourer to better himself. Certainly evidence 
from the Clifton estate suggests considerable upward 
mobility by labouring men as vacancies appeared among the 
broad base of small farms.^3) Opportunities of this kind 
passed by the great majority of workers; but they demon­
strated a growing awareness of their own rights vis-a-vis
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other labouring groups as was reflected in demands for 
shorter working hours, longer holidays, a reduction in 
Saturday work and parity in conditions with miners and 
other industrial workers. With some justification, then, 
contemporaries themselves spoke of the greater "independ­
ence” of the agricultural labourer. Yet "independence” 
was no longer used as a term of reproach and suspicion.
It expressed a widely accepted view that labourers had 
the right to be "treated according to the more advanced 
ideas of the day, which have not only influenced their 
class, but all classes alike throughout society.
Moving up the social order, how far land­
lord tenant relationships changed under the weight of 
new ideas, new legislation and the. pressures of economic 
change is difficult to assess. Much has been written on 
the significance of tenant-right in focusing conflict 
between landowners and tenant farmers. For McQuiston the 
struggle over compulsory compensation for farmers* improve 
ments destroyed deferential habits and signified the
eruption of a social revolution that had never been far
(95)below the surface of Victorian rural England, w  y Newby, 
drawing largely from the body of conventional interpret­
ation, saw land reform as the "burning issue" of the 
1890s, the climax of efforts on the part of tenant farmers 
to assert their economic and political independence.
It is clear that the deepening agricultural 
recession during the last two decades of the 19th century 
was a testing time for the tenant farmer in Lancashire not
f
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just financially but also in his relations with his 
landlord. Of course, no-one seriously disputes the view 
that Lancashire farmers came off better than their 
counterparts in the predominantly cereal growing areas 
of the south and east.^^ At the same time, farmers 
simply did not use such comparisons as a yardstick with 
which to measure their own predicament. If farmers in 
the 1890s drew any comparisons at all it was with the 
"money-making" period of the 1860s and 70s, years of high 
investment, high returns and "expensive habits.
Admittedly, the first years of the 
depression made little impact except on the strongly 
arable districts in the south-east of the county. Apart 
from the steep but temporary fall in butter prices in 
1879, generally dairy prices held up and farmers and land­
owners alike spoke of the passing effects of bad weather
and poor trade rather than in terms of deep-seated
(go)
economic problems.However, farming confidence must 
have been shaken by the trade recession of 1883-6 which 
brought a drop in the price of both stock and arable 
produce. More serious, though, was the drop in the whole­
sale and retail price of milk, the mainstay of Lancashire *s 
dairy industry. No sooner had milk prices made a
hesitant recovery after 1886 than they were pushed down 
again by the far more serious depression of 1892-4.
Arable production in particular was badly hit. Wheat, 
which had been bringing 38/- a quarter at the Lancaster 
market in 1880 was being sold for just 15/t a quarter in 
1894. The price of oat-meal dropped by more than a third
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over the same period. In 1894 potatoes were worth only 
a quarter of their 1880 value. Meat and dairy produce 
did not fare much better. Besides milk, the value of 
store cattle fell away by a third between 1891 and 1894 
and sheep for breeding and fattening were down by 5/- to 
15/- a head in the space of twelve months.
In marked contrast to past prosperity such 
sharp and sudden reversals in fortunes were bound to 
create a sense of unease and uncertainty among fanners. 
Exaggerated or not, feelings were coloured by reflect­
ions on better days and by what farmers read and heard 
rather than by the cold evidence presented to the Royal 
Commission. The reality of the depression was in the 
"mind*s eye" of the f a r m e r . H i s  views would have 
been influenced by reports from the Blackburn district 
where farmers complained of having milk left on their 
hands. Farmers on the larger holdings grumbled that they 
"had made nothing over the past two or three years". In 
Tarleton and Hesketh Bank some were said to be losing 
£100 a year and most had exhausted their capital.
Moreover, claims that rents were "fairly well paid" and 
that no wholesale changes in tenancieshad taken place can 
be misleading. Even Wilson-Fox, in his report to the 
Royal Commission, admitted that "punctual payment is no 
actual proof of the farmer*s position being a satisfactory 
one."^10^  One farmer put it another way. "It is only 
natural", he remarked, "that farmers will say that they 
are getting on, for if they didn*t they would soon have 
their creditors down on them."^105  ^ Many farmers, it was
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thought, might well have given up their farms but for 
the fact that all their capital was tied up in the land 
and the costs of claiming compensation from their land­
lords for the improvements they themselves had carried 
out would be prohibitive* On balance there was perhaps 
no alternative but to hang on.^0^
Cumulative experiences of this kind were 
bound to have an effect on landlord-tenant relationships. 
Yet to what extent did anxieties and resentments give 
way to support for measures aimed at a radical overhaul 
of the existing land system? To go further, did the 
deepening recession pose a real threat to the time- 
honoured political and social bonds between landowners 
and tenant fanners?^^7) interestingly, organisations 
whose primary objective was to expand the proprietory 
rights of tenant farmers made their presence felt in 
Lancashire. The Farmers1 Alliance, for instance, the 
spear-head of a movement to reinforce tenants* claims to 
compensation for their own improvements, put in a brief 
appearance in 1880.^^^ Similarly, the depression of 
the 1890s gave rise to further pressure groups - the 
Lancashire Farmers Association and the Lancashire Assoc­
iation of Tenant Farmers. The latter in particular 
resurrected the slogans of the earlier Alliance. It 
called for a united farmers’ combination against land­
lords and Parliament as the most effective way of secur­
ing the t3F8n - fair rents, fixity of tenure and the full 
value of improvements. It mounted a vociferous campaign
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against the level of rents in the county, but its major 
line of attack was reserved for the Agricultural Holdings 
Act of 1883 which, it was claimed, gave special, advantage 
to the incoming tenant and the landlord in the matter 
of valuing improvements. ^
However, it is doubtful whether the reform 
proposals of the Tenant Fanners Association had much wide­
spread appeal. The strength of its support was exagger­
ated by the Liberal press, its leadership had close 
connections with local radicals and, therefore, criticism 
of the existing tenurial system tended to be mounted by 
those with a political interest in land reform. By itself 
land reform had virtually no practical relevance to the 
real problems faced by Lancashire farmers. There was 
strong opposition to the idea of institutional interfer­
ence in rent fixing by way of a land court. Even the 
farmers’ associations were divided on this issue.(^0) 
Equally, it was almost unanimously held that the Agric­
ultural Holdings Act was of little value. Apart from 
the Devonshire estate, where the agent kept an annual 
record of tenants’ outlays, it was unusual for landlords 
and tenants to take out any written agreements regarding 
compensation for improvements. Admittedly, the costs of 
taking a claim to arbitration and the fear of a land­
lord’s counterclaims for dilapidations weighed against a 
tenant resorting to the 1883 Act. But, on most estates, 
it was the landowner rather than the tenant who had 
carried the expense of such major improvement works as 
drainage and buildings. Moreover, to pursue the issue of
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land reform "too fiercely ran "the risk of undermining 
the landowner’s willingness to finance further improve­
ments.^^ ^
The root cause of farmers’ problems was
foreign competition coupled with poor seasons. Their
most common complaint was the lack of tariff protection,
not the lack of clearer and legally enforceable propriet- 
(112)ory rights. There were calls for land reform but
usually from individuals on the smaller properties near 
the towns. Similar demands might also be heard on the 
larger estates where there had been a recent change in 
ownership, where the landlord was an institutional body 
or where there had been a past history of neglect.
Here, added feelings of insecurity made the lack of 
compensation and tenant right a real issue. Elsewhere, 
tenants1 claims to having confidence in their landlords 
have some substance. On the ancestral estates, in 
particular, various factors combined to insulate relat­
ionships against severe strain - the degree of personal 
contact between landowner and tenant, the relatively 
undisturbed pattern of farms passing from one generation 
to the next and the readiness of the landowner, albeit 
on a diminishing scale, to allow arrears and abatements 
in rent and maintain a certain level of investment. So, 
with some justification, one Lytham farmer felt able to
point out that "a good farmer has got fixity of tenure
(114)as long as he wants to stay."'
However, this is not to suggest that the 
economic climate of the late 19th century did not bring
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changes* Even so, change did not involve a wedge being 
driven between landlord and tenant over the issue of 
tenant right* Rather it took the form of a clearer sep­
aration of business roles. The estate’s managerial 
controls were now something of the past. New market 
conditions made the tenant farmer a much more independ­
ent figure, fully in command of his own affairs. He was 
in a much stronger bargaining position with respect to
the rent he paid and the conditions under which he 
(11farmed.'1 He held his farm on an annual lease and,
generally, he was free from cropping and marketing 
restrictions even on the large estates. The successful 
farmer of the 1890s paid his rent on the basis of his 
ability to recognise shifts in the market, to make the 
best use of the natural attributes of his land, and to 
turn his farming into a finely-tuned commercial operat­
ion. in effect, the fanning interest had replaced
the landed interest as the mainstay of rural society and 
economy.
Ill
On a broader social and administrative 
level changes were taking place which reflected the eclipse 
of landed influence and privilege at the local level.
Even what was understood by the notion of ”county society” 
had taken on a wider dimension by the turn of the century. 
For men of Thomas Clifton’s generation it had meant a 
cohesive, closely-knit group of families. .It had meant 
authority of an inherited kind which, with all its
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attendant rights and obligations, had permeated social 
and administrative life at both a local and regional 
level. This concept, however, was gradually losing its 
relevance in a number of ways.
As a term of social reference "county* was 
taking on a wider meaning. Any cursory glance at the lists 
of what observers in the late 19th and early 20th cent­
uries regarded as "county families" will confirm that 
"county" as a label of social status embraced not only 
the owners of established estates but individuals drawn 
from a wide spectrum of backgrounds. The criteria by 
which Walford in 1874 and Bateman, using the 1873 Survey 
of Landownership, compiled their elite groups are far 
from being explicit, "Great Landowners", the title of 
Bateman’s magnum opus, is in itself misleading. By his
own definition his aristocracy would include men of great
(117)wealth owning comparatively few acres. 7 Walford’s 
"County Families" is just as c o n f u s i n g . 431 indiv­
iduals merited inclusion in his 1874 lists for Lancashire. 
The peerage and baronage head the lists by virtue of 
their titled rank but the enormous tail is an assorted, 
randomly arranged collection of established landed 
families vastly outnumbered by the "new gentry" with dist­
inctly professional, commercial and industrial backgrounds. 
In other words, there are blurred edges to both Bateman’s 
and Walford»s social elites; but perhaps that says some­
thing in itself.
t
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W.T. PikeTs biographical lists, published 
in his "New Century” series, probably provide a more use­
ful in ight into changes in contemporary notions of 
status than either of the previous two sources*Again 
it impresses by the sheer weight of numbers of contains 
and the varied backgrounds of individuals included. Yet 
Pikefs social yardstick is somewhat clearer. His is more 
of a meritocracy. Not only did he include men of obvious 
wealth but essentially those who had made a contribution 
to the civic life of the county as local or county coun­
cillors, magistrates, M.P.s or holders of honorific 
posts. In his significantly titled sections, "Nobility, 
Gentry and Magistrates", only seven of the older landed 
families qualified for a place, Thomas Fair, a J.P. since 
1875 and one of the first members of Lancashire County 
Council, get*a mention; the Clifton family do not. Nor, 
for that matter, did other landed notables of the past 
including the Heskeths of Rufford and the Earls of Derby, 
Sefton and Lilford. Their places were filled by a 
numerically larger and socially more active elite; men 
like Thomas Brooks whose wealth was based on the Rossen- 
dale textile industry. After his appointment to the 
Magistracy, he became a deputy-lieutenant of the county, 
received a baronetcy in 1891 and was finally elevated to 
the rank of Earl of Crawford in 1895; or Frederick 
Baynes who shared the same business background and urban 
roots and who served as a magistrate and mayor of Black­




There was also a spatial dimension to this 
social shift. Geographical as well as social mobility 
transformed, even enhanced, patterns of "country living". 
Yet movement by the nouveaux riches did not take the 
form of acquiring great estates in the fashion of the 
Jacsons of Barton Hall, the Garnetts of Quernmore or the 
Millers of Singleton Hall earlier on in the century. There 
were one or two notable exceptions; William Foster, for 
instance, whose family owned woollen mills in the West 
Riding, bought Hornby Castle and its 10,841 acre estate; 
and Perceval Mayhew, with directorships in numerous Wigan- 
based manufacturing and insurance companies, purchased 
Duxbury Park and Anglezark and Heapey moors. But many 
preferred to establish themselves in the rapidly expand­
ing urban outposts of Southport, Lytham-St.Annes and 
Grange-pver-Sands, or transform former market towns,such 
as Poulton-le-Fylde, into middle-class retreats. Other 
"pseudo Gentry" acted out a more conventional role by 
buying or building mansions amidst rural surroundings. In 
this sense there is continuity of a kind. At the same 
time few now felt under the same social compulsion to 
equip their new found status with the full trappings of 
a landed estate. For most it was enough to buy land 
sufficient to lend an appearance of social exclusivity.
The more remote areas of north Lancashire, 
once the heartland of the county*s old landed elite, seemed 
to be especially attractive to a wave of new settlers. 
Typical were Sir John Hibbert who had a long and dist­
inguished record as Liberal M.P. for Oldham and as a
Privy Councillor. He served as the County Council’s first 
chairman and retired to the large and imposing mansion of 
Hampsfield House, near Grange; Captain J.R. Prescott,
J.P., who inherited Dalton Grange which was built by his 
father, a Liverpool businessman, in 1856; B.B. Gardner, 
J.P., also from a Liverpool background, who purchased 
Aldringham Hall, Ulverston; Captain Peter Ormrod, the 
founder of a large fishery company, who acquired Wyres- 
dale Hall, Scorton. These were just a few among many. 
Moreover, some aped the leisure pursuits of the old order 
by becoming masters of local hunts. Still more took on 
charitable responsibilities which were often greater than 
those of the old established families - as trustees and 
patrons of hospitals, schools for the blind, new churches, 
village halls and as administrators of established 
charities.^ The overall impression of "county society" 
by the beginning of the 20th century was that it no longer 
reflected the traditions and privileges of a narrow landed 
elite. The old and well-worn pattern of gradual absorpt­
ion into the existing landed order had given way to the 
general acceptance of new social leaders who not only 
diluted the ranks of landed society, but actually gave a 
new and heightened expression to the meaning of "county" 
values and traditions.
The social submergence of the old landed 
elite was accompanied by an eclipse of their former 
political and administrative omnipotency. They relin­
quished political controls as their territorial influence 
contracted. The increasingly urbanised character of what
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were once rural divisions and the redrawing of 
constituency boundaries in favour of urban interests, 
substantially undermined the political role of the old 
landowning families in the belt of county divisions extend­
ing from north Lonsdale down to the west Lancashire plain 
to Liverpool* The break-up of many estates no doubt 
accelerated this trend. Some landed influence persisted 
as it had done in the past. For instance, it was felt 
that Arthur Stanley1s electoral success in Ormskirk in 
1905 was in part due to the town’s connections with Lord 
Derby. Yet there is no evidence that pressure of any 
kind was used, that tenants were canvassed by land agents 
and political pledges extracted as had once been the case. 
Tradition, common interests, indeed conviction, informed 
voting habits rather than the landlord’s sanctions. In 
fact Lord Derby was at pains to disclaim any powers of 
influence, and Liberals canvassed openly in former Tory 
enclaves. Similarly, events in Rufford in 1906 clearly 
indicated a change in the times. Not only was it "found 
possible to have a Liberal meeting there" but "it was 
found possible to fill it up". Interestingly, the only 
figure from an established landed family to enjoy any 
continued political success was the Liberal Lord Cavendish 
in North Lonsdale. By contrast, Conservative party
organisations in the rural divisions of the county pref-
(122)erred to bring in political carpetbaggers.
Administrative change at the level of local
* ,
and regional government further diminished and relevance 
of landed power. Traditional functions and responsibilities
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were gradually absorbed by institutional organisations 
established on a broad territorial basis - the police 
districts, poor law unions and rural sanitary authorities. 
Admittedly, their power was more apparent than real. The 
poor law unions for instance, became particularly 
enfeebled. The elected boards overseeing rural areas 
were heavily representative of the farming body and they 
were as interested as their landlords in checking govern­
mental interference and minimizing the rateable burden.
The Fylde Union was probably typical of many. In its 
responsibility for standards of health in the district 
it was as ineffectual as it was dilatory. Its adoptive 
powers were limited, its supervisory practices inadequate 
and its officials incompetent and, in some cases, corrupt. 
By and large it contented itself with matters of a 
general and undemanding nature, setting up registration, 
medical and relief districts, appointments and workhouse 
inspections.Nevertheless, regardless of their 
practical impact, the intrusion of institutional bodies 
was resented. They were seen as the deadhand of central­
ised controls. ^  Accordingly it was the Poor Law 
Commissioners themselves who were especially singled out 
for attack. The leader-writer of the Preston Guardian 
probably expressed widespread feeling when he described 
the Commissioners, in 1848, as a "repository of power, 
despotic, vexatious, ridiculous and repugnant to the 
English character.
James Fair felt much the saifte way about 
the Police Act of 1839; but he had even less patience for
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the poor law unions. "Arbitrary, expensive and meddle­
some", was how he described them to Thomas Clifton/126^
The rural sanitary authorities, established in 1874, at 
first suggested little in the way of improvement on the 
deficiencies of the poor law unions. There was too much 
of an overlap in personnel and they had limited power in 
enforcing acceptable sanitary conditions. Yet, in time, 
new men detached from the vested interests of farmers, 
landowners and agents made their influence felt in their 
insistence on professional standards and the adoption of 
available powers of compulsion. This, for instance was 
strongly apparent in the Fylde where an urban presence was 
becoming increasingly more marked. Here the authority 
busied it producing a series of bye-laws to deal firstly 
with the effective removal of health hazards and later 
with building standards. It was one of the first rural 
authorities to adopt the Housing of the Working Classes
Act of 1890 which introduced compulsory powers to close
(127}buildings deemed unfit for habitation.v ' In what was 
a more effective role the sanitary authority exposed the 
glaring inadequacies in existing housing provision. Basic 
shelter and a clean well no longer satisfied. By 1878 
the Medical Officer was able to report that virtually every 
cottage in the Fylde area was provided with "proper closet 
accommodation", where previously such basic provision had 
been exceptional. Landowners like the Derbys, Cliftons 
and Hornbys now found themselves being harried to bring 
property on their estates up to the required standards.
To someone like Thomas Fair, brought up in the tradition
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of enjoying full authority over his masterfs domain, the 
new instruments of local government were regarded in 
much the same way as his father viewed the poor law unions. 
He complied with instructions to repair cottages, attend 
to defective drains and clear out cesspits hut not with­
out giving vent to his own feelings about what he regarded 
as "unwarranted interference in private matters.
It might be thought, not unreasonably, that 
elective bodies such as the Guardians and Sanitary Author­
ities smoothed the way for the sweeping changes which 
took place in local government from 1888 onwards. In 
other words, the landed order was already accustomed to 
the notion of shared responsibility, at least. This may 
have been the case, but it is difficult to escape from 
the conclusion that the setting up of County Councils in 
1888/9 marked something of a watershed, in that a radical 
shift now took place in the direction of statutory auth­
ority. Clearly landed control over the central adminis­
trative affairs of the county was irretrievably lost. 
Lancashirefs first County Council still drew represent­
atives from the old hierarchy but in a largely honorific 
capacity. Five aldermen came from established landed 
families Assheton, Fitzherbert-Brockholes, Garnett,
Hulton and Starkie. By 1910 their number had been reduced 
to three, and the aldermanry was a decorative role much 
in the same way as the old order had supplied High Sheriffs 
and Deputy-Lieutenants of the county. Real authority had 
passed into other h a n d s . B u t  the setting up of local 
district and parish councils by 1894 probably came as an
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even greater psychological blow. They threatened to 
snap the remaining ties of assumed, inherited authority, 
”Hitherto matters had been greatly influenced by the squire 
and the parson”, Thomas Fair complained with all the 
social prejudices of his class, ”If parish councils were 
elected instead of having leading men on them they would 
be presided over by some liberal shoe-maker surrounded by 
all the pot-house ruffians.
Yet Fair's remarks were an echo of a 
quickly receding past. The old landed elite was already 
a spent force. The Cliftons themselves were in full 
retreat. Their own eclipse by the end of the century was 
partly inescapable and partly self-inflicted. They were 
besieged by new social and economic realities which 
invited abdication of responsibility. They gave way to a 
colder, harsher world in which the traditions and values 
of the country gentleman were fast becoming redundant 
emotions and in which financial survival was of sole, 
paramount concern. And so the increasingly fragile image 
of a great landed elite, built upon a once deep-rooted 
sense of rights, obligations and privilege, was ultimately 
shattered.. ”We live in different times”, Thomas Fair 
remarked to his son in 1892. ”We must adapt with them 
or we shall be nothing.”^ ^  His words held a prophetic 
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APPENDIX I
EXTRACTS FROM 19TH CENTURY FARM LEASES ON THE CLIFTON E5TATS
A farm in Marton, October 184Q Term 9 years
"The 'best ground1 formerly in three parts namely Gt. Field,
Nearer Field and part of West Ground, now wheat stubble to be 
set over with manure and moss cropping in the Spring of 1841 
and to be ploughed early the same Autumn, the following Spring 
to be fallowed and sown with barley and seeds for a pasture*
The Little Low Hey to be set over in the Spring of 18^2 with 
manure and moss cropping. Mr. Clifton (the landowner) making 
no charge for the latter. The Whittham Hills, now an oat 
stubble, to be cleaned and laid down for a meadow. The Great 
Holm to be cleaned and laid down for pasture. The Old Meadow 
may be broken up when more land is laid down. The moss ground 
to be green cropped and oats taken for fodder. Few oats should 
be grown in other parts of the farm. Quantity in tonnage not 
to exceed one-third. The Out-Whittam Hills to be drained with 
sods and tiles. The fences to be improved and new gates wanted 
- a milk house is required."
James Cartwell, Marton 1840 Term 9 years. Vl Acres
"Not to have more than 18 acres under the plough in any one year.
To marl yearly two acres during the term, to have two roods of 
common yellow turnips, two roods of swedes, and not less than 
one rood of white globe turnips....and what potatoes he chooses 
to grow after the other green crops are properly manured and 
meadows attended to. Not to take two white crops in succession 
except it be barley with seed, well manured after a clean wheat 
stubble and then to be pastured two years at least."
Robert Johnston, Clifton, Feb. 18^5. Term 19 years
Penalties for breach of farming covenants:
£5 per acre illegally ploughed and sown.
£1 per ton of compost and manure not used and required to be 
in the Agreement.
Landlord to put buildings in good repair at the beginning of the term.
Lessee to see to the maintenance thereafter.
Materials and labour to be provided by the landlord for boundary fencing
and for making of new fields.
The tenant "shall labour, manure and cultivate the said lands in regular
order and in a uniforraally good husbandlike and approved manner":
t
'Never to p e r m i t  the o r c h a r d  g a r d e n s  a n d  p l a n t a t i o n s  to be 
paotured w i t h  cattle n o r  to t a k e  two successive white c t o d s  
from any part of the said lands a n d ,  i n  n o  case, to sow 
wheat out after summer fallow or green c r o p  both fully 
manured, and no grain to be taken after beans except that 
they snail have been fully manured, drilled and thoroughly 
cleaned; and, during the first fifteen years of the said 
term, to have in each year in regular order and in entire 
fields at least one fifth part of the s a i d  lands in grass, 
which shall have been sown after naked fallow or fallow 
crop well dunged, and during the last four years of the said 
term, to have in each year in regular order and in entire 
fields at least two-thirds of the said lands in grass."
During these last four years the tenant was required:
"To sow nine pounds of red clover and six pounds of white 
clover seeds and one furloe of the grass seed on each acre 
of the lands which may be in crop in the second last year 
of the term."
The tenant was required to use all turnips, potatoes, hay, straw and chaff
on the farm. All compost and dung to be spread on the lands.
In the last year of the term fifteen tons of manure per acre were used where
green crops had been grown and ten tons for naked fallow.
Richard Kirkham, Westby 18^7« Term 1*f Years. 78 Acres
"To keep a suficient stock of cattle upon the premises.. .and 
therewith eating up and consuming all the hay, straw and fodder 
(and) in case any straw shall be taken therefrom, for every ton 
so taken (to bring) upon the same premises in the same year at 
least two tons of horse or cow dung.
Not more than 26 acres to be under the plough. No more than 1 
crop of corn to be reaped in succession....which shall have been 
marled and broken up without a green crop or summer fallow 
intervening; nor cut or mow any clover or grass twice in the 
same year, nor use any top dressing of soot, nor break up any 
old meadow lands, nor lay down any land to remain as meadow or 
pasture but shall be sown with white clover, cow grass, cocks­
foot, trefoil and perennial rye grass."
Thomas Clifton would provide all materials for
"A good and substantial barn, stable for four horses, and sufficient 
shippon for fourteen cows tenant to provide carting and labour."
R. Dingle, Clifton-W-Salwick, 1852
"All draining to be done by Mr. Clifton charging 3% on the outlay 
except the two grass fields lying up to and on the west side of 
a young plantation which shall be done entirely at Mr. Clifton's 
expense.....Mr. Clifton to give the tenant guano for the same 
equal to cwt per customary acre. Mr. Clifton'js usual conditions 
of husbandry to be complied with. New buildings to be put up at 
Mr. Clifton's expense, the tenant carting the materials."
APPENDIX II
LANDOWNERS' INVESTMENT IN REPAIRS AND IMPROVEMENTS : THE CLIFTON ESTATE
Interest on Government 
& Land Improvement Co. Buildings Drainage
Plantations Roads Total
loans 8e Fences
£ £ £ £ £ £
1863 1140 3832 554 726 163 6458
1864 11 **0 to98 444 824 182 6688
1865 u t o 3272 476 876 226 5990
1866 1lto 4352 340 859 191 6882
1867 u t o 3322 247 301 176 5586
1868 11 to to8? 292 884 207 6810
1869 u t o 4119 286 893 183 6621
1870 722 8496 690 735 165 10,808
1871 722 7024 558 920 191 9415
1872 722 44-12 344 935 568 6981
1873 722 4621 611 1014 266 7134
1874 722 5044 1343 816 374 8299
1875 722 4300 897 799 290
7008
1876 722 4142 1490 1076 376 7806
1877 722 4951 1413 685 307
8078
1878 722 4796 894 969 314 7781
1879 722 2652 1030 883 312 5709
1880 722 3614 927 861 290 6847
1881 360 3762 1290 900 296 7093
1882 560 5703 1435 954 454 9595
NOTES
1) Totals slightly distorted by expenditure on urban estate, i.e. Lytham & St. 
Annes though particularly prounounced for the years 1870 and 1871.
2) Additional sums spent on allowances to tenants
ments i.e. grass seeds and fertilizers, viz. £693 between 1863 and 1867.
3) Government loan 1847 - £10,000. Land improvement company loan l8|9 * ^ * ^ 6
4) These figures also exclude the costs of servicing the accumulating deficits
in the current account which in part resulted from continued expenditure on 
the Estate and which were later converted into mortgage debt.
APPENDIX III
THE CLIFTON ESTATE : AGRICULTURAL INVESTMENT AS A PERCENTAGE 
OF GROSS INCOME
GROSS INCOME PERCENTAGE GROSS INCOME PERCENTAGE
£ £
1863 29829 21.5 1874 3387 6 24.3
1864 30523 22.0 1875 34337 20.5
1865 30206 20.0 1876 35872 22.0
1866 32001 21.5 1877 36289 22.0
1867 31886 17.5 1878 37014 2 1 . 0
1868 32137 21.0 1879 36956 1 5.5
1869 32541 20.0 1880 37571 18.0
187 0 32262 33.5 1881 37583 1 9 .0
1871 32576 29.0 1882 38552 25.0
1872 34347 20.0 1883 36931 24.5










Lytham Farms 3448 5700 - 7100
Layton Hall Farms 314 614 66 0 663
Little Marton Farms 2563 3972 4460 4846
Great Marton Farms 296 600 950 975
Westby-W-Plumpton Farms 3340 6069 6307 6426
Clifton-W-Salwick Farms 3059 5618 5875 5947
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(Deposited with the Lancashire Records Office unless 
otherwise stated.)
DDC1. The Clifton Estate. Deposited in four
accessions, 1942, 1954, 1957 and 1966.
The last deposit is by far the largest
and most valuable but is totally uncalendared.
DDLi. The Lilford Estate. Only roughly calendared.
HHDe. The Hesketh Estate. (Rufford Hall)
The Hesketh Estate (North Meols). Meols Hall, 
Southport.
DDCa. The Cavendish (Devonshire) Estate.
DDK. The Derby Estate. Available up to the
early 1840s only.
DDEg. The Wilton (Egerton) Estate. Only roughly
calendared.
DDSc. The Scarisbrick Estate. A very large, recent
deposit. Wigan Records Office also holds 
papers relating to the Scarisbrick Estate.
DDm. The Sefton (Molyneux) Estate.
DDB1. and DDLn. The Blundell Estate.
DDFa. The Ffarington Estate.
DDQ. The Garnett Estate. Roughly calendared.
Other estate papers in the private possession 
of Major W. Garnett, Quernmore Park, Lancaster.
DDTr. The Trappes-Lomax Estate.
DDGr. The Dawson-Green Estate.
DDTy. The Townley Estate.
DDCo. The Cotham Estate.
DDCm. The Miller Estate.
DDRf. The Myerscough Hall Estate.
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DDx. A large and valuable collection of
uncalandered papers and accounts relating 
to estates at Samlesbury, Catterall, 
Winmarleigh and Stalmine. Also assorted 
correspondence, farmers1 accounts and 
memoranda.
Legal Papers
DDP1. Plant, Abbott and Plant, Property Deeds.
DDx, Wilson, Wright and Ashcroft. Deeds, Accounts
and correspondence.
Parish Records
PR. 2831 and 2926. Marton, Lund, Clifton and Warton
Vestry Minutes, Overseers Accounts and School 
Records.
RC.Ly. St. Peter*s Lytham. Sick Club Minutes and
Accounts. Lytham Charities Correspondence.
Local Authorities
PUP. Fylde Poor Law Union. Minutes of the Board
of Guardians.
SAP. Fylde Rural Sanitary Authority Minutes.
MBLS. Lytham Improvement Commissioners, Local
Board and Urban District Council; St. Anne*s 
Local Board and Urban District Council. 
Committee Minutes.
DDx 103 Lytham Charities Records.
DRB. Tithe Mans and Schedules; Lytham, Marton,
Westby-with-Plumpton, Clifton-with-Salwick, 
Kirkham.
Q.DLo Land Tax Assessments. 1781-1831*
Census Enumerators Schedules, 1851-71*








Kirkham and Lytham Times. 
Lytham Standard.
Parliamentary Papers
1833, v, Report of the Select Committee on the
State of Agriculture.
1836, viii, Report of the Select Committee on the 
State of Agriculture.
1843, XII, Report of the Special Assistant Poor
Law Commissions on the Employment of 
Women, and Children in Agriculture.
1845, XII Report of the Select Committee(House
of Lords) to enable possessors of entailed 
estates to charge for the purpose of 
draining.
1847-8,Vii, Report of the Select Committee on 
Agricultural Customs.
1865, XXVi, Seventh Report of the Medical Officer
of the Privy Council. Appendix Six on 
Agricultural Dwellings.
1867-8, Xiii, Report of the Select Committee on
Agricultural Employment.
1868-9, Xiii, Second Report of the Poor Law Commiss­
ioners on the Employment of Children,
Young Persons and Women in Agriculture.
1870, Xiii, Third and Fourth Reports of the Poor 
Law Commissioners on the Employment of 
Children, Young Persons and Women in 
Agriculture.
1873, XVi, Report of the Select Committee (House 
of Lords) on the Improvement of Land.
1881-2, XV, XiV, XVii, Report of the Royal Commission 
on the Depressed Condition of the 
Agricultural Interests.
1893-4, XXXV, XXXVii, Royal Commission on Labour.
1894-6, Xvi, XVii, First and Second Reports of the
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